After carefully reviewing the attached memorandum and Report from Bob
Froehlke, Dave Packard and I have decided that
changes are required to improve the management of intelligence functions
within the Department of Defense and have accepted Bob’s
recommendations. Accordingly, I hereby assign additional
responsibilities for intelligence to the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Administration (ASD(A)).
In view of the importance of this assignment, both to the Department of
Defense and to the nation, I would appreciate your giving the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Administration your complete and continuing
support in this effort.
Attachment2
Washington, July 29, 1969.
Report Prepared by the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Administration (Froehlke)
Report on Defense Intelligence
Introduction
In the months ahead it is likely that intelligence products which are
as timely and as accurate as our resources can conceivably make them
will be even more critical than they are today. There are serious
and severe problems within the Defense intelligence community. Many
of these problems stem from the methods we presently employ to
allocate intelligence resources against requirements. Others relate
to
[Page 394]
inadequacies in the
collection and utilization of intelligence or to difficulties in the
estimating processes.
- —In the area of resource allocation, a new line function must
be established.
- —In the other areas an improved staff element is necessary in
OSD rather than a line
function.
This report therefore proposes that a Special Assistant be
established to perform the line resource allocation function and to
improve OSD staff participation in
the other areas.
Background
In 1953, the Secretary of Defense established the position of
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations). This
Assistant recommended policies and provided guidance on planning and
program development to DoD
intelligence agencies and components, reviewed plans and programs,
developed DoD positions on
intelligence problems, and made recommendations to the Secretary on
the actions necessary to provide for more efficient and economical
operations. In practice the position was almost exclusively
concerned with supervision of NSA. It was seriously handicapped by
the lack of a charter to function as the focal point for DoD intelligence resource
management.
In 1960, a Presidential Task Force, chaired by Lyman Kirkpatrick, was
directed to study the organizational and management aspects of the
intelligence community. The Task Force recommended the establishment
of a focal point within OSD to
exercise broad management review authority over military
intelligence programs, and to provide overall coordination of all
foreign intelligence activities conducted by various defense
components. The report emphasized the operation and use of
intelligence rather than resource management. However, it was one
input considered when DIA was
established in 1961. The DoD press
release of 2 August 1961, announcing the establishment of DIA, stated that a “more efficient
allocation of critical intelligence resources, more effective
management of all DoD intelligence
activities, and the elimination of duplicating facilities and
organizations” was expected. The position of Assistant for Special
Operations was disestablished concurrently with the establishment of
DIA. His responsibilities
vis-à-vis NSA were assigned to DDR&E.
Today, under the umbrella of the Consolidated Intelligence Program
(CIP), the DIA “manages” only about 25% of the
DoD resources devoted to
satisfying both military and “national” intelligence requirements.
The bulk of the resources are found in a number of other programs
such as the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), or are treated outside any formal
program.
[Page 395]
The Secretary of Defense is faced with the problem that there is no
review which compares the resources in one program targeted against
a requirement with the resources committed against the same
requirement in another program. Similarly, there is no arrangement
for evaluating information requirements in terms of intelligence
objectives. In addition, this situation has been complicated by
excessive classification and security compartmentation, which tend
to isolate programs and thwart comparisons.
Objectives
The ultimate objective of a good intelligence program is to provide a
better intelligence product to the consumers; a product which is as
timely and as accurate as our resources can conceivably make it. The
attainment of this overall objective requires improvements in (1)
collection and utilization of intelligence; (2) the estimating
processes; and (3) allocation of resources. The functions of a
Special Assistant are different with respect to the operational and
estimating processes of the intelligence community than they are
with resource management.
Any organization or personnel changes resulting from this report
should be made to achieve the following objectives listed in
priority. (You will notice that these objectives are primarily aimed
at resource management and intelligence policies, and not management
of intelligence operations of a day-to-day nature. This does not
imply that the management of the intelligence operations is
flawless. On the contrary, there is substantial dissatisfaction with
certain operations of defense intelligence. However, improved
management and operations can better result through improved
personnel and policies rather than a radically new organization.)
The objectives are:
-
Objective 1. To establish a
resource review and decision-making process for major
intelligence activities. By resource review I mean
determining the appropriate level and mix of significant
resources for the satisfaction of intelligence
requirements. There are inseparable reinforcing
objectives which are essential elements of this overall
Objective. These inherent objectives are: (1) To
establish a mechanism for making comparisons and
appropriate trade-offs between major intelligence
activities and programs so that DoD decision-makers can select the most
efficient and effective systems for collecting,
processing, producing, and disseminating intelligence
(What form this mechanism takes is relatively
unimportant. It should be simple and understandable.
