Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

169. Memorandum for the President’s File by the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Washington, March 26, 1971, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting with the President, Secretary of Defense Laird, Secretary of the Treasury Connally, Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Moorer, Henry A. Kissinger and Brigadier General Alexander M. Haig, Jr.²

The President opened the meeting by stating that the time had now arrived when it became imperative that we consider carefully what will happen to the South Vietnamese next May, June, and July when U.S. force levels will have been drastically reduced. The President stated that he wanted to be absolutely sure that the South Vietnamese armed forces have all they need in the way of helicopters, planes, artillery and supplies.

The second item that he wished to discuss was one which posed a budgetary problem—U.S. sortie rates in Southeast Asia. The President stated he wishes to be sure that we maintain a high level of air sorties at least through the U.S. elections. He added that at some point we might get a break on the negotiating front and if, for example, the other side agreed to a prisoner exchange and mutual withdrawal by July 1 of 1972, we would probably have to accept the proposal. If so, we would then wish to be sure that the South Vietnamese have enough military equipment to protect themselves. The President stated that he had spoken to the columnist Joe Alsop the other day and Alsop had expressed his concern about the South Vietnamese residual capability. He stated that Alsop has been a good friend and although he may be crazy on this particular issue, nevertheless he wished to be assured. He added that we have sacrificed 45,000 U.S. lives in this conflict and we must do all in our power to ensure that the South Vietnamese survive.

Dr. Kissinger confirmed that the White House had received Secretary Laird’s memorandum on South Vietnamese modernization³ but that he had not had an opportunity to analyze the paper in any detail. He added, however, that he shared the President’s concern that we provide adequate equipment levels for the South Vietnamese. They must be able to move their divisions from corps area to corps area and our sortie levels must remain high through 1972.

Secretary Laird stated that current plans provided for a high sortie level through 1973. He stated that he had just discussed the FY 1973 B–52 level with the JCS. He had planned a level of 700 sorties per month for that fiscal year, but the Chiefs had asked that it be held at 800. The Secretary stated that the principal constraint on the provision of helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft was pilot training and the training of technical personnel. Admiral Moorer stated that because of the training lead time we planned to keep U.S. helicopters and tactical air in Southeast Asia until the end of the Vietnamization program.

Secretary Laird stated that in order to keep our air levels up he had decided to withdraw some U.S. forces from Thailand but to replace them with Air Force personnel, thus not reducing our overall strength in Thailand. He added that we also have the ability to maintain our carrier capability. This was especially worthwhile, since these forces were not included in our in-country tabulations. Admiral Moorer added that these forces do not need U.S. security.

Secretary Connally asked Secretary Laird what level of spares would be left for major items of equipment such as helicopters. Secretary Laird stated that the regular allocation of spares would be left. Secretary Connally stated that once we withdraw from Vietnam it will be most difficult to get Congressional support for the provision of additional equipment for South Vietnam. Therefore, we should leave a good pool of spares as we depart. Secretary Laird stated that our ability to supply the South Vietnamese was contingent upon the Department of Defense’s continual responsibility for the Military Assistance Program. The President asked Dr. Kissinger whether or not he had approved the transfer of this responsibility to the Department of State. Dr. Kissinger stated that the paper he had approved provided for status quo, emphasizing that the Defense Department responsibility had not been altered.

Secretary Connally stated that he believed that if the South Vietnamese needed 500 helicopters then we should leave them a thousand. The President agreed, stating that once we depart it will be very difficult to get additional equipment.

Secretary Laird stated that there was some disagreement within the South Vietnamese military on the levels of helicopters and aircraft that were needed. Thieu would be satisfied with 625 and with 50 aircraft squadrons; he agreed, however, that he would put more in if the South Vietnamese will accept. The President stated that whatever we can leave should be left.

Secretary Laird stated that he also was concerned about Thieu’s desire to cut back on the size of his armed forces before his election in October. The President commented that it is a shame that the U.S. forced Thieu to have an election at a time when his country was at war. Secretary Connally stated that the U.S. had been doing this to its friends for many years.

Dr. Kissinger stated that he would work with Secretary Laird in analyzing the sortie levels and the equipment levels.

Secretary Connally stated that he noted that some of the Democrats are beginning to be concerned about our ability to terminate U.S. involvement. They are therefore talking about a terminal date of their own which would permit them to get the credit. He stated this movement was surfacing in the Democratic Caucus which would meet on March 31.

The President stated that he had met with Senators Albert and Boggs that morning⁴ and had spoken to them bluntly about Laos. He stated that he told them that he had absolutely no incentive to lie about the accomplishments achieved there and suggested that they judge the operation on our withdrawals. If they proceed, the operation should be considered successful. The President informed them that he had a plan to end our involvement at the earliest possible date and that the date he had selected was appropriate for all of the factors which had to be considered: negotiations, Vietnamization, etc.

