Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

131. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, February 18, 1971.

Kissinger: Because they couldn’t get a large number of troops that far south, they’re not—the North Vietnamese are not limited by troops, by manpower. They’re limited by the, by the difficulty of access.

Nixon: That’s right.

Kissinger: And—and they—that problem is solved by putting the Chinese in there. If we went north, if we landed in Haiphong, or if we landed in Vinh or some place like that, then it’s conceivable. But I don’t think under present circumstances—they cannot.

Nixon: But the battle is shaping up on [unclear]?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: Well, they’re moving their divisions?

Kissinger: Oh, yeah. But they are practically committing their entire strategic reserve force—

Nixon: What does the intelligence say? Are they still confused? Are they [unclear]?

Kissinger: Now, they’re pretty—

Nixon: What do the intercepts [unclear] when you were there?

Kissinger: No. Well, now, they’re pretty sure of what it is, and they’re moving in whenever they can.

Nixon: Our diversionary tactics aren’t fooling them much now—?

Kissinger: Well, they’re fool—still fooling them some. They’re holding some, but they’re not moving anyone from the coast. [unclear] But, again, they—

Nixon: The South Vietnamese tried this torpedo boat to attack ships?²

Kissinger: They tried one, and they’re trying another one tonight. They did one; they’re doing another one tonight.

Nixon: Right.

Kissinger: Now, some people scream that that’s a violation of the understanding.³

Nixon: By the South Vietnamese?

Kissinger: Yeah, because they are technically part of the—but, I think you should just state that he—they violated the understanding on it they had with us.

[pause]

Nixon: Oh, I see. The point being that they’re part of the understanding?

Kissinger: Yeah, but all attacks would stop on North Vietnam.

Nixon: What’ll they do when you [unclear]?

Kissinger: We think that this—

Nixon: Um-hmm?

Kissinger: —they’ve actually claimed they sank eight ships last time. I don’t know whether that’s true. Well, they’ve got one more scheduled. It’s probably already over today, and that’s all that’s authorized [unclear].

Nixon: Well, how do you feel your people will think? WSAG and the rest?⁴ Are they all reasonably staying [unclear]?

Kissinger: They’re feeling fine.

Nixon: They’re not—they’re not getting jumpy? Do you know if Laird is a bit?

Kissinger: Well, Laird is a little bit jumpy, but I had breakfast with him this morning.

Nixon: He told me he was going to see you.

Kissinger: Yeah, I had breakfast with him, and he’s all right.

Nixon: He’s calmed down a little?

Kissinger: Yes. Laird is a funny guy; he—he maneuvers like a maniac, but when the chips are really down, he’s amazing, and he’s also loyal to you—

Nixon: Depending on this.

Kissinger: So I—

Nixon: Well, he is. He’s a—

Kissinger: I rather like Mel.

Nixon: He’s a—he’s a rascal, but by golly, he’s our rascal—

Kissinger: That’s right.

Nixon: —and those kind of rascals [unclear]. I think, too, that on this thing, now, thank God, we’re not going to lose it. That’s all there is to it.

Kissinger: In Laos—

Nixon: We can’t. We can’t lose.

Kissinger: No, Mr. President—

Nixon: We—but, I can’t. I am thinking more in terms of Vietnam. For us, the objective of all these things is to get out of there and [unclear] it’s not going to be done. We can’t lose. We can lose an election, but we’re not going to lose this war, Henry. That’s my view. Do you agree with it?

Kissinger: I agree, Mr. President—

Nixon: I have a feeling about Laos as well.

Kissinger: That’s right.

Nixon: It isn’t a question of losing it, but we might. I mean, that’s it. This can make a hell of a difference. We—You say that the air is really pounding them pretty good?

Kissinger: I thought the weather has been off and on, but for the next three days, it’s expected to be perfect. It’s perfect now, and they’re pounding them. They’re putting every B–52 they’ve got in there. They’re putting [unclear]. They are pounding them around the clock.

Nixon: As far as on the ground, is there any way we can determine?

