Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

183. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, April 17, 1971.

SUBJECT

• Hanoi’s Reaction to the Ping Pong Visit

We have received several indications that Hanoi is unhappy about the Chinese invitation to a U.S. ping pong team.²

• —North Vietnamese diplomats boycotted the ping pong matches although they were invited to attend the matches along with other diplomats. They made it clear that their attendance was caused by displeasure at the event.
• —Soviet diplomats have told the British that the North Vietnamese were “extremely upset” and have told the Chinese this.
• —Hanoi media have not reported the ping pong visit.

There are probably two reasons for Hanoi’s displeasure.

• —First, Hanoi must be concerned about any relaxation of tensions between the U.S. and its Communist allies.
• —Second, and more fundamental, Hanoi may fear that this move could represent a shift in Chinese policy from confrontation to negotiation. Such a shift could bring the kind of pressures on Hanoi which led the North Vietnamese to agree to the unsatisfactory 1954 Geneva Accords and compelled them for several years to comply with at least some portions of those Accords.

The North Vietnamese must interpret the ping pong move as a sign that China is prepared to improve relations with the U.S. although no progress is evident in getting the U.S. disengaged from the “civil war” between Taipei and Peking, and although the U.S. is still protecting Taiwan. This interpretation must weigh heavily on Hanoi’s mind, since it may mean that the Chinese would suggest that North Vietnam follow an analogous policy. It could also mean that the Chinese may not be prepared to jeopardize their own interests in order to support Hanoi’s.

This has the following implications for our analysis of North Vietnam:

• —I do not think that the North Vietnamese are in a state of alarm, since their position now is stronger than it was in 1954. But they must still be quite concerned.
• —They may feel that their negotiating position is not quite as safe as before, and may want to adjust slightly. We have no indications that they are ready to give up fundamental demands, but they may be ready to be somewhat more forthcoming.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 154, Vietnam Country Files, Viet 9 Apr 71–30 Apr 71. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads, “The President has seen.” Smyser forwarded it to Kissinger under an April 16 covering memorandum, indicating that he had prepared it at Kissinger’s request.
2. On April 6, the People’s Republic of China made a surprise offer to the U.S. ping pong team, which was competing in Japan, to travel to China for a series of matches, launching what was later termed “ping-pong diplomacy.”