I’ll refer to it, whatever form it takes, as the
Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program (CDIP)); (2) to improve
Defense intelligence resources allocation planning for
the mid-range period by establishing a Five-Year
Intelligence Resource Plan updated annually; and (3) to
focus attention on decisive points in this program by
developing major issue studies on unresolved problems of
intelligence resource allocation and management.
[Page 396]
Existing DoD intelligence
resource programs (CIP,
CCP, and others) are
institutionalized and are not evaluated in relation to
mutual target objectives or in terms of mission-oriented
information needs.
The DoD intelligence
community at the present time does not know the minimum
level of information that will satisfy a stated
requirement. While there is no upper boundary on
intelligence requirements, there is a limit on
resources. Therefore, resource limitations make it
important to ascertain requirements as precisely as
possible. We need to insure that all valid requirements
are met to some minimum level, without going to higher
levels on some requirements while ignoring other valid
requirements. In other words, the risks involved in
acceptance of reduced or alternate levels of efforts
must be known.
The focus of intelligence planning and programming
activities tends to be in the near term period (one or
two years ahead). Long lead times for modern technical
collection systems, automated processing systems and
automated analytic and production aids create the need
to develop a long term intelligence resource plan.
Without such planning, intelligence decisions rely on
short term considerations. Further, there is a tendency
to develop options made available by rapidly expanding
technology simply because they are available.
In the present programming process, recommendations
reaching the Secretary and Deputy Secretary show
fluctuations in manpower and money from previously
approved levels but more significant issues do not tend
to surface within DoD.
Frequently, past decisions on elements or systems having
high dollar value or significant ramifications in a
functional area have been reached through the mechanism
of ad hoc groups convened by the Secretary/Deputy
Secretary of Defense to study each problem when it
arises—generally in a time frame which does not permit
in-depth analysis.
-
Objective 2. To improve
information flow and policy transmission on intelligence
matters between the DoD
and other government agencies concerned with
intelligence resources by functioning as DoD focal point for
interagency relations.
Currently, below the Secretary/Deputy Secretary of
Defense level, no single agency or individual has the
authority to participate across the board in an
effective dialogue at the highest levels with non-DoD agencies.
Representation today is fragmented among a number of
DoD intelligence
officials none of whom possesses the necessary
responsibility for all DoD programs. Since the Special Assistant
will not be the sole DoD
representative in the intelligence community, it is
indispensable that senior DoD intelligence officials do not operate
independently of each other.
-
Objective 3. To obtain a more
efficient distribution of the functional
responsibilities of the DoD intelligence agencies and organizations
[Page 397]
through an
evaluation of their organizational relationships, roles,
and missions.
The U.S. Congress, in the HACIT Report of 1968,3 and other
government agencies have been concerned that the
military Services are performing functions specifically
delegated to the DIA and
vice versa. Additionally, the relationship of the
National Security Agency (NSA) to counterpart agencies
in the military Services as well as to the Unified and
Specified Commands, has been questioned. The
institutional structure of the Defense intelligence
community is the result of a piecemeal process which
seldom addressed the interrelationships of the elements
in the community as a whole.
-
Objective 4. To improve intelligence
flow by insuring that a realistic reappraisal of security
policies and procedures is undertaken with a view toward
modifying standards which lead to unnecessary classification
and over-compartmentation of intelligence information.
(Obviously any activity along this line would have to be
coordinated among all elements of the intelligence community
and with the DCI
specifically.)
Dialogue between the participants in DoD intelligence programs is restricted. As a result,
at times officials charged with reviewing existing programs are
denied information essential to the formulation of
recommendations.
Organization
I recommend that you name one individual to act as the Special
Assistant to the Secretary/Deputy Secretary of Defense for defense
intelligence. He would be responsible for intelligence resource
management. In addition, he would act as staff advisor to the
Secretary/Deputy Secretary of Defense for all other DoD intelligence activities. The
solution to our current problems in intelligence management will not
be found in the panacea of mass reorganization. There are no clear
cut solutions to the problems we face. The Special Assistant will be
feeling his way along a path that will require the closest
cooperation of all members of the intelligence community to insure
meaningful progress.