The President stated that if the Congress selects its own date it would be giving the option to the enemy; there would be no need for them to negotiate. If the Congress wants to push on this issue and take over with an arbitrary date, the Executive will go along but the Congress will have to take the onus for a U.S. defeat and for the ultimate Communization of South Vietnam. The President stated that under his plan he has the responsibility, and if it should fail, then is the time for the Congress to call him to task. The President told them that this is the game that he would play were he on the Hill. But if the Congress wanted to go the other route he would hold them responsible before the American people. If the House and the Senate place a terminal date or limited Presidential funds, the chances are high that we will lose all the stakes.

Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard stated that our plan will work. Secretary Laird stated that we can keep our air sortie levels up even after we have drawn down to 50,000 Americans in-country. Deputy Secretary Packard stated that Defense was also sending more gunships next year.

The President told Secretary Laird to inform the Democratic Caucus that he is on his way out of Vietnam at the fastest rate possible and that this route involved risks. His way will save South Vietnam; a faster rate will lose it. Secretary Laird stated that Senator Teague⁵ was worried. The President told Mr. Laird to tell Teague to wait for his announcement in April since it will be a good one.

The President then asked Admiral Moorer to brief the group on the status of the operation. Admiral Moorer utilized a map which showed the deployments of U.S. and ARVN forces in South Vietnam in the Khe Sanh area. He stated that General Abrams had informed him that only 17 effective battalions remain of the enemy’s 33 original battalions. Of these, nine are deployed north of Route 9 and eight are deployed south of the highway. He stated that the South Vietnamese had moved the reserve regiment of their first division as a buffer between the border and U.S. forces. He made the following additional points:

• —The enemy had only 30 or 40 of its original 150 tanks.
• —We expected some harassment and attacks by fire in the Khe Sanh area.
• —The enemy had now diverted some troops to repair their line of communications.
• —There is no threatening activity within the DMZ.

The President asked if we were going to evacuate Khe Sanh and the Chairman replied that we were merely in the process of thinning out our forces there, adding that we would probably hold the base until May. The President asked about the reported movement of artillery into the DMZ. The Chairman stated there had been some heavy artillery in the central DMZ from the outset and that the enemy was moving some light artillery across the border from Laos into the western DMZ.

The President inquired about the effectiveness of the air strikes against the north and instructed Secretary Laird and the Chairman to have a plan ready for additional strikes. Admiral Moorer stated that the weather would improve with each day and that adequate plans were ready for execution within 48 hours. The President instructed the Chairman to keep the pass areas under surveillance and as soon as targets built up to inform him immediately.

The President then inquired about the reported high ARVN casualties caused by AP the day before. Secretary Laird stated that the report was erroneous and that it had been filed by Tammy Arbuckle. He said that after he had called the wire service they stopped running the report. The President commented that Arbuckle was the same reporter who had created such concerns about Cambodia. He added that as the people became more fed up with the war this kind of reporting became more popular. Nevertheless, we have to hit them each time.

The President asked Secretary Laird to work with the Congress and to meet with Democrats and Republicans during the coming week. Secretary Laird stated that he had done a thorough job this week but that no one would step out front. The President asked whether Secretary Rogers was going to do some work. Secretary Laird stated that he would probably have to retestify on the Middle East and that he thought this was more important. [Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 997, Haig Chronological Files, Haig Memcons, 12/70–12/71, 3 of 3. Top Secret; Nodis.
2. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. It ended at 4:25 p.m. according to the President’s Daily Diary. (Ibid., White House Central Files)
3. Kissinger forwarded Laird’s undated memorandum to Nixon under a March 26 covering memorandum. Laird noted that the RVNAF should be at full strength, 1.1 million troops, in FY 1973, and fully equipped, and that while the United States would reduce tactical sortie rates by more than half, the combined GVN and RLG rates would only be at 1971 levels. Kissinger voiced concern that air power, particularly in helicopter capability, would be lagging. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 153, Vietnam Country Files, Viet 11 Feb 71–28 Mar 71)
4. McGregor prepared a memorandum for the President’s file of the meeting, which was held from 8:30 to 9:45 a.m. According to this memorandum, Representatives Carl Albert (D–OK) and Hale Boggs (D–LA) informed the President that they were obliged to call a caucus to debate an “end of war” resolution because they had been petitioned by more than 50 colleagues. However, they assured Nixon that “they would each fight the inclusion of any date in the Democrats’ resolution. Each expressed the view to the President that they could not stop a resolution (like that passed by Senate Democrats) containing the words ‘withdrawal by a date certain,’ but they emphasized that they would fight the naming of any specific date.” (Ibid., White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 84, Memoranda for the President, Beginning March 21, 1971)
5. Representative Olin Teague (D–TX).