96. Memorandum From the President’s Military Assistant (Haig) to the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1
Washington, February 21, 1970.
Henry:
Per your instructions, I have prepared a memorandum for you including
talking points for your use in your meeting with the President
tomorrow.2 I have pondered this most
difficult of problems at great length this weekend and have concluded
that you should not raise this issue in either the terms I have outlined
or in any other terms unless you have in your own mind definitely
decided to leave Government without any qualms or reservations. In my
view, there is no way to pose a set of alternatives to the President
along the lines outlined which will not ultimately result in your
departure. As I told you earlier, I believe the President will pay any
price to keep you happy and on board, but only at the expense of a bill
which he will collect on later and probably to your disadvantage.
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I am confident that the President has been completely aware of your
problems with Rogers, perhaps to
a greater degree than you realize. If you are to hit him with the hard
alternative now, it should not be with the view toward achieving a
temporary victory which will ultimately deteriorate, but rather with the
view toward providing him with notice that you intend to leave as soon
as it can be conveniently managed.
I recognize the risks that your continuation in this job will pose for
you personally and even for the country in the long run; however, I also
believe that the overriding consideration is our country’s current need
for the kind of counsel and advice that only you have been able to
provide in the present structure of things. Thus, after careful thought,
I am against your taking this course of action now.
Attachment
Washington, February 21,
1970.
Memorandum From the President’s Military Assistant
(Haig) to the
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs(Kissinger)
SUBJECT
- Your Discussion with the President on Relationships with
Secretary Rogers and the
Department of State
General
Attached is a brief talking paper which represents my best judgment
on the tack and rationale you should employ in your discussion with
the President on Sunday, February 22, dealing with your
relationships with Secretary Rogers. As you know, I do not believe that you will
want to permit the discussion to deteriorate into a bleeding litany
of the almost incredible record of poor cooperation, intentional
violations of Presidential instructions and, on occasion, deliberate
deceit. Nor do I think you will wish to press too strongly on the
difficulties you have experienced because of what appears to be a
direct confrontation between you and Secretary Rogers with the parallel and
increasing efforts by the Secretary and his staff to manipulate an
anti-Kissinger press
campaign. Rather, I believe you will wish to present to the
President a calm, deliberate but unshakeable decision on your part
to leave the Administration if the President, for whatever reasons,
is unwilling to provide you with the kind of direct support
essential to a clear-cut and effective working relationship between
you, the Secretary of State and his Department.
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Particulars
The history of Secretary Rogers’ uncooperative attitude with respect to the
office of the Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs is lengthy and tragic and includes documented accounts of
poor faith in the following major areas:
- a.
- State’s uncoordinated and unauthorized policy actions with
regard to SALT talks and
the preparations therefor.
- b.
- State’s abrogations of the Colorado Springs directive of
September 1, 1969.3
- c.
- State’s unresponsive and frequently hostile performance
with regard to such major policy issues as the Middle East,
Latin America and Africa.
- d.
- State’s systematic efforts to erode Presidential policy
decisions on the concept of linkage and, in the early days,
Presidential efforts to hold the line on Vietnam
issues.
- e.
- The recent imbroglios with State involving the visit of
Prime Minister Palme, the handling of the Symington
Subcommittee Hearings (which, incidentally, can best be
attested to by John
Ehrlichman who was the President’s principal
staff agent and who witnessed firsthand Secretary Rogers’ direct refusal to
comply with instructions from the White House), the policy
study on France, the issue of Nigerian relief, and finally
and perhaps most importantly, the near fiasco resulting from
State’s lack of coordination in the preparation of the
President’s Annual Review of U.S. Foreign Policy.4
Discussion
The bill of particulars concerning our problems with the Department
of State in general, and Secretary Rogers in particular, is awesome, detailed and
thoroughly documented by you. It would be naive to believe that the
President is not thoroughly familiar with the problems you have been
having with Secretary Rogers
and, while I believe he has been uniformly in your corner, there
have been continuing manifestations of an unwillingness on his part
to draw the line in a direct and unequivocal fashion with the
Secretary himself. The result of this has only contributed to
Rogers’ inclination and
perhaps growing determination to do you in with a jugular fight. His
disappointment over the public setback associated with the Annual
Review cannot but, in my opinion, add to this determination and
raise the risks of even more serious confrontations in the near
future. For this reason, I believe it is essential that you
measuredly lay the situation before the President while avoiding the
bill of particulars which is available to him at any time if he
feels it necessary to review it, and that you do so in a fashion
which would leave absolutely no uncertainty in the President’s
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mind as to your
determination to leave Government rather than to continue with a
situation which cannot but pose the most serious risks to the
national interest, if not to the future effectiveness of the
President’s authority within the bureaucracy.
Recommendation
That you draw from the attached talking points in a discussion with
the President on your relationships with the Secretary of State, the
discussion to be held prior to the return of the Secretary on
February 23.5
