Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972

73. Statement by President Nixon to the Press¹

Newmarket-on-Fergus, Ireland, October 4, 1970.

[Omitted here are introductory remarks.]

The purpose of this trip, just as has been the purpose of my other trips abroad, is to strengthen the structure of peace throughout the world, and particularly is to strengthen the structure of peace in the Mediterranean area which, because of recent events, has been an area of very great concern for all those interested in peace.

Now, in analyzing what the threat to peace in the Mediterranean is, we must realize that it is not the conventional threat of one nation possibly engaging in overt action against another. It is more difficult than that, more difficult because it is the threat which arises from irresponsible radical elements which might take action which, in turn, would set in the course of events, the train of events, set in motion—I meant to say—a train of events, that would escalate into a possible confrontation between major powers in the area. That is what we saw in the Jordanian crisis and that is the kind of threat to the peace that we will have to be guarding against in the months and possibly the years ahead in the Near East and the Mediterranean generally.

Now, when you have that kind of a threat, in order to meet it the primary need is for elements of stability in the area, economic and political stability, yes, but primarily, where the threat is irresponsible and where it resorts to violence, unexpected and unpredictable violence, without reason, without cause—sometimes—there must be military stability and military strength. That is why I first visited the 6th Fleet.

The 6th Fleet is one element of military stability in the Mediterranean. After visiting the 6th Fleet and being briefed by its commanders and our commanders there, I became convinced that the 6th Fleet is able to meet its mission of deterring irresponsible elements in the Mediterranean area.

After meeting with the 6th Fleet commanders and, also, after having discussed this matter with our NATO allies and with our ambassadors from the Mediterranean countries, I am convinced that it is essential that the 6th Fleet continue to have this capability in the event that other powers, with other designs on the area, other than ours and our friends who have no designs except the peace in the area, and the right of each individual nation to maintain its own integrity—in the event that other forces, naval forces, should threaten the position of strength which the 6th Fleet now enjoys, then the United States must be prepared to take the action necessary to maintain that overall strength of the 6th Fleet.

So what I am saying here is the 6th Fleet presently can meet its mission and, second, we shall be prepared to increase its strength in the event that its position of overall strength is threatened by the actions of other powers who take another position in the area than we do.

Another element of strength in the Mediterranean area is, of course, NATO, and particularly its Southern Command. Without going into the specific conversations that we had with the NATO Southern Commanders, I would emphasize here that this provided an opportunity for me to state very strongly and unequivocally these principles with regard to the United States association with NATO.

Considerable concern, I find, has arisen among many of the NATO nations, the major nations and the smaller NATO nations, as a result of some comments by political figures in the United States as well as some of those commenting upon the American role in the world, that the United States might not meet its NATO responsibilities and was on the verge of reducing its contribution to NATO. I stated categorically to the NATO Commanders, and I do it here publicly again, that the United States will, under no circumstances, reduce, unilaterally, its commitment to NATO. Any reduction in NATO forces, if it occurs, will only take place on a multilateral basis and on the basis of what those who are lined up against the NATO forces—what they might do. In other words, it would have to be on a mutual basis.

I know that the Nixon Doctrine has sometimes been inaccurately described as one that would allow the United States to reduce its responsibilities in the world. That is not the case. The purpose of the Nixon Doctrine is to provide a policy under which the United States can meet its responsibilities more effectively in the world by sharing those responsibilities with others. And in NATO that is our policy.

To summarize, with regard to NATO, we will maintain our present strength. We will not reduce it unilaterally. We will continue to talk with our NATO allies with regard to how, overall, we can meet our responsibilities together.

Moving from NATO now to the Mideast, I found in the conversations that I had with all of the leaders that I met—and, as you know, they covered not only our allies and friends but also they covered President Tito of Yugoslavia, a nonaligned state—I found general agreement on these propositions: strong support for the American cease-fire initiative; and, second, I found that, as far as that cease-fire initiative is concerned, that there is not the pessimism that we sense in some quarters, as a result of what happened in Jordan and as a result of the new instability that inevitably will follow the death of President Nasser, that the cease-fire initiative’s days were numbered.

I do not suggest that the road ahead is not difficult. But I think we have to separate our peace initiative into two parts: one, the cease-fire part of the initiative; and, second, that part of the initiative that has to do with negotiation.

With regard to negotiation, the prospect for immediate negotiation between the two or three or other parties involved on either side—as far as those prospects are concerned—they are, at this time, not bright because of the introduction of missiles into the 50-kilometer zone.

The reaction of the Israelis, of course, has been not to participate in negotiation. However, we are going to continue to attempt to get the negotiating process started and, of course, in the process, to do what we can diplomatically to see that there are no further violations of the standstill, and dealing, of course, diplomatically, with the violations that have occurred. So much for the negotiation side of it.

On the cease-fire side of it, however, I think I can say quite unequivocally that neither party—and by neither party I say neither the Israelis on the one side or the other nations, the U.A.R. and others involved in the cease-fire initiative—will gain by breaking the cease-fire. That is why we believe that our acting and talking strongly in behalf of an extension of the cease-fire for another 90 days is the proper course and that it has considerable chance to succeed. Because any party at this time that would break the cease-fire initiative would have very, very little support in the world. It would be acting alone against the whole weight of the world public opinion and also against the weight of public opinion, I should say, in the United States.

Another comment with regard to the Mideast that I think should be made: We tend in the United States to see our role as being predominant and, of course, it is because of our strength. On the other hand, we must recognize, and this trip brought this home to me and underlined it again, that there are other powers in the Mediterranean area that can play, that are playing, and that must play, a significant role in the peacekeeping area.

The Italians, for example, have a very significant interest in the Mediterranean and have contacts that we do not have that are better than ours. The Spanish also have very significant interests in the Mediterranean and have been very helpful. And the British, in addition, of course, have had a traditional, longtime interest in the Mediterranean area. My talks with the leaders of these three countries were very helpful in that respect because it is not a healthy situation in the world for the United States to be alone, whether it is in the Far East, where we welcome the fact that the British are maintaining a presence there, or whether it is in the Mideast, or in the Mediterranean.

That is why the Secretary of State and I have worked, both before we arrived on this trip and during this trip, on developing not only consultation but participation on the part of other Mediterranean powers who share our views about the area, and participation and responsibility for keeping the peace in that area.

[Omitted here are the President’s concluding remarks devoted primarily to his impressions of the trip and the leaders with whom he met.]

1. Source: Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1970, pp. 804-809. The President spoke at 6:35 p.m. at a reception given for the press in Dromoland Castle. His purpose, indicated in his opening remarks, was to summarize the European trip he was concluding.