Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume V, United Nations, 1969–1972

364. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Green) and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Herz) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, June 11, 1971.

SUBJECT

• Chirep: U.S. Co-Sponsorship of a Dual Representation Resolution

In your May 28 conversation with GRC Ambassador James Shen,² while discussing the Dual Representation strategy you noted that the U.S. would actively support but not propose the Dual Representation resolution. This accords with a GRC position taken earlier this year—that the GRC sees the necessity for a “third resolution” but would prefer that the U.S. not be a co-sponsor—though Shen did not so request at the May 28 meeting.

Our soundings to date indicate that it will be difficult for a Dual Representation resolution to be successfully launched if the U.S. does not act as a co-sponsor and make a major diplomatic effort in its behalf. This is also the view of our UN Mission. We believe that Japan, Belgium, New Zealand and other states which strongly incline toward Dual Representation nevertheless would be reluctant themselves to act as co-sponsors if the U.S. were not prepared to do so. For example, Belgium, which can be of great use in promoting Dual Representation, has told us it would not take the lead—but we believe Belgium would cosponsor a Dual Representation resolution if we take the lead. New Zealand, too, has told us it considers U.S. leadership vital.

There are also a number of neutrals whose support is essential and who would be much more likely to co-sponsor or take an active role if we ourselves are co-sponsors.

Also, without our sponsorship the probability would be very high that a paragraph on the Security Council would be included in a Dual Representation resolution, even before the resolution is tabled.

We therefore believe we should talk about this with the GRC (and also with the Japanese, who must be kept in step with us at every stage).

We recommend that when the President’s decision is conveyed to the GRC (and assuming that it is in favor of dual representation), we also inform them that we have consulted with several of our close allies and have restudied the tactical problems from every angle, and that we have come to the conclusion that it would be useless to go the dual representation route unless we are willing to commit ourselves to it, which means that we would have to act as co-sponsor of such a resolution. We could add that we are aware that the ROC had expressed the hope that we would support a new strategy without formally taking the lead; but we assume that the results are more important to the ROC than the tactical manner in which they are obtained—and if we do not get out in front together with other co-sponsors, the danger is simply too great that the enterprise would fail.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Feldman and concurred in by Winthrop G. Brown and Pedersen.
2. See Document 359.