There seems to be a fairly broad consensus among the agencies participating
in the preparation of papers concerning diplomatic initiatives on Indochina.
That consensus has produced an agreement at the Under Secretary level that
we should propose initiatives based upon a package that involves (a) an
Indochina cease-fire, (b) an enlarged Indochina Conference, (c) an
acceptance of the principle of U.S. withdrawals, (d) an exchange of
prisoners of war, and (e) an international supervisory presence in the
Indochina states.
In order to provide a focus for further consideration of this package in the
NSC meeting of principals scheduled for
three o’clock tomorrow, July 21, I have asked for the development of a
scenario which would lay out the various actions the United States
Government should take to implement the sort of package being considered. I
do not wish to put this forward as a Department of State position, but
merely submit it as a paper which I believe will be of assistance to our
deliberations.
It is my recommendation that this paper be distributed on a tightly held
basis to the various participants in the NSC
meeting for their consideration prior to tomorrow afternoon’s session.
Attachment
INDOCHINA: SCENARIO FOR DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE
Introduction
It is assumed that the scenario for our diplomatic initiative on
Indochina will start from the concept of a package of proposals which
would concentrate primarily upon the military aspects of the problem
while leaving the political problems unresolved. For purposes of this
paper, the package will be considered to include:
- (a)
- a cease-fire throughout all Indochina,
- (b)
- an acceptance of the principle of U.S. withdrawals,
- (c)
- an exchange of POW’s,
- (d)
- an international supervisory presence,
- (e)
- a call for an enlarged negotiation on all Indochina to be
composed of “interested parties”.
While this package is accepted as the concept which will guide our
initiative, it is not necessary that we place all of it on the table at
one time. Furthermore, consideration must be given to the way in which
we will wish to present the various elements of it. The following
scenario projects a realistic time frame for the actions
contemplated.
| July 21 |
NSC decision on negotiating
package. Instructions given to Ambassadors Bunker, Bruce, and Habib. |
| July 22 |
Ambassadors Bunker and
Bruce to Saigon.
Ambassador Habib returns
to Paris. |
| July 24–25 |
Discussions in Saigon with President Thieu. These would be of a
preliminary nature and would give only a general outline of our
thinking. However, they would also touch upon the involvement of
Lon Nol in the
development of our position. It might be suggested that
Thieu invite
Lon Nol, Sirik Matak, and Koun Wich to
Saigon where they could consult with Thieu and Bunker in order to assure Cambodian acceptance
of our proposals. |
| July 27–August 2 |
Refinement and preparation of U.S. position in light of
preliminary consultations with President Thieu. |
| August 3 |
Ambassador Bruce
arrives in Paris. His statements to the press indicate that U.S.
and GVN will propose new
negotiating initiatives. However, he will refrain from giving
any details. |
| August 4–5 |
Ambassador Bruce makes
appropriate courtesy calls in Paris. During these calls, he
informs interlocutors
[Page 1127]
that we will shortly have some new proposals. He makes clear
that these will be serious moves designed to move toward serious
solutions and will not be mere propaganda moves. However, he
will again refrain from details. |
| August 6 |
Ambassador Bruce
attends his first negotiating session, regardless of rank of
those on the other side of the table. His remarks will be
general in nature, but will avoid harsh rhetoric. He will make
clear that he has come to open serious negotiations and that our
side will have some new proposals. When greeting DRV and PRG negotiators informally, he will assure them
that we wish serious negotiations. He will arrange to have
DRV informed that we wish to
renew private talks, with their representatives. |
| August 7–10 |
(a) Ambassador Bunker
consults with President Thieu on form and manner in which we propose to
make our initiative and obtains his concurrence. (b) Embassies
Vientiane and Phnom Penh consult with Souvanna and Lon Nol to obtain their
concurrence in general lines of our proposed initiative. They
are constrained to hold information most closely. |
| August 10 |
Australian, New Zealand, Thai and Korean key figures are
informed of general outlines which we intend to put forward.
