199. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1
SUBJECT
- The Post-Lam Son Mood in Hanoi
The Canadian ICC Commissioner’s report of an early April surface mood in Hanoi of confidence, heightened morale, and conviction in ultimate victory is consistent with other information we have on the mood which was generated in Hanoi after Lam Son 719.
At the end of the Laos operation, Hanoi launched a massive propaganda campaign depicting this battle as a great Communist victory. This campaign has no doubt had some success with the North Vietnamese population. The Hanoi leaders too probably regarded the ARVN’s withdrawal as a victory, at least initially, despite the high costs.
It is interesting to note, however, that Soviet Bloc military attachés in Hanoi reportedly were willing to accept the view that Lam Son 719 was as much an ARVN victory as a Communist one. The extent to which this more sophisticated assessment is shared by the Hanoi leadership is not known.
There is, however, some sign that heavy Communist losses in Laos and a subsequent lack of progress on the battlefield have produced some sobering afterthoughts. A recently broadcast article by COSVN’s chief political officer painted an unusually grim picture of the present “extremely difficult” Communist battlefield situation and candidly admitted widespread morale and logistic problems.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 154, Vietnam Country Files, Viet 1 May–31 May 71. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads, “The President has seen.” Holdridge forwarded it to Kissinger under a May 7 covering memorandum in which he noted that it was a response to Nixon’s query about reports on the DRV’s mood. Haig signed for Kissinger.↩