Kissinger: They’ve—they’ve set up special radars on the ground, things they can bomb within, I think, 150 yards of these—of the frontline troops. And—

Nixon: [unclear]—

Kissinger: —[unclear] the South Vietnamese.

Nixon: ‘Cause they’re lining up these B–52s?

Kissinger: Then, it’s going to be awfully tough for them to take this pounding. They—they took a direct pounding in Khe Sanh three years ago.

Nixon: Did they? And that turned out all right for us.

Kissinger: That worked out all right. We chewed up a lot of their troops. I’ve got a feeling, if things build up, I don’t doubt that the press is going to try to, to cut us up. Now, the major work should be over. And they should stay out if they keep the roads cut. They already determined the Chup operation⁵ is going extremely well.

Nixon: It seems to me, everybody’s agreed. That’s what I understand.

Kissinger: Well, and Laos—we expected Laos to be much tougher. If they would roll over and play dead ten miles from their border, then they’d be completely through. On the other hand, all of the of the units they’re going to lose up there [unclear] will not be ready for an offensive next year, or later this year.

Nixon: The main thing I’m interested in is just to be sure the South Vietnamese fight well—

Kissinger: That’s right.

Nixon: —because they’re going to be battling in there for years to come. I guess if they fight well, North Vietnam can never beat South Vietnam. Never. And it’s because our South Vietnam has more people, and more—

Kissinger: And more equipment.

Nixon: What happens?

Kissinger: North Vietnam will be at the end of their supply lines. The geography will work against it. And in the meantime, in Cambodia, for example, what they have done in the Chup plantation area is to introduce Cambodian troops behind the Vietnamese troops, so that they’re beginning to take over some of the territory. And—

Nixon: The Cambodians are not becoming hysterical over Lon Nol?

Kissinger: No, no. No. That’s gone very smoothly. And also, it’s interesting—of course, now, they don’t report it any more—there haven’t been any road cuts—roads cut since the Chup Plantation operation started.

Nixon: Did we draw them off?

Kissinger: Oh, yeah. We are occupying them all. They can’t move around the country now.

Nixon: Did they fight in there? 300,000 that are in reserve, though, that’s—Abrams believes is an adequate reserve for whatever North Vietnam—

Kissinger: Yeah. I understand there’s another division he’s got in reserve, too. We’ve just got to stay cool now and, and shove in whatever reserves are needed. It’s going to be tough, and we’ll need strong will the next few weeks; there’ll be panicky moments. But I think, having made strides, we ought to stay in there now through the rainy season—until the rainy season starts, and just chew them up.

Nixon: We’ve got to develop a position in terms of being able to stay as long as we’re needed there.

Kissinger: And Moorer gave me some statistics today on helicopter losses, that, actually, they, they lost only six more helicopters last week than in a normal operating week for all of Southeast Asia, and less than they did in a comparable week last year. That, even with the Laos operation, and even with all these horror stories, they lost fewer helicopters last week than they did in the comparable period—

Nixon: I wonder if the—That’s good. I wonder what the situation is with regard to fellows like goddamn [John W.] Gardner⁶ and [Edward M.] Kennedy⁷ going. Kennedy started—you know, they started to press buttons, and the—the Libs kind of all get together and go. But, this time, they aren’t all going together [unclear].

Kissinger: What I’m beginning to think—

Nixon: [unclear]

Kissinger: —is that those who are, who are subject to Communist influence are all going nuts.

Nixon: Exactly.

Kissinger: And—

Nixon: I think Gardner is subject to Communist influence—

Kissinger: Yeah, I’m afraid so. And he’s got this bastard, [Morton] Halperin,⁸ who used to be on my staff for three months. He was—He’s become—

Nixon: He’s got Halperin now?

Kissinger: Yeah, who’s his chief aide, apparently—

Nixon: Gardner’s?

Kissinger: Yes. But, at some moment, I’m going to surface some memos that Halperin wrote for me when he was trying to butter me up.

Nixon: Jesus! We still have Halperin. [unclear] Son-of-a-bitch. What’s happened to him?

Kissinger: Well, I fired Halperin in July of ’69—

Nixon: Muskie is the man with [Anthony] Lake?⁹

Kissinger: He’s—

Nixon: I noticed Muskie is reorganizing his staff, because Lake is still [unclear].

