Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

250. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, August 20, 1971, 0900Z.

13387. Subject: Meeting With President Thieu, August 19, 1971.

1. I was unable to reach Thieu until 1800 August 19² when I had long and explicit talk with him going over with him paragraph by paragraph text of my talking paper. Text in immediate following telegram.³

2. Thieu followed closely my presentation, taking notes as I proceeded. I pointed out to him:

a) That the United States Government’s case for supporting South Viet-Nam has been all along based on the fundamental premise that we wanted the people of South Viet-Nam to be able to determine their own future. If that premise disappears the fundamental basis for our support no longer exists.

b) That the exclusion of Vice President Ky⁴ is viewed as contrary to the spirit if not the letter of the law. Belief is widespread that this was planned by him long in advance and executed with deliberate intent.

c) Even more disturbing is the threat of General Minh to withdraw his candidacy and the distinct likelihood he will do so.

d) Documents had come into General Minh’s possession directing province chiefs to do whatever is necessary to defeat him and arrange the election in Thieu’s favor. We have confirmation of the fact that the document was delivered to province chiefs and are satisfied that it is authentic.

e) General Minh has evidence some voters are being given duplicate voting cards and claims that his own workers have been harassed, threatened and interfered with in many provinces.

3. I said that if General Minh withdrew, the election itself will become a futile exercise. The people are entitled to a choice as between candidates and issues. Unless they are given that choice, the election will be considered a mockery. In such circumstances, I could give Thieu no assurance that the American Congress will vote the funds which will enable President Nixon to continue his policy of support for the GVN.

4. I said that unless there is a real contest, Thieu’s own position will be seriously weakened within Viet-Nam. His moral and legal authority to govern will come into question. Divisiveness, not unity needed to face a determined enemy, will result.

5. I said that immediate and decisive action on his part is essential:

• —To get word to the Supreme Court that you will not object if they find reasonable grounds for validating those endorsements of Vice President Ky which have not yet been certified.
• —To take the initiative and have a talk with General Minh. Although I was going to try to persuade Minh to stay in the race, I did not think my efforts alone would be effective.
• —To issue a written and publicized order to appointed officials throughout the country that it is their duty to insure the fairness of the elections, that they must be impartial to all candidates, that government resources shall be made available on an equal and equitable basis to all candidates and that harassment and intimidation of candidates and their workers is strictly prohibited.
• —Offer to provide Minh with planes, helicopters and other necessary facilities at the provincial and district level to carry on his campaign.
• —To repudiate those who issued the orders to the province chiefs and the document itself.

6. I added that the concern which I had previously expressed to him had been confirmed and heightened by my consultations in Washington. Anything less than an honest election, freely and fairly contested, would completely undermine President Nixon’s policy of support to Viet-Nam. The consequences could be disastrous for Viet-Nam.

7. Thieu agreed to issue public statement I had suggested. He expressed unfamiliarity with the document containing instructions to the province chiefs and asked me to let him have a copy, which I agreed to do. He said he would investigate and take necessary action.

8. He said that Minh’s assertion of the issuance of duplicating voting cards could be correct. This had happened also in 1967 when soldiers away from home had been issued cards and their wives had been given cards for both husband and wife. The Ministry of the Interior has means to check on this and he would see that it did so. With regard to supplying facilities for General Minh, Thieu said the Electoral Council would establish procedures for candidates providing equality regarding number of press conferences, TV and radio time, and means to travel, etc., permitted each candidate. I pointed out to him that this did not cover the situation, since he had means now for travelling around the country whereas Minh did not. His travels, even though in the guise of government business, were in effect campaigning and giving him unfair advantages.

9. Regarding Minh’s complaints of unfair practices, Thieu said he should report these to him and he would take remedial action. He complained of the daily unsubstantiated charges by what he referred to as the “anti-fraud committee of the National Assembly” headed by Senator Vu Van Mau, which was making daily unproved accusations of fraud. The committee was not authorized either by law or Assembly action and he had written to the President of the Senate pointing this out. Thieu added that he had met this week with province chiefs of MR 2 and 3, instructing them to provide protection during the campaign and the voting for both the lower house and Presidential elections, that it was the government’s purpose to see that both elections were clean and fair despite any statements of calumnies the opposition might make.

10. Thieu said that it seemed clear to him that Minh’s leftist supporters were trying to push him to withdraw in order to create difficulties both for Thieu and for the GVN. If Minh loses the election, he will claim that it will be because the election was unfair.

11. I said that regardless of what Thieu might feel about Minh’s tactics, it was perfectly clear to me, and it had been for many months, that Thieu would easily win the election, but it was absolutely essential that there be a contest. An uncontested election would be a disaster. Time was running out and he must act immediately to avert it.

12. Since Minh has already made the decision to withdraw,⁵ there remains only the prospect of getting Ky’s candidacy validated by the Supreme Court. I will press this on Thieu strongly today.

Bunker

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 872, For the President’s Files, Winston Lord, China Trip, Vietnam, Vietnam Elections. Secret; Immediate; Eyes Only; Nodis; Cherokee.
2. See Document 249.
3. The text was sent in telegram 13388 from Saigon, August 20. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 872, For the President’s Files, Winston Lord, China Trip, Vietnam, Vietnam Elections)
4. On August 5, the South Vietnamese Supreme Court rejected Ky’s application for candidacy because a number of the certificates from provincial councilmen he needed to qualify were already signed for Thieu. Ky indicated that he would appeal the decision because some of the councilmen had been tricked into signing for Thieu. (The New York Times, August 6, 1971, pp. 1, 4)
5. See footnote 2, Document 248.