Office of the Historian

193. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, April 28, 1971.

SUBJECT

  • High-Profile Move on POWs at April 29 Paris Talks

You have directed that high-profile move be undertaken by our Delegation to the Paris talks at the April 29 session.2 At Tab A is a memorandum to you from Acting Secretary Irwin describing what will be done in Paris as a result of your directive.3 This will consist of:

  • —Providing quantification by our Delegation of the numbers of sick, wounded, and long-held prisoners of war which our side is willing to repatriate directly or intern in a mutually-agreed neutral third country.4 Initial GVN figures, which we hope can be increased, are 570 sick and wounded and 1200 POWs held over four years. This is the first time that quantification will have been made. Our side will call on the Communists to agree to a safe means for repatriation for the sick and wounded and to designate a third country for neutral internment.
  • —Noting that there has been no authoritative inspection of the other side’s POW camps and that the Communists claim their men are maltreated in GVN camps, and following this up by proposing that both sides nominate impartial parties or governments to serve as protecting powers for the prisoners held by the two sides. This move will be the opening of an intensive campaign to gain access by organizations such as the ICRC and other appropriate groups or governments to prisoners held by the enemy in Southeast Asia. The fact that the ICRC has access to camps where North Vietnamese prisoners are held in South Vietnam, combined with the other side’s claim of maltreatment of its prisoners, gives us leverage to work on the North Vietnamese.

I believe that these two moves, which are fully concurred in by the GVN, will accomplish your purpose. You have already endorsed [Page 592] the direct repatriation or internment in a neutral country of sick and wounded and long-held POWs, and a follow-up is definitely in order. The quantification of numbers of prisoners in these categories held by us will provide further emphasis. Calling on Communists to join us in nominating protecting powers, while not being as attractive as repatriation or internment, should also generate considerable public attention and support. The ad hoc prisoner of war committee chaired by General Hughes should be able to assure that coordination can be effected in generating further publicity.

While Ambassador Bruce’s statement5 will gain attention, we think you may wish to underline it further by making a statement of your own and by being prepared to answer questions on it at your press conference.

With this in mind, we have prepared the following:

  • —A brief statement for you to make (Tab B).6
  • —Questions and Answers for your press conference (Tab C).7

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 121, Vietnam Subject Files, Viet (POW), Vol. II. Secret; Nodis; Paris Meetings. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads, “The President has seen.” Holdridge forwarded it to Kissinger under an April 28 covering memorandum, and Haig initialed it for Kissinger.↩
  2. The directive was sent in telegram 72095 to Saigon and the delegation in Paris, April 27. (Ibid., Box 190, Paris Talks/Meetings, Paris Talks, 7 Jan 71–1 Jul 71)↩
  3. Attached but not printed is Irwin’s memorandum, April 28.↩
  4. In circular telegram 79180, May 7, the Department requested the recipients to approach host governments to see if they would agree to accept internees. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–7 ASIA SE)↩
  5. Bruce made the proposal at the 111th plenary session at Paris. The text is in Department of State Bulletin, May 17, 1971, pp. 633–635. In telegram 84898 to Saigon, May 15, the Department indicated that it would accept Radio Hanoi’s announcement of allowing an unarmed vessel flying a Red Cross flag to repatriate the sick and wounded as North Vietnam’s official acceptance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–7 VIET) The GVN announced on June 2 that only 13 internees had consented to repatriation after extensive interviews by the International Committee of the Red Cross. On June 3, Radio Hanoi announced that the North Vietnamese would not accept them and called the original offer an “ugly, deceptive trick.” The prisoners were never released. (Davis, A Bitter Lesson, pp. 277–282)↩
  6. Tab B is attached but not printed. Nixon incorporated the details into his response to a question at an April 29 press conference but did not read the statement verbatim. The text is in Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 595–596.↩
  7. Tab C, undated, is attached but not printed.↩