53. Editorial Note
In a memorandum of July 26, 1966, to Francis Bator, Arnold Frutkin summarized the difficulty of implementing the President’s December 1965 proposal for international space cooperation (see Documents 36 and 37). U.S. ideas for an “Advanced Cooperative Space Project” (ACSP) included proposals for a joint U.S.-European probe to either the Sun or Jupiter. The European countries limited their consideration to these specific projects although they were only examples of possible missions. NASA believed that European officials were favorable to a joint program, but the fact that the proposal came from the United States was a serious defect in European eyes. NASA officials had few options on how to proceed and hoped that Prime Minister Wilson, during an upcoming visit to Washington, would signal his readiness for the United Kingdom to provide leadership within Europe. NASA suggested that, in his meetings with Wilson, the President note “casually that he continues to have some interest in the possibility that advanced space projects could stimulate Europe to more rapid progress in technology through joint efforts in cooperation with the United States.” (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA Historical Reference Collection, Files of the Office of International Affairs)
The European space organization, ESRO, reviewed the proposals and reported in August 1966 that some proposals were “very favorably received” and others were discussed. But, the chairman added, “The Council had to recognise that an additional project of the proposed magnitude could not be completed within the financial resources which, under existing agreements, will be available to this Organisation during the years 1967–1971.” (Letter from Hocker to Webb, August 3; ibid.)
On August 11 Frutkin informed Webb that, because the prospects for a positive response to the President’s initiative were “sufficiently distant,” it was time to reconsider the proposal for a Webb mission to Europe. Webb’s visit would be billed as a personal fact-finding mission. He was to stress U.S. interest in cooperation and assure the Europeans that “the President’s proposal was in no sense intended to channel [Page 106] European interests in any preconceived direction but rather to offer the widest possible opportunity for Europe to consider what advanced space projects might serve European technological interest.” Although the general atmosphere had been slightly improved by the State Department’s helpfulness toward ELDO, “All in all, we must say the President’s proposal got off to a poor start due to misunderstandings which are inevitable when a proposition of this sort is first made in the headlines without preparation of the ground, the existing poor climate, the ELDO and NATO crises, and the fiscal problems of the UK. My own cautious view at the moment is that the proposal will not be given a hard negative in Europe, that we will be successful in keeping it alive and on the books, and that slowly we will induce the Europeans to recognize the advantages in directing their future ESRO planning in such a fashion as to encompass a useful project of the kind we have suggested.” (Memorandum from Frutkin to Webb, August 11; ibid.)
Rusk concurred that Webb’s mission would be difficult. In an August 29 letter to Webb, he wrote: “The European countries, with the exception of Germany, are apparently not prepared to respond positively to the President’s offer and to our suggestions for an advanced cooperative space program at the present time.” He added that Webb’s visit would contribute to a general improvement in climate and he instructed that “Major multilateral space projects should remain our long-term goal.” (Ibid.; Webb’s response, September 1, is also ibid.)
Webb visited only the United Kingdom and West Germany. No other capitals were visited “in order to avoid undue exposure to the press in light of reports of major Soviet booster developments, and to avoid any appearance of boycotting Paris.” He reported to Secretary Rusk in October that the British were interested but “severely limited” by fiscal constraints. The Germans were interested in bilateral projects, but were not prepared to discuss launching a German experimental communications satellite by the United States. “Taken together with information obtained in London, this suggests the possibility of an increasing regional European interest in communications satellites, comprehending ELDO, ESRO, and CETS and requiring careful US consideration in light of the 1969 INTELSAT renegotiations.” (See Documents 63 ff.) The German preference was for a communications satellite launch within the “European framework.” Webb argued that a regional system might be obsolete before it could be put into operation because of the work being done in the United States and elsewhere in connection with INTELSAT. (Notes on Webb’s visits to England and Germany are enclosed in a letter from Webb to Rusk, October 14; National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Historical Reference Collection, Files of the Office of International Affairs)
[Page 107]In his final assessment of his mission for the Secretary, Webb noted: “I believe the effort was productive but also believe we must begin to pattern the individual actions taken within our government toward a more consistent approach to the needs of those nations we are anxious to have increase their own competence so that they can better participate in multilateral activities and can better understand their own needs and opportunities in bilateral negotiations.” European suspicion about U.S. intentions combined with U.S. export restrictions on key technology was a serious bar to cooperation, despite “the liberal positions taken by you [Rusk] and the President on this subject.” (Letter from Webb to Rusk, October 14; ibid.)