Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

256. Conversation Among President Nixon, his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and his Chief of Staff (Haldeman)¹

Washington, September 17, 1971.

Kissinger: We’re going to go on Monday,² Mr. President, with a—

Nixon: Good.

Kissinger: —maximum effort, everything that flies in a stretch of 20 miles north of the DMZ—

Nixon: Good. They’ve been asking for it.

Kissinger: And—

Nixon: Because they’re building up, and they’ve been violating the thing. Don’t you think it’s the right thing to do—?

Kissinger: Oh, yes. Oh, I—you know the domestic heat we’re going to take. But we’re—the way we’re going to do it, you know, you can judge it better than I can. I think the way we’re going to do it—see, if we hit Monday—what is Monday morning there, that’s Sunday night here—by the time it’s Monday morning here, we will already have announced that the raid is over, and there’ll be no other. We’ll just say, “This completes—this is protective action, and violation of the understandings. They’ve built a road across the DMZ; they’ve been shooting at our planes.”

Nixon: “And endangering—and endangering our forces as we withdraw.”

Kissinger: That’s right.

Nixon: I’d put that point in, rather than protective—“Endangering our forces as we were withdrawing.”

Kissinger: So, we’ll have a—

Nixon: I don’t think anybody’s going to complain about that.

Haldeman: They’re going to know you did. Really, they [unclear]—

Kissinger: Well, 400 airplanes [unclear]—

Haldeman: Okay, but they get confused, Henry. But—

Nixon: Yeah.

Haldeman: —the people—the paper—the press will know it, but when they write it, it still comes out as—they think we’re bombing all the time there, anyway.

Kissinger: So it’s—

Nixon: But you see, Henry, from the standpoint of our diplomatic move—

Kissinger: It’s essential.

Nixon: —it’s indispensable.

Kissinger: It is essential, because—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —it’s—in terms of what you said to the Romanian this morning,³ which I thought was superb, incidentally.

Nixon: Well, Henry—

Kissinger: Right?

Nixon: —did he get the message?

Kissinger: Well, if he—

Nixon: [unclear]—

Kissinger: —didn’t get the message he ought to be fired.

Nixon: Huh?

Kissinger: You said—and you said it in this nice, quiet way. You said, “I just want you to know my patience with these people is wearing thin.” And—that they—you—

Nixon: And I says, “I don’t want you to be surprised by anything that happens.” I said, “You—you know what I mean.” I mean, after all—I says, “I—”

Kissinger: Now, with this thing happening—

Nixon: [unclear] we did in Cambodia, and Laos, and China, and so forth. I said, “I—I’m just not gonna—I mean, they have—we’ve been forthcoming, and they haven’t.” And I said, “My patience is coming to end.” I said, “They just mustn’t press me too far.”

Kissinger: That’s right.

Haldeman: [laughs]

Nixon: [unclear]—

Kissinger: Well, they’ve played into our hands in one respect. Yesterday, Xuan Thuy tied the overthrow of Thieu again—⁴

Nixon: To POWs, even.

Kissinger: To POWs.

Nixon: That was good. That was good.

Kissinger: So, they’re going through a tough phase now, for a few weeks. So this—

Nixon: Well, I feel that—I kind of feel in a way, that with the vote on the draft today, which I just as—of course, I mean, we were all pleased with: 47 to 36.⁵

Kissinger: Yeah, but it was another example where everyone of—told you, or told me at least—I don’t know what they told you—

Nixon: Oh, we were behind seven votes.

Kissinger: —that it was lost. It was like the Mansfield thing, and when—

Nixon: That’s right.

Kissinger: —you stepped in there—

Haldeman: They didn’t tell us that; they told us it was 45 to 45.

Nixon: No. No. Seven votes behind, Bob, is one thing.

[Omitted here is a discussion of the vote on the military draft extension bill.]

Nixon: Incidentally, I hope that you got that, and I wanted to get Bunker’s assessment, now, on the situation. If he—

Kissinger: It’s due tomorrow.

Nixon: If he, certainly—

Kissinger: I’ve written—

Nixon: Also, Bunker—Bunker’s got—you and—or Haig, apparently, got that when you were out—

Kissinger: I got it out within a half an hour of—

Nixon: And you tell him: “This is it.” You—

Kissinger: Well, when we put it out—

Nixon: [unclear]

Kissinger: —we said, “This is—” Well, we said, “This is not simply for your information, as a press conference. This is now a directive. And all of you people are expected to follow this as a directive and not just as a general statement of Presidential concern.”

