Office of the Historian

145. Summary of Conclusions of a Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group1

Washington, March 4, 1971, 3–3:47p.m.

SUBJECT

  • North Laos

PARTICIPATION

  • Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
  • State
    • Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
    • Ambassador William Sullivan
  • Defense
    • Mr. David Packard
    • Rear Adm. William R. Flanagan
  • CIA
    • Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman
    • Mr. William Nelson
  • JCS
    • Lt. Gen. Melvin Zais
    • Capt. Fred W. Terrell
  • NSC Staff
    • Col. Richard T. Kennedy
    • Mr. Herbert Levin
    • Lt. Col. Bernard Loeffke
    • Mr. D. Keith Guthrie

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1.
Extra Firepower for Thai SGUs. CIA and JCS will report within one week on steps that could be taken to provide additional firepower to the Thai SGUs employed in North Laos.
2.
Thai SGUs vs. Thai Regulars. The consensus of the WSAG was that, taking into account military effectiveness, legal restrictions, and administrative and command arrangements, it was preferable to employ Thai SGUs rather than Thai regular troops in North Laos.
3.

Tactical Options in North Laos. With regard to the four options submitted by the field, the WSAG agreed that Option 1 (an advance from Xieng Khouangville to Phou Teung) should not be undertaken. A choice among the remaining three options should be left to the field, although the field was to be informed that Option 4, calling for an attack northwest from Long Tieng, appeared preferable to the WSAG.

It was agreed to authorize Amb. Unger to provide a further briefing to the Thais on the situation in North Laos and to inform them that we did not consider Option 1 feasible.

4.
Air Support. The WSAG agreed that additional air support in North Laos should be provided through a combination of: [Page 448]
(a)
Six US Army helicopters to be brought from Korea and to be flown by pilots arranged for by CIA.
(b)
US Air Force A–1s based at Udorn.
5.
TACAN. JCS will report to the WSAG on the capability to provide alternative air navigational facilities in the event of loss of the TACAN station near Long Tieng.
6.
Refugees. State, Defense, and CIA representatives advised that existing plans for removing and supporting Meo refugees were adequate.

[Omitted here are the minutes of the meeting.]

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–115, WSAG Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1971. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House.↩