Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume V, United Nations, 1969–1972

330. Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts¹

Washington, February 17, 1971, 2157Z.

26614. Subject: Chirep: Consultations in NY with Australian, New Zealand and Japan UN Missions.

1. Deptoffs Jenkins (EA/ACA), Shoesmith (EA/ROC) and Feldman (IO/UNP) held consultations in NY Feb 10 with officers of Australian, New Zealand, and Japanese UN Missions.² USUN personnel accompanied. Following is summary these meetings. Septel reports meeting with Ambassador Liu, ROC Permanent Representative.³

2. Deptoffs met with Charles Mott, Australia UN Feb 10. Mott began by noting GOA in process of reviewing Chirep and he therefore under instructions listen but unable outline GOA views. Deptoffs stressed USG has not reached firm decisions on Chirep policy but wished hold full and frank consultations with key allies (particularly Japan, Australia and New Zealand, in addition ROC) for mutual exploration of situation and discussion of possible alternatives. Hopefully, consultation process would establish parameters and lead to consensus on best course of action. Also noted USG did not see this as necessarily remaining a bilateral consultation process with US consulting separately with GOA, GNZ, GOJ, etc. and then reporting views to GRC; we assumed individual countries would wish to consult with each other and with GRC.

3. Jenkins began substantive discussion by describing our view of Peking’s attitude. Noted our belief PRC definitely wishes join UN, but for foreseeable future will insist upon prior ROC expulsion. PRC doubtless optimistic this will happen 1971 or 1972, wishes no change in manner in which issue presented to UNGA (IQ and Albanian Res), and will exert great pressure, particularly on countries with whom it has relations, to vote against IQ and for AR. Over next several months, countries negotiating PRC recognition may find this part of price. Peking probably fears US and allies will attempt new tactics to deprive it of victory almost in its grasp, probably expects this will be dual representation formula, and will make every effort prevent this tactic from succeeding.

4. Shoesmith discussed GRC attitudes noting that realistically we see only slim chance of its acquiescing in any substantial change from present Chirep policy and tactics. However, we believe possibility of such change is more than just theoretical. GRC has not yet made final decision or attempted to define limits beyond which it will not accept compromise. In addition, discussion of various alternatives to present policy is taking place within govt and KMT. We consider these circumstances moderately encouraging, and are holding frank talks with GRC to encourage further process of objective and careful examination of all facets of situation. We have given GRC our estimates of adverse IQ situation, will discuss specific alternatives and have stressed importance of not underestimating impact loss of UN membership (whether through expulsion or withdrawal) not only on GRC interests but on policy concerns of friendly governments wishing maintain close relations with and support for GRC. GRC has told us they believe IQ should be vigorously pressed at next UNGA and that they regard Security Council seat as matter of prime importance.

5. Feldman noted IQ situation adverse and that tide running against us. If policy unchanged, many countries which voted for IQ in 1970 likely to abstain in 1971 and IQ opponents probably already number 54, increase of 2 over last vote. Vote probably will be very close. Hard to predict outcome at this point, but most likely only three or four votes will separate winners and losers. Noting list certainly not exhaustive, Feldman summarized theoretical alternative dual representation and universality resolutions including general advantages and disadvantages of each. Noted that any alternative formula put forward must be seen by UNGA as reasonable and equitable attempt at solution of Chirep problem and not as gimmick to block PRC entry. If decision ultimately made to follow one of these alternatives, language should be worked out through consultation process to find most saleable and durable formula as far as Assembly concerned, and one which protects strategic concerns in area. In addition, would have to find answers to following questions: How deal with Security Council seat? Maintain present IQ and attempt get two-thirds vote for new Chirep formula or drop IQ and seek passage by simple majority? Put forward new IQ formula stating that resolution to expel ROC requires two-thirds vote instead of present formula that any proposal change China’s UN representation requires two-thirds vote?

6. Mott expressed appreciation for full presentation, expressed particular gratification for observation that final policy decisions should be based upon consensus view major concerned allies. Mott, who had taken full notes, said his mission would be reporting to Canberra in detail.

7. Deptoffs lunched with Minister Yoshida and Kagami of Japan UN mission Feb 10, explaining purpose of their visit to NY for discussions with Australia, NZ and ROC Missions and noting Herz visit to Tokyo preceding week. In general luncheon discussion, Yoshida expressed personal view that separate universality resolution might prove troublesome but suggested that philosophic basis could be established simply by having dual rep res pay homage to universality principle in preamble. Yoshida principally concerned, however, to emphasize importance he personally attaches to retaining IQ formula at least for one more year, either in present or amended form as suggested para 5 above, as essential safeguard against passage of AR. He also alluded to “serious problems which Chirep poses for GOJ” and, although he not specific, seemed to have in mind conflicting forces within Japanese government and LDP. In connection with handling of SC seat, Yoshida said these problems so difficult that he thought GOJ might have to abstain on new resolution. Yoshida also seemed to feel that for similar reasons it might be difficult for GOJ to take lead in developing support for some new approach to Chirep problem.

8. Deptoffs met with Ambassador Scott, Small and Williams of NZ Mission and Hensley of NZ Embassy Washington Feb 10 pm, making presentation essentially similar that given Australia. In following discussion, New Zealanders noted their assessment IQ situation closely parallels our own. Hensley indicated that GNZ primary concern is to avoid expulsion or withdrawal of GRC since this likely generate strong public pressures in NZ to recognize PRC and cease support for GRC. Over time, Hensley suggested, such development could threaten bring Taiwan under PRC control, thus weakening security situation in East Asia. GNZ, therefore, would not wish to see GRC position lost because no new approach made to protect it. Fact that PRC would not agree to some new approach, Hensley stated, would not be “fatal disadvantage” if such approach would buy time to deal with problem of public opinion. New Zealanders saw problems with universality res but also (though independently since we had not mentioned Yoshida’s remarks) thought preambular language of dual rep res might bow in universality direction.GNZ had not thought of quite as many variant dual rep reses as the six listed by Deptoffs, but since meeting between Hensley and Deptoffs (reported State 19896),⁴ has been giving consideration to rather different style scenario under which two separate reses would be introduced in tandem, one seating PRC and one maintaining place for ROC. Idea was that countries would have complete and free choice: they could vote for both reses, or only for “country of their choice.” NZ offs did not know whether Wellington intended that both reses be introduced by same set of co-sponsors and agreed with Deptoffs that this approach would not preclude Albanian res being introduced in its traditional form. Parliamentary handling of two parallel reses, therefore, would be quite tricky and perhaps ultimately uncontrollable. This led to general discussion of whether US and allies would have to get out in front in handling dual rep res or whether it might be preferable let others carry the ball. General view was that if dual rep was to succeed, US and allies would have to make major effort in its behalf. Scott stated his view that even those countries which strongly favored dual rep solution are “waiting for Godot” and would take no action until US intentions became clear.

9. Scott noted he returning to Wellington Feb. 13 for consultations and would discuss matter with Ministry. Both sides expressed desire hold further meetings in near future.

Rogers

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret. Drafted by Feldman; cleared by Armitage, John A. Froebe, Jr., and Shoesmith; and approved by Deputy Assistant Secretary Herz. Sent to Canberra, Tokyo, and Wellington and repeated to USUN, Taipei, and Hong Kong.
2. Telegram 18209 to USUN, February 3, informed the Mission that Jenkins, Shoe-smith, and Feldman would be in New York for a continuation of exploratory discussions. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 300, USUN, January–May 1971, Vol. VI)
3. The meeting with Ambassador Liu was reported in telegram 27069, February 18. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM)
4. Dated February 5. (Ibid.)