The Special Assistant will make the trade-offs among intelligence
programs competing for resources. Directors of DoD intelligence agencies would of
course have the right of reclama to the Secretary or Deputy
Secretary of Defense. In other matters, the Directors of DoD intelligence agencies would report
to the Secretary but the Special Assistant would act as the
Secretary’s principal staff element.
[Page 398]
On occasion the Special Assistant would undoubtedly direct certain
broad management activities other than resources. When so doing, he
would be acting for the Secretary/Deputy Secretary. (It would serve
little purpose to attempt to delineate to what extent and when the
Special Assistant would become involved in day-to-day operations.
Suffice that he will become involved at the pleasure of the
Secretary/Deputy Secretary and probably about as often as they have
in the past.) For substantive intelligence matters this approach
will allow essential and healthy differences in intelligence
judgments within the community to continue to exist and to be
presented to the Secretary/Deputy Secretary.
I recommend that the Special Assistant, as a management technique,
create a forum where the leaders in the Defense intelligence
community can discuss and communicate items of general interest. In
time it could become a decision making body. The exact make up of
the forum and its modus operandi should be left to the Special
Assistant. (This forum was labeled the DoD Intelligence Board in my tentative report.)
I further recommend the establishment of an Executive Council for
Defense Intelligence. It can either supersede or serve in addition
to a similar committee. If it supersedes, the similar committee
should continue as a subcommittee of the Executive Council. In that
way, all the understandings and agreements that were involved in
setting up the existing committee could be continued.
The Council should consist of the Deputy Secretary of Defense as
Chairman, the Director of Central Intelligence, the President’s
Scientific Advisor, the Chairman of the JCS and the Director, Defense Research and Engineering.
The Special Assistant would sit ex officio.
The Council would be an advisory body (however with the Deputy
Secretary as its Chairman, its advice would certainly be heeded).
The primary purpose of setting the Council up would be to have the
benefit of this advice. An important fringe benefit would be the
communication channel it would provide to and from the intelligence
community. Ideally, as time goes on, the Council should do the
following things:
- 1)
- Guide and participate in the formulation of resource
programs.
- 2)
- Recommend to the Secretary of Defense an appropriate level
of effort for resource programs.
- 3)
- Recommend allocations of responsibility and corresponding
funds for R&D for
appropriate systems.
- 4)
- Recommend approval or modifications to the resource
programs.
- 5)
- Periodically review essential features of the major
programs.
Staffing Alternatives
There are a series of staffing alternatives which provide varying
levels of capability to achieve the objectives outlined.
[Page 399]
Three alternatives to provide staff support to the Special Assistant
have been considered:
Alternative 1. Provide a nucleus of
intelligence expertise for the Special Assistant, leaving currently
assigned responsibilities of OSD
elements essentially as they are now. It is estimated that it would
require five professionals and two clerical spaces for this
staff.
Alternative 2. Transfer professional
positions and the necessary clerical support currently dealing with
intelligence resource management to the office of the Special
Assistant. The objective would be to consolidate a number of
existing intelligence management activities in one office. The
transfer of positions might be accomplished as follows (This does
not necessarily mean incumbents would transfer with the
position.):
|
ASD(A)
|
3 |
| DIA |
5 |
| DDR&E’s Office of Special Intelligence |
4 |
| ASD(SA) |
2 |
|
14 |
Alternative 3. Enlarge the proposed
intelligence staff to a level at which it would be capable of
performing, on a totally centralized basis, the full range of
intelligence resource management functions: development and ranking
of requirements, mid-range planning, program and budget development,
and review of intelligence issues. While a detailed analysis of
personnel requirements has not been made, it is estimated that it
would take about 150–200 professionals to accomplish these
functions.
In determining which staff Alternative to recommend, I considered
each in light of the objectives listed earlier:
Objective 1. (Establish a resource review and
decision making process for intelligence resources management.)
The Special Assistant and his staff would have to: (1) Establish and
conduct an objective-oriented Consolidated Defense Intelligence
Program (CDIP) which would
encompass all DoD managed
intelligence resources (Tactical intelligence resources—once
defined—would not be managed by the Special Assistant. However, he
must be cognizant of them to the extent that he can properly
evaluate their impact on the employment of resources allocated to
the satisfaction of the highest level military and national
intelligence requirements); (2) Establish a Five-Year Intelligence
Resource Plan to improve intelligence resource allocation planning
for the mid-range period; and (3) Formulate major issues of
intelligence resources allocation and management.