Kissinger: I haven’t seen him. Well, he’s certainly not as sharp with policy research, which is what he said—he thought he was going to be. And, I don’t think Lake is—

Nixon: He’s not that gifted.

Kissinger: a) He isn’t that heavy; b) His knowledge is out—very out of date. Halperin doesn’t have any insight on this, anyway, because he was across the street writing think papers for me; he didn’t even see any documents. In fact, as I said, I got rid of him in July ’69. And—But, Halperin is probably very much on the list in influence.

Nixon: Yeah, I know. I—I heard that he is.

Kissinger: And, I think those are the guys—

Nixon: [unclear] over-conceited. [unclear]

Kissinger: And those are the guys that are going now.

Nixon: Like Gardner is? Who’d want that fool anyway?

Kissinger: Well, it’s a tragedy. At one stage, I thought Gardner had pot—potential Presidential caliber.

Nixon: You ever hear Johnson’s strategy? Gardner came in—I guess Johnson called him and Gardner came in—he said he just couldn’t go with the emotional energy, you know, with Vietnam, and Johnson says, “Well, that’s just fine. You can resign.” He kicked him out. Just think. He shouldn’t have done it. I mean, these guys [unclear]. If not, you kick ‘em out. We can’t just do it. One of these guys—

Kissinger: Yeah. But, you know, to say your policy is a policy that leads to more war—what is their alternative? If they had the guts to say, “Just get out,” but that they don’t have the guts to say. I may have to ask John Dutton for lunch some time because he’s an old—he used to be an old friend—and just ask him, as a friend, “Now, what the hell would you do if you’d been in this whole thing?” It’s a pity to see a man of his caliber go to hell.

Nixon: Henry [unclear] no hard feelings. You’ve got to see who finances [unclear]. It may be that. I—I’ve noticed that that’s the fellow from Dreyfus, [Howard] Stein is financing it. Stein is way left, you know.

Kissinger: Yeah. Howard Stein—

Nixon: I think maybe he’s just a pacifist. He’s not to the left of these other financiers, who may be left, too.

Kissinger: Yes—

Nixon: Well, Stein is. Isn’t it amazing? Here is Stein, one of the richest men in the country, and he is so goddamn liberal.

Kissinger: Well, but what you should see—Mr. President, you’ve changed the political landscape. I’m—

Nixon: I’m convinced of that.

Kissinger: I am absolutely convinced that you [unclear] Vietnam, as you are now 80 percent of the way to doing, no matter what happens—

Nixon: [unclear] if we get knocked out of Laos, they’ll succeed on that—

Kissinger: Yeah, but we won’t get knocked out of Laos. [unclear]—

Nixon: [unclear] The South Vietnamese are going to fight. They’re going to stand and fight. Aren’t they?

Kissinger: Oh, yeah. So far, they have. They are, right now, moving cautiously to reconnect, so that they can cover each other with artillery. That’s fine. We don’t care, as long as they’ve got the roads cut. And, the—But I think we can win in ’72. These guys won’t be able to stand 4 years in the wilderness. More, you can fight them off cheap.

Nixon: [unclear]

Kissinger: I know, but I—

Nixon: I’ll get a new establishment.

Kissinger: You can create your new establishment.

[Omitted here is discussion of Italian Premier Emilio Colombo and the President’s schedule.]

Kissinger: Agnew would like to go to Asia again to visit some of our friends.

Nixon: Yeah. This is a question of honor, isn’t it?

Kissinger: I think it’s not. I think we don’t need any additional covenants on paper, now.

Nixon: I don’t think it’s the time. I think we should do it if we get anything in Laos.

Kissinger: That’s what I think. It would just—

Nixon: [unclear]

Kissinger: Well, I just wanted to—

Nixon: We have been a little tentative, Henry, considering [unclear]—

Kissinger: [unclear]

Nixon: You know what that is—you know what I mean? That’s—That’s—

Kissinger: Well, it’s partly human. He likes to be in places where he gets a nice human reception.

