You may wish to re-read the five-page summary paper at Tab B before the
meeting.
Tab B
VIETNAM POLICY ALTERNATIVES
To choose among military and negotiating strategies for Vietnam, the U.S.
needs to determine what its objectives are. In turn, the choice of
objectives depends on an estimate of the costs and risks of alternative
military strategies and the probabilities of their success.
This memorandum first describes alternative outcomes that the U.S. might
seek, and then alternative military strategies. Third, combinations of
military and negotiating strategies in pursuit of various outcomes are
described and their implications evaluated.
I. Alternative Outcomes (Tab I)8
A. Assured GVN Control
of All of South Vietnam
U.S. would seek to bring all of SVN under
complete and assured GVN control. U.S.
forces would remain until either the NVA
had been withdrawn and the VC forces and
structure eliminated, or until Hanoi had negotiated a settlement for
such withdrawals including assured GVN
control and perhaps international supervision and guarantees.
B. Mutual Withdrawal Without Political
Accommodation
U.S. would seek the withdrawal of NVA
forces from South Vietnam and the end of infiltration. In return, U.S.
would phase out the withdrawal of its own forces with those of the
NVA, tacitly or by agreement, even
in the absence of political accommodation in SVN. (The U.S. will have to decide whether to insist upon a
withdrawal of NVA forces from the
Laotian panhandle and from Cambodia.) With U.S. military and economic
assistance, the GVN could confront the
indigenous
[Page 19]
communist forces; or
agreement could be reached between the GVN and the groups opposing it during the withdrawal
process on a political or territorial accommodation.
C. Political Accommodation (with Mutual Troop
Withdrawal)
The U.S. would seek a political accommodation which would end the
military conflict in South Vietnam in a manner acceptable to both sides.
The U.S. could seek to participate in the negotiation of this
accommodation or it could leave such negotiations to the South
Vietnamese. U.S. forces would be withdrawn from SVN only after an agreement acceptable to the GVN and the NLF had been negotiated. International forces might play a
role in the election arrangements or in support of a coalition
government.
D. Territorial Accommodation
The U.S. would accept or even encourage a division of South Vietnam into
several large Vietcong and GVN regions,
and seek to terminate the war through a ceasefire, explicit or tacit.
U.S. forces could be reduced or perhaps completely withdrawn as the
threat from the NVA could be handled by
RVNAF, or as the NVA withdrew.
II. Alternative Military Strategies (Tab II)
The two basic approaches in selecting a military strategy are:
- (1)
- to continue pressures on Hanoi through the current strategy,
threats of escalation, or actual escalation; or
- (2)
- to reduce the U.S. presence in South Vietnam which, by making
U.S. presence more sustainable, could be another form of
pressure.
A. Escalation
- (1)
- Expanded military operations, from resumption of bombing or ground
operations into Cambodia, to limited or full invasion of North
Vietnam and Laos.
- (2)
- Alternatively we could threaten such escalation.
B. Current Military Posture
Continue current force levels and current military operations, i.e.,
emphasis on defense of Saigon and other cities, wide-spread intensive
patrolling, sweeps, and operations into communist base areas. (A variant
would involve restructuring of U.S. ARVN into small units, deployed throughout populated
areas.)
C. Substantial Reduction in U.S. Presence with RVNAF Assuming Increasing
Responsibility
To reduce costs and fatalities and to increase credibility of the U.S.
remaining as long as necessary, a substantial number of U.S. forces
[Page 20]
would be withdrawn in the first
year and more in the second year, to reach a level that can be
sustained. U.S. would continue programs to modernize RVNAF and expect South Vietnamese to
carry an increasing share of the burden.
III. Negotiating and Military Strategies To Attain
Alternative Outcomes
A. Assured GVN Control
of All of South Vietnam
This objective could be obtained either through a “fade away” of all
North Vietnamese forces (hence requiring only a tacit agreement by Hanoi), or through a more formal agreement.
The latter might be harder to obtain since Hanoi would have to
acknowledge defeat, but it could include international guarantees
against renewed infiltration. (Yet, this has proven of little help in
the past.)
Advocates of the current military strategy argue
the NVA could be destroyed or driven out
and the VC defeated (sufficiently for
RVNAF to cope with them) within
1–2 years. Assuming this military outcome can be achieved, how can Hanoi
then be induced to give up? Is it possible that with the VC eliminated, NVA attacks could be handled by an improved RVNAF and U.S. forces small enough to
maintain indefinitely?
