Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

177. Backchannel Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Bunker)¹

Washington, April 12, 1971, 1734Z.

WHS 1037. Subject: The U.S. Impact of the Upcoming Elections in South Vietnam.

1. It is becoming evident that the next great public battle for which we will have to gear up is the forthcoming presidential election in South Vietnam.

2. There are already a number of proposals in the Congress for “insuring” that that election is fairly held. These are accompanied by demands that South Vietnam permit a large group of Congressmen to travel around the countryside before and after the election, and that it permit another large group of staffers to be in South Vietnam for a period of several months before the elections.

3. One of the resolutions specifically states that all U.S. aid should be cut off if the elections are not “totally fair.”

4. Another proposal, started by Senator Stevenson, calls for Congressional observers to make certain that the U.S. does not support President Thieu in the election.²

5. It goes without saying that at least some of these Congressional groups will trumpet even the most minute suggestion of unfair play (such as the government having more loud-speakers than its opponents) and will try to claim that any support we give to any South Vietnamese program in the next six months is intended to help Thieu. Some will be fair, but others will not.

6. I hope you can discuss this with President Thieu and can suggest ways in which he can seize the initiative on these issues.

7. For example, he could announce that we would welcome international observers, and he might call for a delegation from the troop contributing countries, from the United Nations, or from the U.S. Congress. If his proposal is reasonable (suggesting, perhaps, that the delegation remain in Vietnam for a period of two weeks before and just after the election), we can probably get support for it here.

8. A good thought might be for the South Vietnamese Foreign Minister to issue the invitation to the TCC parliamentarians at the TCC meeting to be held in Washington later this month.

9. Another possibility would be for Thieu to announce in advance a cease-fire for a period of several days around the elections.

10. All this, of course, might have to be related to the new political initiative which we have discussed with President Thieu, but it need not wait until he has actually taken that initiative.

11. I would appreciate it if you could discuss this with President Thieu and let me know his thinking and yours.³

Warm regards.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 853, For the President’s Files, Lord, Vietnam Negotiations, Camp David, Vol. VII. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Smyser forwarded a draft of the message to Kissinger under an April 8 covering memorandum, recommending that he send it to Bunker. (Ibid., Box 153, Vietnam Country Files, Viet 11 Feb 71–28 Mar 71)
2. Senator Adlai Stevenson (D-IL) introduced a resolution on April 5 calling on Nixon to implement a policy of strict neutrality in the elections and create a commission of 10 U.S. Congressmen to oversee U.S. activities.
3. In backchannel message 229 from Saigon, Bunker told Kissinger that he expected even greater Congressional pressure for the October election than there had been for the 1967 election. He suggested that asking the GVN to hold a “‘totally fair’ election is asking something we have not achieved in the U.S. in two-hundred years,” but said that he would discuss the idea of inviting international observers with Thieu and believed that he would be amenable. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 853, For the President’s Files—Lord, Vietnam Negotiations, Camp David Vol. VII)