115. Editorial Note
In an August 3, 1970, memorandum to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, Frank Shakespeare, Director of the U.S. Information Agency, requested that effective immediately the USIA Director attend all meetings of the Washington Special Actions Group dealing with Southeast Asia, particularly Cambodia. Kissinger wrote “nonsense” at the top of the memorandum. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 294, USIA, Vol. II, 1970 [27 Feb–Dec 14, 1970]) In a November 5 memorandum to Alexander Haig, USIA Deputy Director Loomis noted that of 89 National Security Decision Memorandums mentioned in a recent report, USIA had received only 9. “While we recognize that some of these NSDMs deal with subjects of marginal concern to this Agency, there are others that USIA needs if it is to do its job. For only if we know what U.S. policy is on a specific subject can we make sure that our media are accurately portraying and effectively supporting it.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–300, NSC System, Institutional File General, 1969 through 1974.) Jeanne Davis, NSC Staff Secretary, wrote Haig on November 12: “As you know, more than a year ago we cut back on the amount of information we were giving USIA about NSC activities at Mr. Kissinger’s request. Then, when the Review Group (which Frank Shakespeare attended) was abolished in favor of the SRG (which he does not attend) their isolation was almost complete. Our rationale has been, of course, that USIA receives its policy guidance from the State Department. But, given the history of ‘interpretations’ of Presidential decisions, it may be wise to provide, or at least supplement, this guidance more directly from here.” (Ibid.) On November 16 Haig sent Loomis copies of 24 NSDMs. (Ibid.)
About the same time Shakespeare asked for a meeting with the President. “We can probably pinpoint two points on Shakespeare’s mind from a series of recent memos,” Harold Saunders of the NSC staff conjectured in a November 18 memorandum to Haig: “(1) Soviet duplicity in the Mid-East and (2) the importance of keeping USIA informed on the foreign policy line we want projected.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 294, USIA, Vol. II, 1970 [27 Feb–Dec 14, 1970]) Shakespeare met with the President on November 25 and, according to Haldeman, had a long session “about his concern about Rogers and lack of loyalty at State, Rogers’ lack of conformity to P’s Soviet policy, State effort to ‘get’ him, etc.” (The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition) Haldeman informed Kissinger that at the meeting the President had “agreed that, from time to time, Frank should be in on certain NSC meetings to give him some [Page 253] background on the subjects covered. You should look for opportunities for Frank to sit in on such meetings.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–300, NSC System, Institutional File General, 1969 through 1974.)
On January 3, 1972, Shakespeare met with Haldeman to discuss his resignation, which he had submitted to the President on December 15, 1970. According to Haldeman, Shakespeare “said his reasons for resigning were, first, that he wanted to get back to the business world. That he couldn’t stay beyond this year anyway, but second, and undoubtedly far more important, was his disagreement with our basic foreign policy in terms of our failure to accept the Soviet threat as such. His third reason was exclusion from knowledge and participation which makes it impossible for him to function, especially since his views run counter to those of the establishment, although parallel to those of the P[resident]. He said our problem is that we’ve got to make a basic decision. Either we do or don’t want an independent USIA. The State Department, of course, wants to take it over and keep it locked up under its wing. If we do want an independent USIA that represents the P and his policy, then we’ve got to have the right director first, and second, the director must know why we are doing things in foreign policy. He has to be present at all NSC, Cabinet and WSAG meetings, both so he’ll be informed, and so that the bureaucracy will know that he’s part of the internal establishment. It’s essential that he be fully informed on policy and the reasons for it.” (The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition)
On March 29, 1971, Shakespeare met with Kissinger and reached an understanding that he outlined in an April 15 letter to Kissinger asking for confirmation; he would not be a formal member of the NSC or the Cabinet but would be invited to all Cabinet and NSC meetings as well as all WSAG and Senior Review Group meetings; the arrangement was personal and would not be extended to another USIA officer in his absence or to his successor in the event of his departure. On that basis Shakespeare indicated he would withdraw his resignation. He remained Director of USIA until February 7, 1973. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 295, USIA, Vol. IV, 1972 [Jan–Oct 1972])