If not, or if the NVA cannot be driven
out, threats of escalation or actual escalation might be used. However, it is possible that
Hanoi might not give in because, (1) it withstood previous escalation
and might believe it can withstand more, and (2) it might expect to
receive aid from Russia and China which would at least offset the
effects of U.S. escalation.
Arguments against seeking this objective are: (1) that U.S. objectives in
South Vietnam could be achieved with other outcomes; and (2) that
because of VC/NVA strength and limitations in GVN/RVNAF improvements,
it would require prolonged fighting, unacceptable to U.S. public.
B. Mutual U.S.–NVA
Withdrawal Without Political Accommodation
The objective would be the withdrawing of NVA forces, at the price of U.S. withdrawal, giving the
GVN a fair chance of overcoming the
VC insurgency. Should the GVN nonetheless be defeated eventually by
the VC, it would be the result of a
primarily indigenous conflict. Such a withdrawal by outside forces might
lead quickly to agreement on political or territorial accommodation.
Withdrawal might result from formal agreement or it might be tacitly
coordinated. (The U.S. would continue economic and military aid to the
GVN.)
The reason for not seeking an overall political accommodation as part of
mutual withdrawal is that (1) the GVN
would oppose it, (2) it would probably require protracted negotiations,
and (3) might deeply involve the U.S. in a settlement that results in a
Communist takeover.
[Page 21]
The U.S. could seek to press Hanoi to agree to mutual withdrawal with the
current military strategy or even through threats of escalation or
actual escalation. By thus confronting Hanoi with a more complete defeat
(perhaps leading to assured GVN control
of all of the South), it might be easier to obtain a compromise
settlement and Hanoi would be prevented from dragging out
negotiations.
On the other hand, the U.S. could seek the mutual withdrawal outcome by
reducing its own forces, so as to (1) avoid the risk of having a new
military commitment fail, (2) make it less costly for the U.S. to engage
in prolonged bargaining and hence convince Hanoi of its staying power,
and (3) perhaps stimulate the GVN to
better performance. (Indeed, if the GVN
and RVNAF really improved, assured
GVN control of all of South Vietnam
might then still be possible.)
With mutual U.S.–NVA withdrawal, the
GVN could keep the VC from over-running population centers and
could probably extend its control in the countryside. (However, some
believe that, under VC pressure, RVNAF might be forced to consolidate its
strength and to abandon some districts to VC control.) If Hanoi refuses military withdrawal, the U.S.
could keep its forces in Vietnam, while building up RVNAF. If NVA forces were reintroduced later, the U.S. could
reintroduce troops or escalate in other ways.
C. Political Accommodation (and Mutual
Withdrawal)
The argument is made that there is sufficient common interest among South
Vietnamese to make possible an independent noncommunist state even if
the NLF participated in the political
process. Alternatively, this could lead to the Communists coming to
power by peaceful means, but the U.S. would still have fulfilled its
commitments. And given the enemy’s costs of continuing the war, he might
accept the uncertainty of a political contest. Some argue that the
NVA would withdraw only if there is
first a political settlement.
Should the U.S. participate in negotiating a political settlement? An
argument in favor is that it would lead to a more satisfactory and
perhaps speedier agreement. An argument against is that it would make
the U.S. more responsible for the outcome.
The pros and cons here of alternate military strategies are essentially
the same as those for the mutual withdrawal outcome discussed above.
D. Territorial Accommodation
While there are few if any direct advocates of partition, some degree of
territorial accommodation exists and any tacit de-escalation or
stand-down during negotiations might further solidify it. The VC and GVN,
in default of a political compromise, may evolve a greater acquiescence
in a territorial status quo.
[Page 22]
For this outcome to emerge by an evolutionary process, rather than by
negotiated agreement, there probably has to be a progressive lessening
of hostilities. A modified version of the present military posture is
probably compatible with territorial accommodation. Some reduction of
troops, a deliberate concentration of counter-insurgency in certain
areas, and a reduction of offensive sweeps (except against large-unit
enemy concentrations), would probably contribute to this outcome.
A substantial reduction of U.S. troops is compatible with such an
accommodation, and would probably contribute to it if the VC wished such an accommodation. But
substantial reduction undoubtedly would raise the VC temptation to enlarge its control and to demoralize the
GVN, i.e. to upset the status quo;
U.S. troop reduction probably increases GVN willingness to accept a territorial status quo.
