150. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1
Washington, March 15, 1971.
SUBJECT
- South Vietnamese Operations in Laos and Cambodia
Attached at Tab A2 is a report from General Abrams on the operations in Laos and Cambodia. The report discusses the impact on the enemy, current status, and his views concerning the conduct of the final phases of these operations.
LAOS
Impact on Enemy. The report makes the following points concerning the impact on the enemy of the Laotian operation:
- —Of the ten NVN regiments committed, six have suffered significant casualties. The enemy has lost an estimated one-third of the 30 battalions and one-quarter of the 12,000 rear-service personnel in the area.
- —These losses will have a major impact on the enemy strategic reserve and strategic plans.
- —Recent reports indicate that the enemy is experiencing morale problems as a result of severe losses.
- —The operation has caused substantial disruption of the overall enemy logistics efforts and major disruption in Base Area 604.
- —While the total effect of the operation on the enemy’s logistics efforts cannot be fully assessed, most of the truck movement in the northern area appears to be in direct support of the battle. Greater use of Route 23 for the first time is indicative of the criticality with which the enemy views his logistics situation in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.
- —The significant decrease in enemy activities and inability to mount a counterattack last week indicates that the enemy is attempting to resupply and reorganize units which were severely hurt during initial battles.
- —Although the enemy has lost well over one-half the tanks sent into the battle area, additional reinforcements are being sent to support infantry units.
- —By South Vietnamese standards, the move to Tchepone was a landmark and it was undoubtedly costly to the enemy.
Current Situation. In commenting on the current situation, General Abrams reports that:
- —The enemy now has five under-strength regiments north of Route 9 with an additional regiment probably on the way from North Vietnam. There are also five under-strength regiments south of Route 9, with another regiment moving from northern South Vietnam to the area. The southern enemy units are more dispersed and more difficult to support from North Vietnam.
- —Although helicopter losses were moderately heavy during the initial phases of the campaign they were not excessive considering the number of sorties flown. Present and projected aircraft levels are satisfactory to meet campaign requirements as well as continue Vietnamization transfers on schedule.
- —There appear to be no major logistical problems in the near future.
Future Plans. In assessing future plans for the operation, General Abrams notes that:
- —President Thieu sees the remaining goals as the Route 914–C complex, Muong Mong area, Base Area 611 and the Ashau area (See map at Tab B).3 Attacks into these areas, except Ashau, would be most effective from current South Vietnamese positions in Laos.
- —The withdrawal phase of the operation includes plans for the neutralizing of enemy forces and destruction of stockpiles and facilities in Base Area 611. Attacks into the area may be conducted both from the northwest and from the border (Ashau) area in South Vietnam. The month and a half remaining prior to the monsoon transitional period should permit this.
- —As the ARVN attacks south and east into Base Area 611 some enemy elements north of Route 9 will probably join those to the south to defend the area.
- —The extent of South Vietnam’s effort in Base Area 611 will depend on a sound rotational plan, enemy pressure, and weather. To continue to be effective, South Vietnamese units must be rotated, refitted and rested.
CAMBODIA
With respect to the Cambodian operation General Abrams states that:
- —The first phase has been completed. The reentry into the Chup Plantation and successful operations in the Dambe and Chhlong areas are noteworthy accomplishments (See map at Tab C).4
- —The enemy has changed tactics and has resisted the ARVN operations in this area. This is indicative of the seriousness with which the enemy views possible loss of control of this area, which is the southern terminus of the Mekong line of communication that provides a major portion of the logistics support to enemy forces in southern South Vietnam. When the enemy has attacked the ARVN in strength, the enemy has suffered heavy losses.
- —The operation has reduced the level of enemy threat to Cambodian areas west of the Mekong and reduced the level of enemy activity in southern South Vietnam.
- —The operation has not only disrupted the logistical system but may have interrupted the provision of replacements for enemy units.
- —The equivalent of one-third of the 24 enemy battalions committed to defense of the area have been lost.
- —The enemy will probably continue to oppose incursions into rear service facilities and will employ economy of forces tactics to conserve personnel and supplies.
CONCLUSIONS
In reflecting on the outlook for the two operations General Abrams advises that:
- —The remaining course of the campaign must be directed toward inflicting maximum damage to enemy installations and troop dispositions.
- —Weather is a key consideration and will require a flexible timetable during the latter stages of each operation.
- —Priority of allocation of resources remains with the Laotian operation.
- —Premature or hasty withdrawal would be a mistake.5 The one viable option available is to continue toward an orderly conclusion of both operations with an outcome which reflects hard fought but successful campaigns in Laos and Cambodia.
In endorsing General Abrams’ report Admiral McCain emphasizes several points (Tab D):6
- —Enemy losses of personnel and supplies has put him in a position where he can no longer take the initiative.
- —Enemy losses indicate that attainment of his objectives becomes increasingly remote as success of the South Vietnamese forces is assured.
- —Barring unforeseen events the South Vietnamese can and will retain the initiative. The favorable tactical situations which now prevail and continued U.S. support will insure an orderly successful conclusion.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 84, Vietnam Subject Files, Special Operations File, Vol. VI. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads, “The President has seen.”↩
- Attached but not printed is a retyped copy of COMUSMACV message 140425Z from Abrams to McCain, March 14. Moorer also forwarded excerpts to Rogers in memorandum CM–704–71, March 16, excluding the sections on Thieu’s plans for Lam Son 719. He noted only that the information was from a recent Abrams message, adding that they provided a good view of results to date and should be useful in Rogers’ congressional and press discussions. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 VIET S)↩
- Attached but not printed.↩
- Attached but not printed.↩
- In his message, Abrams wrote the following: “The remainder of the operation should not be tied to a date or tightly defined time frame. The field commanders must retain sufficient latitude within authorities to permit precise yet flexible orchestration of the campaign in a tempo responsive to the vagaries of enemy activity.” He ended this paragraph by noting, “Premature or hasty withdrawal contains significant military risk and courts certain North Vietnamese exaggerated claims of South Vietnamese defeat.”↩
- Attached but not printed is a retyped copy of a message from McCain to Moorer, March 14.↩