Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972

88. Memorandum From the President’s Military Assistant (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, December 1, 1969.

SUBJECT

• Problems with the Program Analysis Operation

You should be aware that Larry Lynn is becoming increasingly discouraged from the attitude displayed by the Department of Defense toward his various projects. While there are many minor problems, I believe the most serious involves the role of the DPRC and the fact that Secretary Laird has put out some extremely prohibitive guidance to the Department of Defense which is now being translated into a stonewall position against Lynn in most of the areas with which he is dealing and which involve the DPRC, as well as some of the non-associated NSSMs such as the NATO Tactical Nuclear issue.

I believe that it is essential that you meet with Larry early this week to discuss the specifics of his problem. Following that meeting, you should ask for a meeting between Mel Laird, Dave Packard, Larry and yourself, together with whomever Mr. Laird might want to include to sort out the many problems. If you do not do so, I am convinced that the following situation will develop.

1. Larry will resign his position within a matter of weeks.

2. The entire DPRC system will remain stillborn.

3. All other Defense related relationships involving the NSC will suffer accordingly.

As you know, you do not have a Richardson counterpart in Defense. Also, as you probably know, Mr. Packard is being systematically isolated by Secretary Laird from Defense policy issues so that, in effect, any agreements arrived at between our office and Mr. Packard are meaningless. There is also an indication that many of the staff sections in the Defense Department are becoming increasingly disenchanted with the NSC system which they consider as a drilling formation, a bottleneck for actions which they believe they have worked diligently to prepare only to find them stalemated for weeks at a time, at the NSC level.

All of the above convinces me that unless prompt remedial action is taken and that unless a constructive dialogue is developed between you and the Department, we are headed for a complete collapse of our relationships with the Department of Defense. I do not believe we can or should permit this to happen, especially in view of the growing problems with State. To me, all that is necessary is a rational, high-level discussion of the issues and, if necessary, some give on our part. This is not a matter that we can procrastinate on any longer, nor can we keep Larry at arm’s length, pouting over his frustrations and harboring strong resentments toward you for lack of support or toward the Department of Defense for its lack of cooperation.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Staff Files—Staff Memos, Box 1050, Lynn, Laurence E., Jr. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Kissinger initialed the memorandum, indicating that he saw it.