Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume V, United Nations, 1969–1972

306. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, November 2, 1970, 2346Z.

2888. Subject: Chirep at 25th UNGA. Ref: USUN 2860.²

1. Dept will note from reftel that in First Committee vote on Korean reses Oct 30, following countries shifted their votes in manner favorable to Soviet position and unfavorable to our own: Bolivia, Chile, Barbados, Congo (K), Mauritius, Morocco, Tunisia, Guyana, Ceylon, Kenya. Following countries shifted in manner favorable to US: Cambodia, Guatemala, Burundi, Saudi Arabia, Upper Volta.³

2. Some of these shifts appear to have no particular implications from Chirep standpoint. Absence of Congo (K) during vote was apparently deliberate, but seems based upon personal desire of Ambassador to make small show of independence on issue which he considered relatively minor. Naturally, we are checking further, but assume at this time no Chirep implication exists. View established Moroccan Chirep stand, their defection on Korea was to have been expected. Similarly for Ceylon and Kenya. On the other side of the line, Burundi’s abstention is probably in nature of a bow to Ambassador Melady, while Saudi Arabia’s “yes” seems attributable to confusion on part of their delegate while Baroody was out of the room.

3. Following shifts do raise Chirep questions however: Bolivia, Chile, Barbados, Mauritius, Guyana, Tunisia. We have assumed little chance of stopping new Chilean Govt from this year voting against Important Question (IQ) and for Albanian res (AR). This seems confirmed by their vote on Korean invitation reses. Believe we must now assume Mauritius will not adopt voting stance more favorable than last year when they voted “yes” on both IQ and AR, and vote against IQ now becomes distinct possibility. Shift to more unfavorable position also seems indicated for Barbados (1969 vote: abstain on IQ, no on AR); Bolivia (1969: yes on IQ, no on AR); Tunisia (1969: no on IQ, abstain on AR); and possibly Guyana (1969: yes on IQ, abstain on AR). Finally, though this did not emerge from Korean voting, Chad informed deloff today they were now instructed to vote yes on IQ and abstain on AR. On the positive side, we may perhaps take some comfort from fact Colombia did not shift and continued vote for our Korean res and against Soviet res.

4. Based on foregoing plus other info available to us and Dept, following is our picture of Chirep shifts certain, probable or possible, with approximately 7–10 days to go.

[Omitted here are two tables listing the possible voting shifts on the Albanian Resolution and the Important Question.]

5. Above pattern of expectations indicates following spreads:

A. On AR:

• Best—50–55–22 (most unlikely)
• Probable—52–50–25 (now most likely)
• Worst—54–48–25

B. On IQ:

• Best—71–50–6
• Probable—68–51–8
• Worst—62–54–11

6. Note that we reluctantly conclude a small voting majority in favor of the Albanian resolution now appears probable, unless we can contain and limit the number shifts now foreseeable. Accordingly, in addition to Bridgetown and Rome, we recommend strong démarches in the following capitals: Yaounde, Fort Lamy, La Paz, Bogota, Georgetown and Lima. In addition, we urge strong efforts with Tunisian Foreign Minister Masmoudi while in Washington.

7. Dept repeat to posts as desired.

Yost

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 299, Agency Files, USUN, Vol. V. Secret; Exdis.
2. Dated October 30. (Ibid.)
3. On October 30 the First Committee of the General Assembly defeated draft resolution A/C.1/L.250, that called for the simultaneous and unconditional admission of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea to take part, without the right to vote, in future UN discussions relating to Korea. The First Committee approved draft resolution A/C.1/L.251, allowing representatives of both states to participate in discussion of the Korean question provided that they unequivocally accepted the competence and authority of the United Nations to take action on the Korean question within the terms of the Charter. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1970, pp. 209–210)