Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume V, United Nations, 1969–1972

327. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, February 1, 1971, 0854Z.

436. Subject: Chirep. Ref: State 13771.²

1. During courtesy call by PolCouns and William J. Cunningham of Embassy Tokyo, Vice Foreign Minister Yang Hsi-k’un took opportunity to raise Chirep. He emphasized that he had not discussed his views even with his colleagues, and that he was speaking personally and most confidentially. Yang prefaced his statement by remarking that there was little imagination “at higher levels” of GRC on Chirep.

2. Yang said that he views the Chirep situation this year as critical. He said that this year, as after the tie vote of 1966, his government, like that of U.S. is re-examining Chinese representation problem.

3. Yang referred to “exploratory” conversation Jan 25 between Ambassadors Liu and Chow and Assistant Secretaries Green and De Palma on which he had just received a report. Yang said he believes that some new formula, such as a “third resolution” is necessary to “preserve the Important Question.” (Yang did not elaborate on this point.) He suggested a two-paragraph resolution: one paragraph would seat the People’s Republic of China in the UN; a second paragraph would note that the seating of the PRC would be without prejudice to the rights of ROC in the United Nations and its specialized agencies, with the understanding that the differences between the two contending governments would always be subject to peaceful resolution by the parties concerned. After the adoption of such a resolution, the burden would then be on the ChiComs to show whether they would be prepared to accept this kind of a formula. Yang said it was essential that the Republic of China be called “the Republic of China” in such a resolution, even though it was understood that the ROC was government of “only Taiwan and a few small islands.” (Yang did not mention the Security Council.)

4. Yang said it was most desirable that “third resolution” get a two-thirds majority. When asked if he thought this was essential, he replied that the vote should be as close to two-thirds as possible. In order to obtain a high vote for third resolution, Yang said it was necessary that the United States, Japan, and other close friends of the ROC be free to lobby as strongly as possible. He thought it also desirable to have as many co-sponsors of the third resolution as possible, including Japan, the U.S., and if possible past supporters of the Albanian Resolution. Yang said that if the 45 votes for the Albanian Resolution which represent hard-core ChiCom support could be reduced to 35 opposing the third resolution, he believed that at least 70 votes could be obtained for the resolution. There would, of course, have to be a tacit understanding that the GRC would oppose such a resolution, but it would not object to its friends voting for it.

5. Yang said that within the GRC bureaucracy it is extremely difficult to present a proposal of this sort to President Chiang, since the motives behind such a proposal could easily be misunderstood. He thought the best way would be a presentation by the United States, which would inform GRC that after thorough study, U.S. had come to the view that a third resolution was necessary to protect the interests of both the GRC and itself. Yang said that President Nixon would be the ideal person to present such a proposal to President Chiang, but supposed this was impractical. He believed, however, that if President Nixon were to send Vice President Agnew, for whom President Chiang has highest respect and trust, there would be good chance of getting a sympathetic hearing. Yang emphasized that President Chiang could not publicly agree to a third resolution, but Yang believed he might “acquiesce” in one.

6. Yang reverted to the 1968 vote on the Italian study committee resolution which had been considered a GRC victory in Taipei. He said he had pointed out that of the 67 votes against the study committee, only six (Thailand, Philippines, Australia, Jordan, Paraguay, and Honduras) were really firm supporters of the GRC. After the 1970 Chirep vote, he had reminded a meeting of the GRC’s National Security Council of this vote in his report, and said he thought the situation more serious this year. President Chiang, who was chairman, asked for Yang’s views on Chirep this year. Yang said he demurred, saying the decision was purely political and should be made by the President himself. When Chiang insisted on hearing Yang’s views, Yang said that [for] the GRC to withdraw in any way or to be expelled from the United Nations would lead to international isolation, and for the GRC isolation is suicide. (Yang said that he had never discussed this statement with anyone outside the NSC.) Yang added that if the GRC were expelled, the Chinese Communists would enter the United Nations, and immediately lodge a formal charge against the United States of aggression against Taiwan. Yang said the United States, to protect its own interests, would then be forced to modify its policies in all East Asia.

7. Comment: Yang’s views are obviously not current GRC policy, and Department will recognize necessity of protecting him. For this reason, these views should not be discussed with Chinese or other foreign nationals. Yang had carefully thought out what he said, and we believe he would give full support within GRC to U.S. proposal for “third resolution.”

8. Department may wish to pass this on eyes only basis to Hong Kong, Tokyo, and USUN.

McConaughy

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Nodis.
2. Telegram 13771, January 27, transmitted an account of Ambassadors Chow and Liu’s January 25 meeting with Assistant Secretaries Green and De Palma. (Ibid.) See Document 325.