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Kissinger: And—

Nixon: Good.

Kissinger: Of course—

Nixon: Well, we got out some of the other things, too, in that thing—

Kissinger: Oh, yeah.

Nixon: —and that’s with just Vietnam. I think a lot of things that were said in Foreign Policy needed to be—

Kissinger: Actually, this AP–UP meeting this morning is very critical—

Nixon: Great. Good.

Kissinger: Bill Hearst, unfortunately, is coming out with an editorial on Sunday blasting Thieu. He talked to Ky’s man. Is it worth my while talking to him—?

Nixon: Yes.

Kissinger: —when I’m in—

Nixon: Yes.

Kissinger: —on the West Coast next week?

Nixon: Hearst—No, no. Not if it comes out first.

Haldeman: It’s too late.

Nixon: Call him now—

Kissinger: Well, it’s too late—well—

Nixon: Is his editorial already printed?

Kissinger: His editorial is printed, but I can keep him from following it up.

Nixon: Well, I didn’t know that the West Coast man will do any good, Henry.

Kissinger: Well, Bill Hearst, himself.

Nixon: Is he out there?

Kissinger: Somebody told me he was out there.

Nixon: [unclear] the summer.

Kissinger: Otherwise, I can see him in New York when I go up to meet with Howard Stein’s group.

Nixon: Goddammit, I’d call him on the phone.

Kissinger: I’ll call him.⁶

Nixon: I’d call him today and say that I want you to meet him, and that we understand his position on the whole thing. “But now look here, you’ve been our staunchest supporter, and will you withhold—will you please hear our case?”

Kissinger: You know, Jackson was stunned by what you said yesterday;⁷ he thought it was aimed at him.

Haldeman: It was.

Nixon: Jackson did?

Kissinger: Yeah, and he said that he’s releasing a letter—⁸

Nixon: [unclear]

Kissinger: —he’s releasing a letter he wrote to you, which is, in effect, saying the same thing.

Nixon: That it’s [unclear]? Well, what do you mean?

Kissinger: Well, he’s releasing a letter saying how you should fix the election: that get another—he said he would never have wanted to suggest overthrowing Thieu.

Nixon: He—oh, he denies that, huh?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Haldeman: Well, you didn’t aim that at him. But, you said that he said, specifically, you should withdraw—withhold foreign aid.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Haldeman: If they don’t—

Kissinger: Oh, yeah.

Haldeman: —hold free elections, and you said [unclear]—

Kissinger: Well, he didn’t quite say it. He said he wants to reserve it—

Nixon: Nevertheless, at least it got him to respond.

Kissinger: Oh, yeah.

Nixon: I think they’re all on a—

Kissinger: And that’s one of the great advantages—great advantages, Mr. President. If they are responding to you, that’s a hell of a lot better than if we are running around defending ourselves against their nitpicking.

Haldeman: That’s really kind of the difference we’re in now. We’re on the offensive, and they’re, they’re having to swing back, instead of the other way.

Kissinger: McGovern looks like a horse’s ass now.

Haldeman. Yes, he does.

Nixon: How?

Kissinger: Well, he says they’re softening their terms the same week that they’re hardening it. He says you can get—when I explained to these AP and UP guys this morning the—what, what they mean by a cease-fire when they offered it, they said, “Well, how can McGovern do this?” I said, “Well, I know him. He’s a very honest, very honorable man. He just didn’t study this thing. We live with it day after day. He doesn’t know the strict terminology they use.”

Nixon: Cease-fire, yeah.

[Omitted here is discussion of George McGovern, the media, and the Pentagon Papers.]

Nixon: But, getting back to Johnson, don’t you think he’s just terribly—must be terribly frustrated, the poor son-of-a-bitch? You know, you think of this miserable war—and, first of all, Henry, it isn’t a miserable war. The goddamn war was fought for a great cause and a good cause—

Haldeman: But it’s been made—

Nixon: —and we didn’t have to get into it, to begin with. We shouldn’t have started down the Diem trail. We shouldn’t have made the Laotian deal, in my opinion. All right, that’s all second-guessing. But once in it, this war could have been ended in a year or two years—

Kissinger: Mr. President—

Nixon: Using our air power we could have knocked those bastards right off the lot—

Kissinger: —if you, if you had been in office—if we had done Cambodia in ’66—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: If we had done Cambodia in ’66, and Laos in ’67, the war would be history.

