Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

162. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 22, 1971.

SUBJECT

• Implications of the Laos Operation for South and North Vietnam and for the U.S.

This memorandum estimates the implications of the Lam Son operation for South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the United States.

The following represents our current judgments, which are necessarily preliminary.

Implications for South Vietnam. The implications for South Vietnam will be mixed, with some potential military benefits and some potential political disturbances.

• —The amount of munitions destroyed and delayed in the operation will seriously crimp enemy plans this dry season and perhaps over the entire year. Hanoi’s capacity to interfere in the South Vietnamese elections, except through sporadic showpiece efforts, will be very sharply limited.
• —The effects of the operation on Hanoi’s military plans will be particularly severe because of the loss of other Communist sources of supply in the south and the loss of the Cambodian sanctuaries. Hanoi would have to send about one and a half times as many supplies through the pipeline this year than last just to keep even. As a result of this operation, it is now virtually certain that Hanoi cannot even match last year’s total. General Abrams reported this morning a 75 percent reduction in throughput of supplies to Cambodia and South Vietnam when compared to last year’s estimate.² We are already getting reports of severe Communist supply shortages in Military Regions 3 and 4 to the South.
• —We know that a number of enemy units have been very badly hurt, and have suffered heavy casualties. Those units would probably have been used against I Corps within the next few months, which cannot now be done. Thus, on balance, even though the ARVN has also suffered heavy casualties, our judgment is that the North Vietnamese cannot follow up in time to take advantage of it. It appears that the casualty figures against North Vietnamese forces may have in fact been greater than we have heard. We conducted over 500 B–52 raids; we attained damage assessments on only 10 percent of these. In virtually every case, the assessments showed the raids had been massively effective in destroying staging areas and achieving casualties. Thus North Vietnamese losses may range much higher above 10,000 than we now believe.
• —It is also clear that the North Vietnamese, like the South Vietnamese, were taking losses in their elite units rather than the lower rated units.
• —We cannot yet tell whether the pace of Vietnamization would have to be slowed, but right now I doubt it. In any case, we will want to review the ARVN performance carefully in order to see what changes, if any, we should make in our Vietnamization program.
• —Thieu may be hurt politically for having launched a venture which was not a full success. This could make him vulnerable in the upcoming election. Minh and (particularly) Ky appear to be maneuvering to profit from this.
• —Thieu may be less willing than before to proclaim a new political initiative, since he will not be leading from unquestionable strength.

North Vietnam. In Hanoi the reactions will probably also be mixed, with some relief that the operation ended as it did but some concern over what it demonstrates about South Vietnamese readiness to carry the battle into vital areas.

• —It is clear that Hanoi, from the moment that the battle began, was intensely alert to all its implications and treated it as an engagement of the utmost importance. In fact, the North Vietnamese concentrated more of their resources and showed a higher readiness to sacrifice lives and material than the South Vietnamese.
• —Given the Politburo’s predilection to continue on its chosen course, it is probable that Hanoi will now be reluctant to make any new negotiating proposals until the end of this year or at least until all the political results of the operation are in.
• —But Hanoi’s ultimate attitude must be tempered with concern about the number of men it has lost. Hanoi also knows the real cost of the operation to them and cannot key its future plans solely on U.S. press reporting.
• —Moreover, Hanoi’s capacity to inflict significant military damage in South Vietnam has been severely reduced. And Hanoi will probably have to be prepared for further South Vietnamese incursions. ARVN operations in Cambodia have shown that the South Vietnamese are prepared to come back into enemy supply and base areas again and again.
• —Hanoi may be forced to try to keep the supply trails open as long as possible and perhaps even during the rainy season, which would be a costly and not very remunerative operation.
• —It is also possible that Hanoi’s relations with China were strained as a consequence of this operation. Although the Chinese came in with a number of helpful words and gestures, there are indications that Peking’s performance fell short of Hanoi’s fondest hopes for binding Peking commitments.
• —Something we should bear in mind, although it does not relate directly to the consequences of the operation, is the reluctance the North Vietnamese have shown about crossing the DMZ in force, even though they may have been tempted at times. This probably reflects Hanoi’s fears that we are just looking for an excuse to resume bombing. It may also reflect its concern that the ARVN, and perhaps we, might have followed retreating NVA units right into North Vietnam.

The United States. Here, particularly because of the very one-sided press treatment of the operation, the consequences of the operation were probably most adverse. Laos has again brought the war to the front pages, in a way which shows that no early and easy end is in sight. Opponents of Vietnamization will probably be encouraged to push harder for a unilateral U.S. withdrawal. However, these problems may be overcome over time if it can be shown that, as a result of this operation, our casualties have declined even lower and that the rate of enemy attacks has been materially affected.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 549, Country Files, Far East, Laos, Vol. VII. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads, “The President has seen.”
2. See Document 161.