39. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security
Affairs (Kissinger) to
President Nixon1
SUBJECT
Attached is a memorandum written by an acquaintance of mine which provides a
rather comprehensive assessment of the United States’ position in the world.
Although I do not agree with its every last word, it does define the problem
we face—the generally deteriorating strategic position of the United States
during the past decade.
Many analysts have written about the problems faced by the Communists. But I
do not believe that the world situation, as viewed from Moscow, provides
great cause for Communist pessimism.
Andrei Zhdanov’s “two-camp” speech in September 1947 referred only to
Bulgaria, Poland and Romania as relatively secure Communist states and
allies. He saw no real possibility in the Middle East and no hope in Latin
America. He considered China to be imperialist. But Zhdanov’s pessimistic
outlook has not been justified by subsequent events—certainly during the
last decade.
- —In the Middle East, Russian influence is spreading and moderate Arab
governments are under increasing pressure.
- —In Latin America, the potential for guerrilla warfare grows, and the
outlook for future Nasser-type (if not Communist), anti-American
governments improves.
- —In Europe, NATO is in a state of
malaise, accentuated by our shifting policies over the last 10 years.
Europeans are increasingly concerned about isolationist currents within
the U.S. (particularly within the liberal community).
- —In Asia, as you saw on your trip, leaders are concerned about the
future U.S. role there.
You inherited this legacy of the past decade. The lesson one can draw from it
is not that we can fight this trend on every issue. But foreign policy
depends on an accumulation of nuances, and no opponent
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of ours can have much reason to believe that
we will stick to our position on the issues which divide us. When Hanoi
compares our negotiating position on Vietnam now with that of 18 months ago,
it must conclude that it can achieve its goals simply by waiting. Moscow
must reach the same conclusion.
These are dangerous conclusions for an enemy to draw, and I believe that we
therefore face the prospect of major confrontations.
Hence, my concern about the gravity of the situation, of which I thought I
should let you know.
Attachment
Washington, September 29, 1969.
THE MODERN WORLD, A SINGLE “STRATEGIC THEATER”
Section A
- 1.
- It is one of the truisms of our time that because of the
sensational development of communications and transportation, the
globe has shrunk with distances between formerly far-away countries
having been reduced to mere hours of flight time. We all pay
continuous lip service to the axiom that the hallmark, today, of
relations among States, even among continents, is interdependence rather than independence. But while every
political writer and speaker belabors this point ad nauseum, we
actually deal with the Mideast, Latin America, the Atlantic Region,
Eastern Europe, NE Asia, and SE Asia as if we were still living in
the WW-II era when it was realistic
and feasible to speak of a European, an India-Burma-China, a Pacific
“Strategic Theater” as essentially separate and autonomous.
- 2.
- In theory, people may understand the phenomenon of interdependence
rather well and be quite aware of the fact that the whole globe, by
now, has become a single strategic theater. In practice, however,
near-unavoidable bureaucratic compartmentalization has led to
specialization among experts and decision-makers: Those who are
knowledgeable regarding the strategically more and more important
Trucial Oman, know little or nothing about Canada, and those who are
experts on Berlin have no eyes for, or interest in, the issue of
Okinawa. The man who daily struggles with the agonizing problem of
Vietnam can hardly be expected to pay special attention to the
latest coup in Libya, and the person concerned with US aid to Latin America has little time
or inclination to consider recent political developments in
Czechoslovakia.
- 3.
- Since, by chance, it has become my specialty to be a generalist,
let me draw for you a sketch of how seemingly isolated developments
in specific areas are deeply interconnected in fact, how the single
stones of the mosaic actually form a clearly recognizable overall
tableau.
Section B
I
- 1.
