Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

171. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 29, 1971.

SUBJECT

• South Vietnamese Morale

Attached are three reports from Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams on the state of South Vietnamese morale following the operation in Laos. In commenting on the morale of military units (Tab A),² General Abrams states that:

• —The general performance of the individual soldiers and the majority of their units was very creditable.
• —Although casualties have reduced the strength and weakened the leadership structure at the lower levels in a few units, the morale of these units is expected to improve and eventually reach the high level enjoyed by other participants in the operation as replacements are made available and unit accomplishments become more widely known.
• —Morale suffered in certain ARVN combat units which were heavily engaged for extended periods of time, operated over difficult terrain, and experienced heavy casualties. However, even units with heavy casualties fought valiantly and inflicted many enemy losses. One battalion ended up with only 110 effectives but reportedly has maintained its esprit.³

In assessing public reaction and possible political consequences (Tab B),⁴ Ambassador Bunker observes that:

• —The Vietnamese public reaction went through three phases: an initial euphoria, followed by doubt in the latter part of February that the campaign was going according to plan, and finally a resurgence of confidence in the ARVN and pride in its accomplishments.
• —The resurgence of confidence, which began with the advance to Tchepone in early March and was stimulated by reports that the ARVN was acquitting itself well against a numerically superior enemy, has persisted.
• —During the past two weeks there have been widespread public manifestations of support. For example, demonstrations in support of the armed forces were planned in every Province for March 27. (President Thieu indicated that these were not government sponsored or managed.)
• —There is pride in ARVN ability to conduct two campaigns outside the borders of Vietnam simultaneously. The people were encouraged to see ARVN take the initiative and there was a feeling that this indicated a shift in the balance of power. The fact that the fighting may have forestalled North Vietnamese attacks in South Vietnam has been especially appreciated.
• —Although there has been very little public disapproval of the operation, the number of casualties suffered remains a sensitive issue. The major overt critic of the operation has been Vice President Ky.
• —There is considerable divergence between the Vietnamese interpretation of the results and the view presented in the foreign press. The view of the Vietnamese press, both pro-administration and oppositionist, is that the operation was a heavily fought engagement in which some things went wrong but that basic objectives were achieved and the ARVN fought admirably.
• —While it is too early to evaluate the political impact of the operation with assurance, it appears to have been a political plus because of the confidence and pride it has created in the ability and accomplishments of ARVN. There has been satisfaction that the fighting took place outside the borders of South Vietnam and that ARVN inflicted heavier casualties on the enemy.

In an earlier interim report (Tab C)⁵ following a meeting with President Thieu, Ambassador Bunker noted that:

• —President Thieu reflects the general mood throughout the country of pride in the ARVN’s accomplishment and confidence in its ability.
• —He is still determined to go ahead with several other raids in Laos.⁶

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 153, Vietnam Country Files, Viet 29 Mar 71–8 Apr 71. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads, “The President has seen.”
2. Attached but not printed at Tab A is a retyped copy of a cable from Abrams to McCain, March 23. The original was sent as message 230100Z Mar 71 from Abrams to Moorer and McCain. (Ibid., Box 85, Vietnam Subject Files, Special Operations File, 20 March 71)
3. Abrams also sent a report on the enemy’s intentions in a March 23 message, a typed copy of which Kissinger forwarded to Nixon under a March 29 covering memorandum. Abrams wrote that there were indications that Hanoi was planning additional tactical activity in the Khe Sanh area, but that because of its manpower and logistics losses in Laos and lack of reinforcements it would not be able to attack the city. Instead, Abrams expected the enemy to harass Khe Sanh and Route 9 with small probing attacks while it continued to restore and defend its logistical system. (Ibid.)
4. Attached but not printed at Tab B is backchannel message 787 from Bunker to Kissinger, March 25. See also footnote 3, Document 168.
5. Attached but not printed at Tab C is backchannel message 766 from Bunker to Kissinger, March 24.
6. In telegram 53867 to Saigon, April 1, the Department instructed Bunker to deliver a message to Thieu from Nixon acknowledging “the great respect and admiration he has for the valor of the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam in this historic effort,” noting that they faced a numerically superior force. The message also noted that because the enemy’s logistics were disrupted and so many of its first line troops were destroyed, GVN security had been significantly enhanced. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 153, Vietnam Country Files, Viet 29 Mar 71–8 Apr 71)