Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972

183. Memorandum From the Director of Central Intelligence’s Deputy for National Intelligence Programs Evaluation (Bross) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms¹

Washington, January 27, 1969.

SUBJECT

• Report on the Organization of CIA and the Intelligence Community

1. I am submitting herewith my report on the organization of CIA and the intelligence community.²

2. As I have pointed out before, the report is in considerable measure an explanation and a defense of existing organizational arrangements (particularly as regards the Agency). Parts I., II., and V. of the report are purely expository. Part III. includes a discussion of what have appeared to me to be some of the more complicated organizational problems in CIA and some indication of my reasons for believing that the organizational dilemmas which these problems present should be resolved in favor of the existing structure. In reaching these conclusions I do not intend to imply that everything is working perfectly. I simply mean that organizational changes in themselves will not, in my opinion, improve the effectiveness or efficiency of particular programs.

3. Part VI. contains a discussion of what appear to me to be the important factors involved in an assessment of the present organization of the community. Here again, except for the specific actions proposed, I do not believe that organizational changes are needed to improve the over-all intelligence effort although improvement is clearly necessary and possible and will depend more on the individual competence and qualities of leadership of the senior managerial officials of the community than anything else.

4. It will be noted that some at least of the items which I have included in the list of matters requiring action are really not organizational matters. Possibilities for improving dissemination of counterintelligence information, personnel procurement or research facilities do not necessarily have organizational implications. They do, however, involve the interrelationship of several organizational components and, it seems to me, are properly noted within the context of an organizational survey because of their importance.

5. Finally, it will be noted that most of my specific recommendations call for further reviews. This is not because of any particular reluctance on my part to take a position on the problems at issue. All of them, however, are extremely complicated and their solution involves what are in very considerable measure subjective judgements. It seemed to me unlikely, within the time frame of this review and without a staff which was larger than appeared necessary or desirable under the circumstances, that I could develop conclusions which were sufficiently informed and which reflected anything like the consensus necessary to support really helpful recommendations. On the other hand, it seemed to me that it would be helpful to identify those areas where additional attention and review would really serve a useful purpose.

6. Attached, in addition to the survey itself, is a brief summary of specific recommendations.³

John A. Bross

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01284A, Box 4, Folder 2, Intelligence Community Reorganization. Secret. A copy was sent to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
2. Attached but not printed is the Report to the DCI on the Organization of CIA and the Intelligence Community, January 20.
3. Attached but not printed. Comments on Bross’ report by Abbot Smith and John Huizenga, Director and Deputy Director of Office of National Estimates, respectively, are in Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 80–R01621R, Box 1, Folder 19, D/ONE Files, 1969. Comments on the report by DDI Jack Smith are ibid., Job 80–R01442R, Box 2, Folder 13, National Intelligence Program Evaluation (NIPE), 1969.