Nixon: And with a victory.

Kissinger: And with a—they couldn’t have taken that, plus the bombing. Impossible.

Haldeman: We wouldn’t have had to do it if we had done the bombing right, early enough—

Kissinger: That’s right.

Nixon: And [unclear]

Kissinger: And we might not have had to do the bombing if you had done Cambodia and Laos. So—

Nixon: Now, Moorer—evidently, Laird is clued in on this thing, isn’t he?

Kissinger: On the—Monday? Yeah.

Nixon: Yeah. All right.

Kissinger: We did it through Laird.

Nixon: Fine. And he knows that, that there were a variety of reasons [unclear]. Good. Good. Okay. Do we—

Kissinger: Well, you—

Nixon: —tell Rogers, or not?

Kissinger: No.

Nixon: And he shouldn’t. Probably not.

Kissinger: He’s up in New York.

Nixon: Probably not, it’s just as well to just let it—

Kissinger: To let it—

Nixon: And when it comes, just say, “Well, it’s a routine matter.” I just—I wouldn’t play the whole thing.

Kissinger: Or, I could call him tomorrow and say that—

Nixon: I’d just say, “Look, you ought to know that we had this—

Kissinger: The President has author—

Nixon: “—we had this enormous buildup in the DMZ, and it threatened our forces, and because, and so forth. So, we thought—the President just authorized this one—”

Kissinger: One—

Nixon: “—two-hour strike to take out the stuff so that we aren’t going to have some casualties.” I’d put it on that deal.

Kissinger: Right. Right.

Nixon: Would you do that?

Kissinger: I’ll do it tomorrow—

Nixon: And then, we could—and we’re not going to comment. We’re going to throw all the comment over to Defense—

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: —and we’re not going to say anything. It’s just the one—the few hours.

Kissinger: I’ll do it.

Nixon: But I want him to know.

Kissinger: Right. I think it’s better.

Nixon: Yeah, then we—but, you see, Henry, in terms of your diplomatic game, coming back to [unclear]—

Kissinger: We must have it. If we’re going to—

Nixon: —I feel that, I feel that—now, the little Romanian gnome, he’ll wire that tonight, won’t he?

Kissinger: Oh, yeah. That’s back already.

Nixon: And then, what you told him—you left that hanging over the son-of-a-bitch, didn’t you? You had—

Kissinger: Oh, and I warned them. Our records show I warned them at every meeting, “Stop this build-up of—north of the DMZ.” They’ve been firing from north of the DMZ.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Kissinger: And we’re getting a poop sheet together in case if the public—

Nixon: That’s right.

Kissinger: —reaction gets bigger than we think it will.

Nixon: Good.

Kissinger: To get it around. And, uh—

Haldeman: Can you hang that on violation of the DMZ?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: Sure.

Kissinger: Oh, yeah.

Nixon: It’s a violation of the understanding, a clear violation of the understanding.⁹ But tomorrow’s thing, I—rather than a technical thing—I never get into that.

Haldeman: Yeah.

Nixon: I’d simply say, “They had a build-up in—”

Haldeman: [unclear]

Nixon: “—violation of the understanding, which endangered our American forces that are withdrawing. It would have increased our casualties, and we’ve taken it out.” Yeah, boy, and then let it fly—

Haldeman: And you’ve said all along if, you know, we’re—

Nixon: Sure.

Haldeman: —pulling out [unclear]

Kissinger: No, in terms of the diplomatic game that we are proposing it’s essential—

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Kissinger: It’s highly important because it enables the Russians to say things could get worse. Incidentally, I’m giving you two memos for this weekend: one a fairly lengthy one that lays out the whole scenario, all the choices—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —including unilateral—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —the prisoners for—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —and where I think we are. And then, a briefer one for the NSC.

Nixon: Good.

Kissinger: The basic—I think, actually, Mr. President—

Nixon: I think we’ve decided it, though, Henry.

Kissinger: The NSC meeting ought to be very brief.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: I think we—

Nixon: Should we tell them?

Kissinger: —just get a little briefing—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —from—

Haldeman: [unclear]

Kissinger: —from Helms.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Kissinger: Maybe get Moorer to do a little one on the military situation.

Nixon: That’s right.