They are asked to hold information most closely. |
| August 11 |
(a) Djakarta Three (Indonesia, Japan, and Malaysia) are
informed of general outlines of our proposal and asked to render
their support. They are advised that we and the Indochina states
will count on them for aid in observing and supervising the
cease-fire. |
|
(b) British and Soviet Co-Chairmen are given generalized
outline of our proposals and are assured of our desire to pursue
them seriously in negotiation. |
| August 12 H–8 hrs to H–2 hrs |
(a) U Thant, Pope
Paul, French, Indians, Canadians Poles, and
NATO allies are informed in
general terms of our proposed initiative and asked to give
public support. They are also informed that we intend to
negotiate seriously on these proposals. |
[Page 1128]
| H–2 hrs |
(b) Congressional leadership of both parties invited to White
House and given advance briefing of proposed initiative. They
are then kept as “captive audience” to listen to President’s TV
presentation of initiative. |
| H hour |
(c) President Nixon
goes on nationwide TV (with overseas satellite broadcast) to put
forward our proposals. |
In his speech, the President emphasizes four features of the proposals:
- (a)
- Indochina cease-fire,
- (b)
- acceptance of withdrawal principle,
- (c)
- call for an Indochina negotiation among “interested
parties”,
- (d)
- mutual release of POW’s.
He will deliberately leave the nature of a cease-fire vague, but will
stress the need for its application in Laos and Cambodia, as well as
Viet-Nam. He will also emphasize the requirement for international
supervision and will leave the impression that we consider the ICC alone to be inadequate for a
satisfactory control. He will suggest the need for the presence of some
Asian states in this effort.
In stating our acceptance of the principle of withdrawal of U.S. forces,
the President will avoid use of the word “unilateral” and will also
avoid any suggestion of a timetable. However, he should leave the clear
impression that he is talking about unilateral action on our part and
that we are willing to negotiate about a timetable.
Again, on the question of the composition or venue of an Indochina
negotiation among “interested parties”, the President will avoid
specifics. He will indicate that we prefer a broader composition of
participants than the current “our side-your side” group in Paris, but
that we are not willing to pay any price to obtain that new structure.
He will make it clear that, if Hanoi turns down a broader form and
composition, we are quite prepared and willing to pursue our
negotiations in the Paris forum.
On POW’s, the President will be as
categoric as possible. The proposal should be couched in terms of a
mutual release of all prisoners of war within a specified period after
the cease-fire takes place, with no linkage to other events. The release
would be unconditional and would permit those released to return to the
area of their choice. The ICC, or other
supervisory body, would be charged with the responsibility for their
safe transportation.
Although he will not touch upon it in his speech, the President may face
subsequent questions about the conceptual framework in which cease-fires
could be arranged in Laos and Cambodia. Our general
[Page 1129]
answer to this will be that we would
foresee no problems in this proposal if the other side accepts the idea
of an enlarged Indochina negotiation. In the event we are constrained to
the Paris forum, we would look upon the ICC mechanisms in those two countries to be the principal
instruments for effecting a cease-fire.
| August 12 |
Press backgrounding, press and television coverage, and USIA handling will assure
world-wide coverage of the President’s proposals. Instructions
will be sent to all our diplomatic representatives abroad to
bring the proposals to the attention of foreign governments and
to seek their support. A major information campaign will begin
in its support. |
|
The White House will similarly direct a campaign in the
domestic media to obtain the broadest coverage and the widest
support. |
|
Immediately after the President speaks, President Thieu in Saigon (August 13
Saigon time) will make a statement endorsing the proposals and
indicating his association with their development. Leaders of
other Asian allies will make similar statements in order to
demonstrate unanimity. Souvanna and Lon
Nol will do likewise. |
| August 13 |
At the Paris talks, Ambassador Bruce will formally table the President’s
proposals. He will indicate his readiness to negotiate their
substance. |
|
On the same day, either he or Habib will propose private talks with the North
Vietnamese in order to establish the arrangements for a more
detailed exploration of the negotiable portions of the
proposals. |
| August 14 and thereafter |
Negotiations in Paris proceed on two levels, public and
private. The private talks will be essentially between US and DRV representatives. However, our representatives
may from time to time supplement these channels with the Soviet
channel, whenever that is considered useful. |