Initially, it will take a considerable number of man years to achieve
this objective. I do not think the staff should be set up for the
initial surge of personnel needs. This initial
[Page 400]
surge could be met on an ad hoc basis
from within DoD.
This is the highest priority Objective. Presently it is not being
met. Decision makers need a framework for selecting alternative
options and corresponding levels of effort. Establishing a CDIP to provide this framework, and
conducting an annual review has primary claim on manpower assigned
to the Special Assistant. An early goal should be the reduction of
detail that currently characterizes the present intelligence reviews
(CIP and CCP). There is unanimous agreement that excessive
detail makes these reviews unwieldy and makes it necessary to devote
manpower to these efforts to an unwarranted level. (The Directors of
the DoD intelligence agencies will
be directly responsible for the development of their respective
programs.)
The Five-Year Intelligence Resource Plan will strive: (1) to permit
resource allocation decisions to be made as early as possible,
especially for long lead-time items; (2) to explore the adequacy of
resources to meet future needs; (3) to present the costs and
benefits of satisfying various levels of intelligence needs; and (4)
to understand better the resource implications of satisfying various
future requirements.
A major factor in the development of the Plan is the pressing need to
establish a continuing system for review of intelligence collection
requirements against collection resources, taking into account costs
and risks. No means exist at present for accomplishing this, since
there is no measure of value for levels of information. No one knows
how much information is essential and we have only sketchy estimates
of what it costs to obtain the information. (There are a number of
efforts underway which, hopefully, will structure a solution to this
problem.)
The formulation of major issues is closely tied to the preceding
objectives, and much of it can be accomplished in the process of
gaining those objectives. Formulating major issues has never been
attempted successfully in the Defense intelligence community. It is,
however, necessary in order to determine the proper courses to
follow.
In theory Objective 1 could be accomplished by any of the three
staffing Alternatives. However, if Alternative 1 (the minimum staff)
were selected, the Special Assistant would operate principally as a
monitor, with the major effort fragmented among DoD agencies. As a practical matter,
therefore, it is questionable whether Alternative 1 could do the
job.
Objective 2. (Improve intelligence
communications among DoD and other
agencies.)
It is envisioned that the Special Assistant would act as the DoD intelligence management contact
with DCI, BOB, PFIAB, and other
non-DoD members of the
intelligence community. One of the less obvious responsibilities
would be to keep communication channels open at all times unimpeded
by a lack of rapport and understanding.
[Page 401]
Any one of the three staffing Alternatives could satisfy this
Objective.
Objective 3. (Evaluate the intelligence
organizational relationship, roles and missions.)
It appears that this could best be accomplished by an Ad Hoc study
group. (The Defense Blue Ribbon Panel appears to be a likely
candidate.) As a result, this could be accomplished under any of the
Alternatives.
Objective 4. (Reappraise security policies
and eliminate unnecessary classification and over-compartmentation
in the intelligence field.)
This Objective would necessitate a review, under the aegis of the
DCI, of current security
policies and procedures. It is a continuing effort because of the
ever present tendency to over-classify and over-do
compartmentation.
There is a distinct feeling in the community that over-classification
and over-compartmentation exist. It is a natural tendency and I
observed evidence of it. If it is present in any significant degree,
it certainly is bad because over-classification impedes the flow of
information and over-compartmentation excludes agencies and
individuals who may have a legitimate need for the information.
Both Alternatives 2 and 3 (the middle and maximum staffing
Alternatives) could accomplish this Objective. Alternative 1 (the
minimum staffing Alternative) could not accomplish it unless the
function was farmed out to other OSD
elements.
The primary advantage of Alternative 1 (minimum staff) is that it
requires a minimum number of people under the Special Assistant.
Cosmetically, this is advantageous.
The primary disadvantage of Alternative 1 is that it would be
impossible for the Special Assistant to achieve the stated
Objectives without relying almost entirely on a number of other
elements in DoD. This raises the
distinct possibility of the Special Assistant having the image of
responsibility but not the ability to carry it out.
Alternative 2 (the middle staff) has the advantage of providing
sufficient staff to meet all of the objectives and establishing the
Special Assistant as the intelligence manager for the Secretary and
Deputy Secretary of Defense. All the staffing would be under the
supervision of the Special Assistant. It also clearly reduces
fragmentation of DoD
responsibilities for intelligence.
