94. Letter From the President’s Special Assistant for Telecommunications (O’Connell) to Secretary of State Rusk1
Dear Mr. Secretary:
Recent analysis of the status of COMSAT and of INTELSAT, and indeed of international telecommunications in general, has led me to conclude that there are increasingly serious threats to the future success and viability of both COMSAT and INTELSAT.
The motivations and the ongoing actions in response to them by many interests have such serious potentials that I have prepared and submitted to the President a memorandum expressing my concerns. A copy of this memorandum is attached.2
The purpose of this letter is to focus more sharply upon those critical issues which appear to me to require prompt and continuous action.
A variety of motives and incentives are leading certain nations to conclude that it may be in their best interests to establish regional satellite communications systems separate from and independent of the INTELSAT system. That one of the incentives relates to maintaining or achieving greater financial returns is apparent. Equally apparent is the fact that the unique promises of satellite technology for effecting greater international understanding and for promoting the social, political, and economic growth of less developed nations will be subverted to the narrower interests of national prestige, political influence, and unilateral economic gains at the expense of greater growth, lower costs, and better service for all nations.
The French, for example, are moving aggressively in the direction of establishing a European-African regional system which could contribute to her quest for hegemony in Europe and would strengthen her traditional political and economic influence in her former African colonies.
Japan, whose technological capability in telecommunications is great and growing, gives clear evidence of her desire to establish a regional system which would include the Japanese islands, the Far East, and probably Southeast Asia.
[Page 176]I believe it to be of the greatest importance that the incentives for the establishment of regional systems be removed to the extent that it is possible to do so, and that the United States redouble its efforts on behalf of the single global satellite communication system.
If this is not done, and if the concept of regional systems is successfully implemented by the French and the Japanese, they will inevitably be followed by other nations capable of competing. The ensuing proliferation of regional systems will destroy the concept underlying the establishment of COMSAT and INTELSAT and ultimately destroy INTELSAT itself.
The situation is confused, moreover, by the introduction of a number of U.S. domestic issues which are now before the FCC and will soon be considered by committees of Congress. Action by the United States at this time to establish a separate domestic system would, by our example, add much strength and support to the French concepts of a European regional system outside of INTELSAT. Thus, there is urgently needed the formulation of a national policy which will clarify the position of the Executive Branch in respect to the global system and the respective roles which COMSAT and INTELSAT play in establishing the global system. Such a statement of policy by the Executive Branch does not now exist.3
For text of NSAM No. 338 (Revised), see Document 96.
A number of intragovernmental panels have been engaged in addressing these matters. The complexity of the problems and the infrequency of panel meetings have caused the panel actions to move slowly and they have not been keeping pace with the rapidly developing situations. As a result, representatives of our respective offices have discussed ways and means of expediting action on the most serious and fastest growing problems. We are now working on an informal but increasingly expedited basis with representatives of your Department.
I believe that our joint efforts can profitably be directed toward two immediate objectives. It needs to be made clear to the nations of INTELSAT that the seeming attraction of regional systems is illusory, that there is nothing which a regional system can do which the global [Page 177] system cannot do better and at less cost, that replacement of the idea of a unified, integrated, and free association of nations in the INTELSAT venture by a scheme to partition the world into spheres of separate, competing systems will bring with it all of the serious defects of our present international communications structure.
Specifically, as a matter of urgency, there would appear to be great value in instituting a series of talks with the European nations which are currently considering entering into the proposed European regional system.
I further believe that a most important objective in the interest of getting INTELSAT more firmly established is to achieve more rapid progress in establishing the required earth station complex. Earth stations are the means by which the global system can be completed. Far more significantly, however, they are the means by which the voices of the poorer, underdeveloped nations can be heard in the councils of INTELSAT. This collective voice can be the strongest counteracting influence upon those nations which seek to establish or reestablish in this new field nationally polarized communications hegemonies.
A variety of influences appears to be delaying decisions concerning the establishment and financing of earth stations in developing countries, particularly in South America. In the latter area, additional conflict and confusion result from domestic and international interests of U.S. common carriers.
The tide of events presses urgently for a policy which will permit expeditious acquisition of earth stations by those countries which are clearly interested but apparently unable to make headway in obtaining them. In this respect, I recommend that the Department of State make such representations to the Inter-American Development Bank as will result in prompt action on loan requests from South American nations, and that any indications which previously may have been made to these nations of an unwillingness by the Inter-American Development Bank to accept loan requests be rescinded.
I cannot overemphasize, Mr. Secretary, my concern with the need for prompt and aggressive action in these matters. I want you to know that the resources of my office are available to support and assist you in all such actions that you may decide to take.
Sincerely,
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, TEL 6. Confidential.↩
- Document 93.↩
- U. Alexis Johnson wrote to Richard Sneider from Japan on January 20: “I agree with you that the basic problem is that not even we ourselves have defined a ‘single global system’ and, therefore, it is tough to get another country to sign on the dotted line for something that even we cannot define. However, I fully understand the impossibility of getting such a definition at this time.” He added: “It also seems to me that there is an inherent illogic in the draft [NSAM No. 338] in recognizing that there are ‘unique and vital national security needs which cannot be met by commercial facilities’ in so far as the U.S. Government is concerned, but not recognizing that other countries may feel that they also have ‘unique and vital’ needs, whether security or otherwise, which cannot be met by a ‘single global system.’” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1967–69, TEL 6)↩