- It might be helpful to start out with a remarkable, largely
unnoticed, passage in Senator Mansfield’s Report to the President,
on his recent Pacific tour. Having stated that the leaders of the
Asian countries visited by him “agree” that the role of the US in Asian affairs should shrink, the
Senator remarked that there was also “some uneasiness” among those
leaders “that the pendulum will swing too far from [US]2 over-involvement to
non-involvement.” Mansfield is not a “pessimist,” because—as you may
remember—he had on the very eve of the invasion of Czechoslovakia
reported to President Johnson that, on the basis of his analysis of
the situation in East Europe, he considered a reduction of US forces in Germany not only
appropriate but even desirable. Actually, the Senator’s
wording—“some uneasiness” in non-Communist Asia about the US moving toward a stance of
non-involvement—constitutes a “diplomatic” understatement which
barely hints at, but does not really reflect at all, the
overwhelming fear of such countries as S. Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos,
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore—and even Indonesia, the Philippines
and Australia—to have to face potential future aggressors
essentially with their own military forces.
- 2.
- Your country specialists will tell you, if you ask them, that the
Indonesian leaders—despite the size and relative geographic
protectedness of their island nation—have informed us of a need for
the US to “stay” for at least 3 more
years in Vietnam, so that they might peacefully consolidate their
country without fear of Communist direct or indirect
aggression.
- 3.
- It also deserves to be noted that Gen Romulo—unwaveringly
pro-US and
anti-Communist—nevertheless remarked in a public speech, some time
ago, when he took over the position of Foreign Minister at Manila,
that in view of the impossibility to rely henceforth on US protection it would be necessary to
“adjust” Philippine Foreign Policy. He remarked, in this connection,
that, as of that day, Philippine Foreign Office references to China
would no longer be to the “Chinese Mainland” but to the People’s
Republic of China, the country’s official designation adopted by the
Mao regime. In an
interview given by Romulo at the UN
in N.Y. he expressed a wish (see NY Times of
[Page 113]
September 22, 1969) “that the UN, in its peace-keeping efforts would
consider [General] MacArthur’s suggestion that borders threatened by
guerrilla infiltration or possible enemy invasion be sealed off with
a belt of radioactive materials.” The suggestion of so strong, and
innately unpopular, a measure by a SE Asian Foreign Minister does
reveal more than mere “uneasiness” in the face of coming
dangers.
- 4.
- The Prime Minister of Singapore, Mr. Lee, who
proudly calls himself an Asian Socialist, shocked the anti-Vietnam
War Swedish Social Democrats last year, when he declared in an
address to that party’s annual Congress, that the US was fighting in Vietnam for the
independence of Singapore and that this independence was predicated
on US willingness to continue the
fight.
- 5.
- You also remember that Sihanouk of Cambodia—certainly not a friend
and even less a tool of the US—has
explained again and again over many years that he had no choice but
to accommodate to China the powerful, because one day, regardless of
US protestations to the contrary,
Washington would move its forces out of SE Asia and he, as a
convinced Cambodian nationalist, deemed it his task to establish
such relations with the Communist victors of tomorrow that, at
least, the Communist takeover would be “peaceful.”3 In a very
dramatic, typically Sihanoukian letter to the editors of the NYT the
Cambodian Chief of State asked his US
readers not to consider him naive regarding Communist intentions. I
know very well, he wrote, that, although they [Communists] are
friendly to me now, “they will say ‘Sihanouk down on your knees,’
once they are victorious and oust me without ceremony.” I do not
have to point out to you that, by now, the Cambodians are actually
trying to cooperate, tacitly and secretly, with the hated S.
Vietnamese in a not very successful attempt to prevent expansion of
de facto Communist control over still further areas of their small
country.
- 6.
- You are also, I believe, fully aware of what Souvanna Phouma of
Laos, the leaders of Thailand and those of Malaysia—to say nothing
of Chiang Kai-shek in
Taiwan—tell us in confidence as regards their true feelings; i.e.,
naked fear, concerning a US military
withdrawal from SE Asia.
II
- 1.
- The preceding paragraphs have been devoted to SE Asia not only
because—by chance, or due to some inherent geopolitical
necessity—that region of the world happens to be at the moment our
most obviously active area of preoccupation, but also because, for
that very reason, it must be these days the center of your own
attention and deepest
[Page 114]
worries. The world, too, focuses its attention on Vietnam, as an
indicator of the direction in which US policy and strategy in general are likely to move.
