264. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- The President
- Brigadier General Alexander M. Haig, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- A. Toumayan, Interpreter/Notetaker
- Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos
- Ambassador of Laos
After an exchange of greetings, the President expressed his satisfaction at how well things had gone during the last dry season and also commented on the fact that the enemy had been contained.
The Prime Minister responded that his forces contain the enemy and have retaken some of the lost ground but they expect an early return of NVA forces who will certainly open a new offensive. Hanoi has suffered much from the floods but as soon as this is over, next month in fact, new troops are expected to come into the Plain of Jars. For some reason Hanoi has the idea that the Plain of Jars can be used as a starting point for aggression against North Vietnam.
The Prime Minister said that in April 1964 he had a long conversation with DRV Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap who had told him that North Vietnam would never tolerate the presence of troops other than Pathet Lao in the Plain of Jars. The Prime Minister affirmed that we must speed up the training of the irregulars, particularly the Thai, so that we have a strong body of forces to use against the enemy push which is certain to come during the next dry season.
The President inquired about the morale of Lao troops who have been in battle for so long. Are they discouraged or are they hopeful? The Prime Minister responded that they have their highs and their lows and that some officers are easily discouraged.
[Page 958]The Prime Minister remarked that he has just relieved the commander of MR IV and reassigned him to the general staff in Vientiane. He said that Vang Pao, the Meo leader, also tends to become easily discouraged. Over all, however, morale is good considering that Lao forces have been fighting since 1949 without leave, and under conditions of poor equipment and poor pay. He remarked that, with its population of 3 million, Laos has 100,000 men under arms. The Prime Minister expressed his particular gratitude for U.S. support of Thai forces which are fighting in Laos.
The President inquired about the present status of the Pathet Lao and its morale.
The Prime Minister replied that there are two currents within the Pathet Lao, one deeply committed to Hanoi and bound to it, the other, lower ranks, now understood that they were doing Hanoi’s work for them. In recent months 1,000 Pathet Lao soldiers had defected and as Hanoi becomes more arrogant toward Laos there would be increasing desertions.
The President asked if the Prime Minister believed there were any U.S. prisoners of war in Laos. The Prime Minister stated that he believed there were some in Laos and that North Vietnam had probably brought some to Laos where there were more hiding places in the caves and the mountains and where the nature of the terrain made surveillance of the prisoners easier.
The President wondered how one could get intelligence on this and the Prime Minister agreed that it was very difficult to penetrate those areas. He had tried unsuccessfully in connection with requests from U.S. parents of prisoners of war for information.
Asked if North Vietnam was getting stronger or weaker, the Prime Minister answered that it is getting morally and physically weaker having lost during the Dien Bien Phu period those officers who were the pride and glory of their army. Whereas in 1962–63 government promises of rewards for capturing North Vietnamese soldiers were fruitless, since 1965 about 100 prisoners had been captured and an additional number had surrendered. The Prime Minister added that North Vietnam had suffered greatly from bombardments and had been devastated by the floods. There were reports of hundreds of thousands of casualties. He pointed out that the whole Red River Delta lies very low, is protected by the dikes and that the population there is very dense.
The President asked for the Prime Minister’s reaction and advice concerning his visit to Peking.
The Prime Minister said he would not presume to advise the President but was highly satisfied that the President had taken this initiative. Laos approves and applauds the President’s decision. If the President had some influence in Peking this might help bring peace back [Page 959] to Southeast Asia and Laos could resume its normal existence. Laos could then devote its resources to economic development and not to prosecution of the war which now takes up more than half the national budget. The Prime Minister said he felt that the President’s influence in Peking would be substantial. Perhaps the President could convince Peking that the United States has goodwill and that it is prepared to live in harmony with all nations rather than interested in dominating the world as the Communists now argue.
The President pointed out that it was more important that the Chinese convince us that they did not want to dominate the world. He was not going to Peking with naive expectations. There were differences between the two systems, and there would inevitably be areas of divergent interests. All the visit means is that we are beginning the long road of negotiation on differences. We would like to reach with the People’s Republic of China the position we now have with the Soviet Union. We have many differences with the Soviets on Berlin, strategic arms, and the Middle East. We are negotiating about them. We would like to reach the same stage with the People’s Republic of China.
The President asked what the Prime Minister believed to be Hanoi’s real reaction to the President’s planned trip to Peking.
The Prime Minister expressed the view that Hanoi fears a change in Peking’s attitude toward North Vietnam and that there would be pressure on Hanoi to moderate its ambitions. Ho Chi Minh had always felt he would replace the French in Indochina. That is why Hanoi had created and maintained the Pathet Lao to use it in Laos as an instrument to establish a communist regime under its control. This applied to Cambodia also. The Prime Minister had told the Secretary of State that, even if the war ended, Laos would still need help to survive because China and North Vietnam would continue to help the Pathet Lao in the political struggle.
The President emphasized we are aware that the end of the fighting does not mean the end of the war. He stated that his intentions were to obtain from Congress means to support our friends but we face growing difficulties. His philosophy was that we will continue to aid the countries along the rim of China which would be threatened by aggression. He renewed expressions of support and friendship for the Prime Minister.
In conclusion the Prime Minister asked the President to urge upon Peking and Moscow strict adherence to and compliance with the 1962 Geneva Accords on Laos.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 758, Presidential Correspondence, 1969–1974, Laos, Souvanna Phouma Correspondence. Secret. The meeting took place in the Oval Office and ran until 4:10 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) Holdridge forwarded the memorandum of conversation to Haig under an October 1 covering memorandum. Haig approved it and Holdridge’s recommendation that it be sent to the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA. Kissinger met with Souvanna on October 1. At one point, Kissinger stated that he considered the Soviet Union’s attitude toward Laos to be ambivalent: “it was not in the USSR’s interest to leave a vacuum in Southeast Asia that China could fill, so he thought the USSR would like to see independent countries in Laos and Cambodia.” (Ibid., Box 549, Country Files, Far East, Laos, 1 July–31 Dec 1971)↩