Kissinger: And then, I think the less discussion—if you just could stress that we need to—whatever we do, Thieu has to be, now, preserved.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: And that the—that the speculation about withdrawal strategy must end.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

[Omitted here is discussion of preparing for the NSC meeting.]

Kissinger: But, for example, you know very well, Mr. President, if they could launch a big offensive, now—

Nixon: Yeah?

Kissinger: —they’d have us on the ropes. And the fact that they are not launching a big offensive shows that they just haven’t got it. Laos used up this year’s supplies, one way or the other, because they expended them or because they were destroyed. But, one way or the other, they couldn’t launch an attack even in I Corps. Every other year they’ve had an attack in the Highlands in the summer. This year we figured, with elections coming up, they’d certainly have an attack.

Nixon: And they didn’t.

Kissinger: And they haven’t had any significant—even—

Nixon: Well, now the argument that could be made that they didn’t do that is because they were having talks with you, you know.

Kissinger: But no one thinks they have the forces there.

Nixon: No, I’m just suggesting that.

Kissinger: Yeah. You could say that. That’s true, you could say that.

Nixon: That’s possible, because we have been restrained.

Kissinger: You could say that.

Nixon: I don’t agree. I—but you don’t think that’s the reason?

Kissinger: I don’t think so. Because—

Haldeman: Can they still attack now?

Kissinger: Because their usual tactic is—

Nixon: Sure.

Kissinger: But they—

Nixon: [unclear] but, so they don’t.

Kissinger: Well, but their usual tactic is not to do that. Their usual tactic is to hit you while they’re talking.

Nixon: That’s correct. And so is ours.

Kissinger: Although, I did warn them that if there were attacks—

Nixon: Well, all right. We’re going to do this for—incidentally, this has to be done anyway.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: Because, looking down the road, I think it is dangerous to have this buildup. Do you not agree?

Kissinger: Oh, yes. Well, Abrams urged it on me when I was there in June. He was pleading for it then.

Nixon: Well, here we’ve given it to him. And, incidentally, won’t there be a bigger target now?

Kissinger: Oh, they’ll—that—that’s a big one. Oh, yeah.

Nixon: There’s plenty of stuff in there to hit.

Kissinger: Oh, well, he wants to hit it for five days. But that we can’t. That—

Nixon: Is there enough to hit—?

Kissinger: Oh, there’s more than enough. I—there’s five days worth of attacks in there. He wanted 5 to 10 days, but that would create too much of a furor, don’t you think—?

Nixon: No, no, no. We’re just resuming the bombing in the North.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 575–7. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. The exchange is part of a larger conversation, 5:37–6:24 p.m.
2. September 20.
3. Nixon and Kissinger met with Ambassador Bogdan in the Oval Office that morning. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972, Document 207.
4. See “N. Vietnam Toughens Its Peace Terms,” The Washington Post, September 17, 1971, p. A1.
5. See “Draft Bill Survives In Senate: Nixon Wins 47–36 Victory; Filibuster Set,” The Washington Post, September 18, 1971, p. A1.
6. Kissinger spoke with William Randolph Hearst, Jr., Editor-in-Chief, Hearst Newspaper Chain, on the telephone at 6:40 p.m. and complained that “you of course heard only one side of the story.” Hearst replied, “I know that Ky(?) is a representative of [omission in the original] but then Ky and I are close personal friends.” Kissinger requested a meeting with Hearst, who replied, “Tell the President that if I have done him an injustice I will go.” Kissinger ended the conversation by saying, “We are so close—we know where your heart is and I will call you Monday.” No record of further discussion between the two men has been found. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 11, Chronological File)

7. At his September 16 press conference, Nixon said a propos of Senator Jackson’s recommendation that the United States consider withholding aid to South Vietnam if the upcoming Presidential election was not contested:

   “If what the Senator is suggesting is that the United States should use its leverage now to overthrow Thieu, I would remind all concerned that the way we got into Vietnam was through overthrowing Diem and the complicity in the murder of Diem; and the way to get out of Vietnam, in my opinion, is not to overthrow Thieu with the inevitable consequence or the greatly increased danger, in my opinion, of that being followed by coup after coup and the dreary road to a Communist takeover.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, p. 953) See also “Jackson Wars on Aid to Saigon: Senator Says He May Shift Stand Unless Nixon Gains a ‘Genuine’ Election,” The New York Times, September 11, 1971, p. 1.

8. Not found.
9. See footnote 3, Document 131.