You know more, of course, about US
future plans and intentions than anyone else, except the President
of the US and his Secretary of State,
but I venture the assertion that any objective analyst—be he in
Peking or Bonn, Moscow or Paris, Ottawa or Cairo—simply cannot help
reaching the conclusion that, so far, all the indicators point in
one direction only: an ultimate pull-out, a radical reduction of
military commitments, a withdrawal of US military power not simply in hotly contested Vietnam
but on a worldwide scale.
- 2.
- It can hardly be questioned by now that we are on the verge of
restoring the Ryukyus, our great stronghold in the NE Asia region,
to Japan. And even such bases as we may retain on those islands will
be, more likely than not, under the same restrictive regime now
applying to our troops and military installations in the Japanese
homeland (in accordance with the US/Japan Status of Forces Agreement). That South
Korea—already shaken and frightened by the meek US reaction to the capture of the
“Pueblo” and to the shooting down of our EC-121—is deeply worried by
this development is well known and more than natural, especially
since Seoul is afraid, not entirely without justification, that in
the “post-Vietnam” period we might thin out, or even reduce greatly,
the US forces now stationed in that
country. Less well known is the fact that the Japanese
themselves—although Tokyo, for obvious reasons, cannot publicly
admit it—feel less well protected with the US military strength on Okinawa diminished or newly
restricted. It is generally, and somewhat superficially, assumed
that this heightened sense of insecurity may have the salutary
effect of spurring Japan into making a greater defense effort of its
own. But one must ask, whether it would really be in the US interest, if the Japanese followed
this line of thought to its logical conclusion; i.e., to the
establishment of a purely Japanese nuclear weapons arsenal.
Moreover, the leftist opposition, and pacifism in general, are
sufficiently powerful within Japan to create such internal upheaval,
if the government were actually to embark on any large-scale
rearmament, that there would be a lengthy period of instability and
weakness in the country, before it could actually become militarily
more self-reliant. In the meantime Japan could hardly fail to seek
an accommodation with Red China or the USSR or, “ideally,” both. In any event: The
simultaneous US trend to reduce its
power position in North as well as in South East Asia, is bound to
have a profound effect on the political and strategic thinking and
planning of any Asian country which in the ultimate
analysis—willingly or reluctantly—has to rely on the US as a protective shield against the
potential super power: China. New Delhi, for example, cannot very
well assume that the US is prepared
to come to its rescue, when it observes Washington’s eagerness to
move
[Page 115]
out and away in
regard to Pacific areas (such as Indochina and Okinawa/Japan) in
which the US has long had an
infinitely more pronounced and direct interest than in India. The
Indian leaders, in addition, would have to be influenced by the
stark military fact that, in the event of a Communist takeover in SE
Asia, their country would be outflanked in the East, with a
pro-Chinese Pakistan constituting at the same time a (real or
imagined) threat in the West.
III
- 1.
- As regards the Mid East, it is customary to think, to the
exclusion of almost any other consideration, of the Arab/Israeli
conflict. No doubt, the present Administration is engaged in a
superhuman effort to make the two sides see reason and prevent a
“fourth round,” but in view of earlier US performances, it must be decidedly difficult for
Arabs or Israelis to rely on anything but their own brute strength.
A US role as an effective guarantor
of any future compromise solution is simply not credible, because of
our obvious past and present reluctance (with the one exception of
Lebanon in 1958) to back up diplomatic agreements or political
friendships with a US military
presence.
- 2.
- Cynics used to believe that, because of the Jewish vote in the
US, Washington would necessarily
have to intervene in Israel’s favor in any “real emergency.”
Actually, the historical record proves otherwise. In 1956, we turned
against our French and British allies and our Israeli protégés and
impelled the latter to evacuate the Sinai peninsula; while in 1967,
when Nasser threatened war with remarkable frankness, we tried in
every way to dissuade Tel Aviv from reacting to the Egyptian
blockade of the Straits of Tiran by non-peaceful means. Israel then
started military action on her own, strictly against our wish and
will, and won so quickly and overwhelmingly that our readiness to
come to its rescue no longer had to be tested. I do not, as you
know, consider it an a priori US task
and mission to protect Israel, but it so happens that in the eyes of
the world that small Western enclave in a non-Western environment is
considered our “client,” and conclusions must be drawn, of needs,
everywhere (not only in Moscow and Tel Aviv but in other capitals as
well) from the fact that the US is
obviously disinclined to support even its own client, if that would
mean military involvement.
