Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume V, United Nations, 1969–1972

428. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 24, 1971, 0004Z.

3816. Subj: Chirep: Meeting of Inner Core of Co-Sponsors Oct. 23, 1971.

1. Summary: Informal mtg with Australian, New Zealand, and Japanese co-sponsors was held at USUN morning of Oct 24.² US side represented by Phillips, De Palma, Newlin, and MisOffs. Phillips reported US belief our position was strong and we should continue concentrate all our efforts on attaining victory for IQ. During discussion initiated by Australians of possible contingencies it became apparent Australians, New Zealanders, and possibly also Japanese had received preliminary guidance as to fall-back positions should IQ fail. Australian Cabinet, meeting this weekend, may decide to abstain on AR in event IQ fails and probably would favor Baroody amendments (BA) should they be put to vote. New Zealand also favorably inclined toward BA but would like certain changes in wording. Japanese also favor BA with reservation GOJ believes there only one China. Advisability of voting on AR in parts was also discussed. If IQ fails, Japanese felt we might seek to defeat last part of AR as final effort to save ROC seat although chance of success not bright. End Summary.

2. Phillips opened mtg with report that White House and State Dept felt at highest levels our position was strong and we should press on with IQ. At this point USG was not prepared to consider fall-back positions. We would, of course, listen and report views of our friends.

3. One important objective, Phillips noted, was to have maximum number of speakers inscribe to explain vote on Mon, Oct 25. In view of lobbying actions yet to be completed and undesirablility of vote Mon evening, US felt it highly desirable for GA to commence voting no earlier than Tues, Oct 26.

4. PolCouns Newlin reported AR co-sponsors were split over timing of vote. Albanians believed vote should come only after full, fair debate and, for example, did not oppose mtg of First Comite scheduled for Mon morning at expense of morning plenary session. Activists such as Yugoslavs and Pakistanis within Albanian camp, on other hand, seemed anxious to have vote ASAP.

5. Phillips pointed out it also important to work for interval between defeat of AR and vote on DR to allow for consultations and full assessment of situation. Legal Adviser Reis will confer with Under-SYG Stavropoulos regarding feasibility of having explanation of vote between ARs’ defeat and vote on DR, although from strictly legal view this proposal to interrupt voting may be difficult to sustain. We could also consider moving for temporary adjournment or suspension of GA.

6. Remainder of mtg for most part involved discussion of tactics and contingencies in case IQ should fail. Discussion was led primarily by Australians and New Zealanders, both of whom clearly had received at least preliminary guidance from their govts regarding possible fallback positions.

7. McIntyre (Australia) welcomed encouraging view of Washington but expressed concern about possibility—even if not at present anticipated—of uncoordinated situation should things go wrong in what surely will be close vote on IQ. Australia has and will continue to explore with Canberra various contingencies should IQ fail. Australian Del has not yet received substantive instructions but has begun to receive “broad guidance.”

8. McIntyre said he could not overlook possibility that his Ministers, meeting this weekend, might decide to abstain on AR were IQ to lose.

9. McIntyre asked how US might vote on AR assuming defeat of IQ. De Palma responded Dept had not sent guidance in view of decisions taken yesterday in Washington.

10. Newlin, speaking personally and hypothetically, supposed it likely US would oppose AR in whole or in parts given traditional Albanian interpretation of AR, which is shared by Under-SYG Stavropoulos, that first part as well as second calls for ROC expulsion. Further, should we be faced, against our present expectation, with IQs’ defeat, it probably would be difficult to win vote for considering AR in parts. In any case, with prospect of passage of IQ we obviously should not oppose splitting AR. Japanese and New Zealanders agreed.

11. Scott (New Zealand) indicated he had received preliminary instructions regarding Baroody amendments. Wellington favors altering BA by deleting phrase “de jure” and substituting “territory” for “country.” Scott suggested we should consider approach to Baroody prior to voting on IQ regarding these changes. Otherwise interval between defeat of IQ and voting on AR probably would not allow for sufficient consultations with him. On balance, Scott felt his govt would support BA but would prefer changes mentioned.

12. McIntyre thought his del also would vote for BA if IQ fails. Nakagawa (Japan) said his del probably would do same, with reservations stemming from GOJs’ view that there only one China.

13. McIntyre, who spoke with Baroody Oct 22, reported Baroody probably would withdraw his amendments and save them for next year in event IQ passes. If not, he likely would press them to vote. Newlin added that Baroody seemed determined to offer self-determination amendment to DR before voting begins.

14. Nakagawa did not say he had received Tokyo’s thinking of fallback positions, but commented that in his view BA could not win if IQ failed. So perhaps we should consider asking for vote on AR by parts, with vote on second (explicit expulsion) part coming first. Such vote would be difficult to win but would represent last ditch effort to preserve ROC seat. McIntyre agreed this might be worthwhile tactic.

15. Nakagawa raised possibility Albanian side might ask GA President to rule, before voting on IQ began, whether IQ applied to whole of AR or only to second part. Scott felt certain Malik would refer questions of interpretation of AR to GA for vote no matter what Under-SYG Stavropoulos recommended. We therefore might wish to ask for ruling as to meaning of first part of AR ourselves to ensure question is phrased in best possible way. Newlin commented best procedure would be to see how situation unfolds and at appropriate time determine whether our interests best served by clarifying meaning of AR or by leaving matter vague.

16. Newlin also noted possibility that Albanian side might challenge legality of DR under UN Charter. We will be prepared for this but hope it will not happen.

17. Comment: Mtg was characterized by frank, informal exchange of views with complete understanding by attending co-sponsors of US determination to bring about victory of IQ and defeat of AR.

Bush

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Canberra, Tokyo, and Wellington.
2. The weekly meeting of all the co-sponsors was held October 22. (Telegram 3794 from USUN, October 23; ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 302, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. VIII)