Nixon: Yes, of course, Henry. He’s [unclear] very sensitive [unclear] he gets hell of a good reception. But, I must say, you know, after seeing Hubert [Humphrey] today with all his good qualities, can you really imagine Hubert—

Kissinger: No way—

Nixon: —being, being here?

Kissinger: Mr. President, I, I told [John] Chancellor this. I said, “I love Hubert.” And, I said, “But, can you really feel that if there was a Democrat here, this country wouldn’t be torn to pieces?” He asked me what your—I said, “The—the thing you never get credit for is you’ve kept the Right in this country related to this, to the government, where, in all normal situations, if anyone else had had to do this difficult thing, and—so, you’ll still turn out to be the best protection of the students who are rioting against you, even though they’ll never thank you for it, because the alternative to you in 1968 was not a liberal Democrat, but a [George C.] Wallace or a [Ronald] Reagan. And, I think that if this country is radicalized, it will not be from the Left. The Left will start it, but the Right will take it over.

Nixon: Yeah, maybe. But, right now, the important thing is to see this miserable thing through. They [unclear] the North Vietnamese [unclear] settle the thing. In fact, there it is. And, I suppose it’s a long shot, it may just be the Chinese Government saying it.

Kissinger: No, that’s against their national—

[unclear exchange]

Kissinger: I mean, Duc called them their “hereditary enemy.” What I think we can do, what I would recommend, Mr. President, in our game plan is if we get through this [unclear] bomb September, close to the election, I ask for a meeting with Le Duc Tho. Then have it October 15th, and tell him, “Look, we’re willing to give you a fixed deadline of total withdrawal next year for the release of all prisoners and a ceasefire.” What we can then tell the South Vietnamese, “You’ve had a year without war to build up.” And, I think, then, we can settle. We may have a fifty-fifty chance to get it.

Nixon: We should be able to get it. What the hell is their choice? [unclear]

Kissinger: I think they may take it. But it’s too early, because it would panic the South Vietnamese. But, after Thieu’s election, I think we may able to do that.

Nixon: Okay.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 451–23. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. This exchange is part of a larger conversation, 6:16–6:37 p.m.
2. On the evening of February 17, two South Vietnamese torpedo boats out of Danang, on interdiction patrol in the South China Sea opposite Quang Binh Province in southern North Vietnam, engaged and destroyed a North Vietnamese gunboat and a tanker. Later the South Vietnamese boats attacked two North Vietnamese junks, their crews armed, as it turned out, with machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades, and recoilless rifles. The two sides exchanged fire for about an hour with inconclusive results and around midnight the South Vietnamese broke contact and returned to base. (Conboy and Andrade, Spies and Commandos, p. 248)
3. On October 29, 1968, President Johnson summarized the understanding:

   “—Hanoi has agreed in a secret minute, and in our discussions to begin serious talks toward peace in Vietnam—talks which would include representatives of the Government of South Vietnam.

   “—We have made it clear to them that a continuation of the bombing cessation was dependent, first, on respect for the DMZ, and second, upon there being no attacks on the [South Vietnamese] cities.” ( Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, volume VII, Vietnam, September 1968–January 1969, Document 140)

4. The WSAG met earlier that day from 3:05 to 4:22 p.m., and discussion essentially was a situation report on Operation Lam Son 719 and the military campaign in Laos. Minutes of the meeting are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–115, WSAG Meeting Minutes, 1971.
5. South Vietnamese operation to neutralize enemy headquarters and base area in the Chup Plantation in Cambodia running parallel to Operation Lam Son 719 in Laos.
6. Former Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Chairman of the public interest advocacy group Common Cause, and anti-war activist.
7. Democratic Senator from Massachusetts.
8. Halperin joined Common Cause in February 1971 to advise on the organization’s anti-war campaign; he was previously Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in Johnson administration and briefly a member of the National Security Council Staff in 1969.
9. Anthony Lake was a member of Kissinger’s staff until he resigned on April 29, 1970, partly because he differed with the administration over the decision to mount a cross-border operation into Cambodia. In 1971 he was a foreign policy adviser to Senator Edmund Muskie’s Presidential campaign organization.