- 3.
- Those Arab regimes, on the other hand, which have struggled to
stay relatively pro-West can be even less trustful as regards our
active help than the Israelis, since there is no Arab constituency
in this country.
- 4.
- We have in the past been unable to protect the pro-US royal regime in Iraq. We did not help
Saudi Arabia against the Nasser-supported Republican Yemen. We
tolerated the establishment of a radically
[Page 116]
leftist, pro-Peking rather than pro-Moscow,
Republic of South Yemen, when the British withdrew from Aden and the
Aden Protectorates. We showed no interest, when the moderate
government in the Sudan was overthrown by revolutionary radicals;
and we obviously will do nothing, if after complete withdrawal of
the British from the Persian Gulf area, the present rulers of the
various Sheikdoms there should be thrown out by wild-eyed Arab
nationalists with Marxist leanings. From the point of view of the
moderate Arab leaders it must appear that friendship with the US does not offer protection and does
not pay.4 Only a few
weeks ago, King Idris of Libya was ousted by a group of officers
leaning toward the Iraqi type of Baathism, one of the most fanatic
and anti-Western forms of Arab radicalism. We seemed grateful that,
for the time being, the new rulers declared their willingness to
tolerate our base at Wheelus and promised not to nationalize the
US and other Western oil
companies. For King Idris, however, we were either unwilling or
unable to do anything. One of the results of the Libyan coup—apart
from the fact that roughly one billion $ in annual oil revenues has
now passed into the hands of avowed Revolutionaries—is the ominous
deterioration of Tunisia’s position. Long one of the “most
reasonable” and most enlightened among Arab countries, Tunisia,
still led by the distinctly pro-Western Bourguiba, suddenly finds
herself surrounded by two hostile neighbors: Libya and Algeria.
Bourguiba can hardly help feeling that with his moderation he has
betted on the wrong horse. Small moderate Lebanon, too—which in 1958
was still able to call on US military
help—is currently being forced to abandon its traditional policy of
neutrality and to tolerate, despite surprisingly courageous
counter-efforts by its President Helou, the takeover of its
southernmost border areas by Arab Commando groups composed almost
exclusively of non-Lebanese. Considering the lack of any physical
outside support for Helou, it seems only a question of time, when
he, too, will be replaced by regimes of the kind now governing
neighboring Syria and Iraq.
- 5.
- Under the circumstances, even those Arabs who used to maintain a
degree of friendship with the US
cannot possibly place great trust in Washington’s declarations of
amity. It may be a paradox, but must nevertheless be understood,
that, precisely because we have shown ourselves so peaceful and
patient, so obviously unwilling to intervene with force anywhere or
against anyone, it will now be virtually impossible for either Arab
or Jew to see in the United States the great power that would
actually protect one side against the other and maintain any
[Page 117]
agreed upon peaceful order
by forceful means, should that prove necessary. If a country is so
clearly shying away from physical involvement, it is difficult to
believe that it will ever permit itself to become so
involved.
- 6.
- It has widely been assumed that the USSR would restrain the Arabs, as we might restrain the
Israelis, out of a fear of a direct US/USSR confrontation.
It should be observed, however, that the Soviet interest to exercise
such restraining influence is bound to decrease to more or less the
same degree to which Moscow’s fear of a direct confrontation of the
two super powers diminishes. The more the Soviets—looking at US actions and inactions around the
world—become convinced that the US
remains unbendingly resolved to negotiate rather than to confront,
the smaller their incentive to restrain their clients; i.e., in the
Mid East case, the Arabs.
IV
- 1.
- In Latin America, too, the US has
demonstrated such extreme unwillingness recently to use “power” that
we actually seem to have placed a premium on hotheaded and
undesirable ventures by extremists. We have let Ecuador, Peru, and
others, arrogate to themselves exclusive fishing rights in a zone of
200 miles from their coastlines, and we have permitted US fishing boats found in those zones to
be shelled or brought to port by foreign naval vessels, whence they
have been released only against payment of arbitrary “fines.” We
leaned over backwards not to apply the Hickenlooper Amendment5 as a sanction against Peru for uncompensated
expropriation, by a revolutionary Officers Junta, of hundreds of
millions worth of US property. The
example was quickly followed by Bolivia where a few days ago,
another revolutionary group likewise led by a general, enacted
certain measures, on the very first day of its existence,
foreshadowing expropriation of US oil
companies in that country.6
- 2.
