Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

137. Diary Entry by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer)¹

Washington, February 25, 1971.

1200

Met with Dr. Kissinger in his White House office in preparation for briefing of the President on the Lamson 719 operation.² I took this occasion to comment upon General Westmoreland’s reservations concerning the Lamson 719 operation. I pointed out to Henry the following:

a. General Westmoreland was briefed by the COMUSMACV briefers, along with the rest of the Chiefs, when this operation was being planned and he stated no objections at that time.

b. General Westmoreland was polled by SecDef prior to concurrence in the execution of the operation and agreed, at that time, to its being executed.

c. During the entire planning process for this operation, General Westmoreland said nothing about the weaknesses of the ARVN airborne troops, the weakness of their commander, or their propensity for “dying easily”.

Kissinger replied that I should not worry about this because he had not told the President about Westmoreland’s briefing.

I then explained to Kissinger that the message from Abrams that Kissinger described as “petulant” was merely Abrams’ faithfully describing Thieu’s conversation with him and that Abrams’ concurrence in Thieu’s plan was not implicit in the “petulant” message. I then showed him Abrams 251200Z in which Abrams described the results of his examination of Thieu’s scheme of maneuver and the modifications resulting from that examination.

Then proceeded to the President’s Executive Office Building office and briefed him on the Lamson 719 operation.³ The President was pleased and encouraged by the prospects of 6,000 additional RVNAF troops being committed to the operation and seemed pleased with the entire ARVN plan as described in Abrams 251200Z (copy attached).⁴

I informed the President of the situation at Fire Support Base 31, reported under tank/artillery attack. The President said that he had not heard of this and I went on to give him the detailed information derived from our telephone call to the COMUSMACV DDO.

I then briefed him on the recent truck activity along key infiltration routes and the sensor indications over the past several days. I briefed him on the enemy buildup in the Tchepone area and the North Vietnamese forces remaining in North Vietnam.

I then gave him a conceptual summary of ARVN plans for the next several weeks and made the point that this should be considered an area and that Tchepone as a point had really little, if any, significance.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 218, Records of the Chairman, Moorer Diary, July 1970–July 1974. Top Secret.
2. At 11 a.m., Moorer spoke on the telephone with Laird. According to Moorer’s diary entry, “Kissinger told him [Laird] that after the President had talked to Laird yesterday he had a little better conceptual understanding of what is gong on in Lamson 719 and Henry thought that if I could give the President a once a week conceptual briefing on the operations rather than on specifics such as the number of helicopter sorties and helicopter losses, etc., that the President would be more interested and follow the action better. I replied that I could arrange this.” (Ibid.)
3. A memorandum for the President’s file provides a record of the conversation among Nixon, Moorer, and Kissinger, which took place in the Oval Office from 12:05 to 1:09 p.m. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, Box 84, Memoranda for the President, Beginning February 21, 1971)
4. Not attached.