The disadvantage, if it really is one, is that this level of staffing
will not allow the Special Assistant to become involved in the
day-to-day operations of the intelligence agencies. Another
disadvantage, if it is one, is that the Special Assistant will spend
a good deal of his time dealing with DoD agencies and the rest of the intelligence community
because staff will not be available.
[Page 402]
At this stage, it is impossible to say whether or not the Special
Assistant’s duties will require his full-time attention: in other
words, will the workload prevent assigning the job to an ASD as
additional duty? From all my observations and conversations, I feel
that it will not be a full-time job, although getting the new system
started will certainly require a lot of attention. Once the new
organization is started and running, you may perceive that it is
indeed a full-time job. At that time the billet can be so
designated. The same reasoning applies to the size of the staff: as
more is learned about the workload, you will be better able to
determine the size of the Special Assistant’s staff. As of now,
about 15 professionals appear to be adequate to get the system
started.
Alternative 3 (maximum staff) has the advantage of being able to
accomplish all objectives—and then some. It not only allows the
Special Assistant to be primarily responsible for intelligence
resource management but could permit him to become deeply [involved]
in the day-to-day intelligence operations. The primary disadvantages
of Alternative 3 are the cosmetic one of added manpower and the
disruption caused by major reorganization. Both Congress and the
intelligence community would react adversely to this.
Alternative 3, because of the considerable additional OSD manpower and disruption, does not
make sense at this time.
Alternative 1 would be an improvement over the present but the lack
of sufficient staff supporting the Special Assistant would probably
leave responsibility diffused.
I recommend Alternative 2. It is a happy compromise. It would
accomplish the four stated objectives with a minimum of
reorganization and personnel.
Location of the Special Assistant
The number of options available for the location of a Special
Assistant for Intelligence narrows down to five:
-
Option 1. “Normalize” present
intelligence resource management and allocation with a
Five-Year Intelligence Resource Plan, Development Concept
Papers (DCP’s) from the Director, Defense Research and
Engineering, and Major Program Memoranda (MPM’s) from the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), with a
minimum role being played by the Special Assistant.
-
Option 2. Assign to an existing
Assistant Secretary of Defense the responsibilities
described in this report for the Special Assistant for
Intelligence.
-
Option 3. Establish the Special
Assistant under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
-
Option 4. Establish a Special
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense as a separate office
directly subordinate to the Secretary.
-
Option 5. Establish an Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Intelligence).
[Page 403]
Analysis of the Options
-
Option 1 does not truly integrate the
DoD intelligence effort, and
it puts sizing and development of intelligence forces under
officials who have an interest in intelligence products for use
in developing weapons or in setting force levels. It has the
effect of placing the intelligence resource management
responsibilities in the hands of officials who are customers for
various parts of the intelligence product. (This Option actually
lends itself only to staffing Alternative 1.)
-
Option 2 furnishes the man charged with
the job with the prestige and authority, both inside DoD and with other government
agencies, possessed by an Assistant Secretary of Defense.
Further, the intelligence management function envisioned should
not require the full-time attention of an ASD. However, when
required, the authority of his office as an ASD is
available.
-
Option 3. The JCS are oriented primarily toward strategic
planning and direction and to those activities of the military
Services which supply these functions. The assignment of
intelligence resource management to the JCS would short-circuit those responsibilities for
resource allocation and management charged to the Secretary of
Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments. The
JCS are also customers for
major portions of the intelligence product. Their responsibility
in intelligence management is more properly one of providing
views based on the intelligence needs of the JCS and the combat forces.
-
Option 4 would probably accomplish the
objectives but is handicapped by the lack of position and
authority normally associated with an ASD. The Special Assistant
in this Option is solely dependent on his relationship to the
Secretary to accomplish the objectives. As a result, there is an
aura of the “ad hoc” about a separate Special Assistant.
-
Option 5 would require redesignation of
an existing ASD or Congressional action to add an ASD because of
the statutory limit of seven Assistant Secretaries. The
magnitude of the intelligence function suggested in staff
Alternatives 1 and 2, in terms of manning levels and percentage
of the total DoD budget managed,
is relatively small and therefore militates against Option
5.
Recommendations
I eliminate location Option 1 (normalize present practice) and 3
(JCS) because it appears to me
that either could result in the Special Assistant being unable to
achieve the stated objectives.
I recommend Option 2 (assigned to an existing ASD).
If there is some reason that Option 2 is not selected, I would
recommend Option 4 (Special Assistant) and finally Option 5 (New
ASD).
Respectfully submitted,