- The Latin temperament is rather volatile by nature and the
colossus to the North is not necessarily popular among Latinos. It
is dangerous, therefore, and does not promote peaceful developments,
if the impression is created that irresponsible—or even normally
quite
[Page 118]
responsible—elements, can act wildly and illegally without having to
fear any serious reaction on our part. We certainly could not hold
the Brazilian government responsible for the recent unprecedented
kidnapping of the US Ambassador in
full daylight. But it is doubtful whether our concern for a single
diplomat’s life, our clearly manifested “hope” that all the
kidnappers’ demands be fulfilled speedily to save one man, was as
humane as it seemed: Since it has become all too clear now that the
host country of a US representative
can be blackmailed with such surprising ease, it must be feared that
there will be further kidnappings of US diplomats in the foreseeable future.7
- 3.
- It is no longer seriously doubted today that the Balaguer regime
in the Dominican Republic with all its deficiencies, is,
nevertheless, the best administration that country has ever had
since 1865 (when Santo Domingo gained its final independence from
Spain). The regime was established after order had been restored in
the Republic by US military
intervention, which at the time was bitterly criticized by many,
even well-meaning people as an act of US “imperialism.” No US
President, of course, would like to repeat a similar venture. Yet,
it is not desirable, in the very interest of peace, to let everybody
assume, as appears to be the case today, that the US will no longer intervene anywhere in
Latin America at any time.8
V
- 1.
- When Czechoslovakia was invaded in August 1968, the experts, and
large segments of public opinion, found one consolation in the
mournful event: It would re-awaken the Western World to the danger
from the East and revive the somewhat lethargic NATO. The prediction (which, as you
may recall, I contradicted at the time) was wrong. The lasting
impression that finally resulted was that of NATO’s and the US’ virtually total non-reaction, except in words, and
the capability of brute force (applied in this case by the Soviets)
to impose its will.
- 2.
- The Germans, as you know only too well from frequent and direct
observation, have—after two World Wars lost, with five totally
different regimes following each other within 50 years, and with
their country still divided—by no means regained their
self-confidence. I
[Page 119]
transmitted to you the other day a report containing the remarks of
a German leader9 who, upon his
return from an official visit to Moscow, while admitting that the
Soviets had remained totally rigid and offered absolutely nothing,
concluded nevertheless that W. Germany had no choice but to come to
terms with Moscow “because,” he said, “I have twice recently been in
Washington and found there such a trend toward isolationism that I
am certain the Americans will sooner or later pull their forces out
of Germany.” The individual in question may have been objectively
wrong, but the fear he expressed is actually shared by virtually all
Germans who do have opinions on foreign and world affairs.
- 3.
- After having visited Washington and signed the Offset
Agreement,10 Chancellor Kiesinger thought he had obtained a
US undertaking that current
US force strength in Germany
would be fully maintained during, at least, the two years covered by
said Agreement. You are far better aware of the fact than I am that
his impressions were overoptimistic.
- 4.
- It is sometimes asserted that the very threat of US troop reductions would bring about a
greater defense effort by the united Europeans themselves. In actual
fact, however, Europe—though united it would be a Great Power—is not
yet united, and Italians, Germans, Frenchmen, Beneluxers, and
Scandinavians think of themselves as small, in terms of military
strength, and in need of protection by the only super power that
happens to exist in the non-Communist world: the US. When big brother even appears to
falter, the little brethren will not move forward courageously—as we
seem to think—but, on the contrary, they will anxiously take several
steps backwards.
- 5.
- By coincidence, I happened to be in Italy at the end of August,
when the fact leaked out that our very small garrison there (in the
Verona/Vicenza area with a logistic base at Leghorn) would be cut in
half for “economy reasons.” The Italians guessed, more or less
correctly, that no more than a total of about 1,500 men would be
involved. Not a single Italian, whom I heard discuss the
matter—regardless of whether he stood politically on the right, left
or center—accepted that explanation. Everybody assumed, as a matter
of course, that this was simply the first installment of a total
US military pull-out from
Italy.
- 6.
- The Canadians, incidentally, encounter the same disbelief
throughout Europe, when they adduce economic motives for withdrawing
roughly one-half of their small European garrison. Unaware of
Trudeau’s marked sense of independence, many Europeans actually
believe that Canada could not very well take such a measure without
the, at least tacit, approval of Washington. This, then, leads to
the further conclusion that the entire North American continent is
beginning to turn inward and intent on ultimately withdrawing all
its forces still stationed on foreign soil.
VI
1. You will not expect in this sketch any analysis of the complex issue
of US/USSR relations. But one comment deserves to be made in the
general context I have chosen: The Soviets are developing some genuine
fear of Red China and its intractable leaders. They might, therefore,
feel impelled by self-interest to seek a genuine Kremlin/Washington
détente, and even make certain concessions to the US as a conceivable future ally, semi-ally or at least
friendly “neutral” in a Soviet-Chinese confrontation. The entire Soviet
assessment, however, of the weight and value of the United States as a
friend or foe, will depend very largely on their considering US either strong-willed or else weak in
purpose and resolve. The realists in the Kremlin may now be “taking our
measure,” and a US yielding, and
reluctant to act on all fronts, will appear less interesting and
important to them as a factor in the international power struggle than a
super power obviously able and willing to use its strength.11
VII
- 1.
- This then is the overall image of the US as a reluctant giant: seeking peace and
reconciliation almost feverishly, withdrawing forces not in one but
in many parts of the world, tired of using its physical power and
firmly resolved to cut existing commitments and keep out, for a very
long time to come, of any confrontation that might lead to any
military involvement.12
- 2.
- This picture appears to be confirmed by a flow of US governmental statements on military
budget cuts, temporary suspension of the draft, overall reduction of
forces, deactivation of units, and mothballing of naval vessels.
Although in reality these various measures, so far, are not
earth-shaking in themselves, they do produce the impression
[Page 121]
of an irreversible trend,
of deliberate first steps on the road toward a liquidation of very
many long-held power positions, of a systematic retreat into an
inner shell. Even though we do not want it, we do appear to friendly
as well as hostile observers as intent upon descending from a stage
to make room for new actors whom nobody can fully see as yet, but
who cannot fail to appear to take the spaces we are leaving
empty.
VIII
- 1.
- Anyone with a sense of history will grasp the tragic elements in
this situation. The President by training and instinct knows, of
course, exactly what is at stake. So do you, a historian and a man
with a pronounced sense of power realities. The policy on which we
seem embarked is very obviously dictated by a conviction that
“public opinion” demands it and that, accordingly, the government is
essentially helpless to act otherwise. This pessimism about the
public might be unwarranted. Results of a Gallup poll, published in
today’s NYT (see Annex)13 indicate that 3 out of 5 persons polled consider
US intervention in Vietnam
justified. The votes lie not with those professors, students, and
other particularly visible and audible protesters, nor with the
writers and readers of our few great (or perhaps only big)
newspapers.
- 2.
- The votes lie with the masses, and I have the truly frightening
suspicion that these very masses—which today do not even care very
much about foreign affairs and foreign problems—will be the first
ones to yell for retribution and stampede forward over our bodies,
howling that we have betrayed them, when a year or two from now it
becomes clear that our well meant policy, allegedly attuned to
public opinion, will have led to defeat, and to crises infinitely
more terrible than that Vietnam war we have to face now. Lincoln
used artillery in the streets of New York against rebellious
“copperheads;” about 1100 people were killed in two days as a
result. He was considered, however, not only a great man but a great
humanitarian, when it turned out, subsequently, that he had been
“right.” “The people” are not very just, they forgive the victor,
but always make scapegoats of their own leaders who are not
victorious.14 The Dolchstosslegende (the propaganda tale of
the “stab in the back” of the fighting troops) unfortunately can be
invented in any country and at any time.
