Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXIV, Energy Diplomacy and Global Issues

49. Position Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

Washington, June 14, 1966.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE VIEWS ON THE POST-APOLLO PROGRAM

United States scientific and technological achievements have become prominent indices of our international power and standing. Such achievements, and especially those in the field of space, are important components in the definition of our international stature. The United States should not be diffident about using its scientific and technological prowess in support of its international objectives. Yet we must recognize that international advantage flows more readily and constantly from sound and solid scientific endeavors than from enterprises designed primarily for political purposes.

In the development of a post-Apollo program, the first and overriding objective must be goals that are sound, scientifically valid and consistent with fiscal realities. At the same time it must be appreciated that the size, scope, content and effectiveness of the program will inevitably have a significant bearing on international events and the way we are regarded by the rest of the world.

In short, the effect of the U.S. Space Program on our international posture is substantial and cannot be overlooked. Design of programs should be calculated to fulfill the scientific and technological potential of outer space, but on a scale and in a manner that will exploit all reasonable opportunities which may enhance our world position in the future.

Soviet skill in exploiting space achievements to their advantage in the areas of national prestige and international politics must be recognized and countered. We must expect that space spectaculars will continue to be the order of the day to the extreme limit of Soviet capability. And they will not stop at the moon.

During the first ten years of the Space Age we have regularly found ourselves in the apparent position of following the Soviet lead in space exploration, of responding to, rather than issuing, challenges. We have, and should continue to have, a superior program characterized by openness and a willingness to share knowledge freely. We should guard against a gap in planning and development that will vitiate our advantages and leave us in a posture of response rather than of leadership.

In view of all these points it does not seem too early to seek answers to several questions regarding what comes next.

1. When will the post-Apollo program provide for exploration of near-by planets? Manned? Unmanned?

2. How adequate are the resources allocated to research for advanced, post-Apollo, space vehicle propulsion systems? Are power sources for spacecraft receiving sufficient support?

3. What is the nature of the follow-on lunar program? What are the plans for a lunar research station? When will we be ready for internationally manned lunar stations?

4. Does the program include development of technology for broadcast satellites direct to community antennae? To homes?

5. What does the program provide for the development of remote sensing technology for agricultural, geological, oceanographic, and other scientific and commercial purposes?

6. When will the program provide for a Manned Orbiting Research Laboratory? What degree of international cooperation is foreseen in utilizing such facilities?

1. Source: Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383, SP 11 ELDO. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the source text. This paper was prepared for a meeting of the National Aeronautics and Space Council on June 15 to discuss post-Apollo planning and specifically to answer a question of the Vice President: “Do you see any special advantages in selecting any particular goals in advancing this country’s prestige or bargaining position abroad?” (Memorandum from Pollack to Rusk, June 15; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, SP 10) In the June 13 covering memorandum to the Secretary that accompanied this memorandum, Pollack stated the Department’s goals: “Because of the hard facts of international relations in a space conscious world, post-Apollo programs have significant political importance and must therefore be constructed with that in mind. In order to establish and clarify the record it is suggested that you table a paper at the meeting … which would voice the Department’s interest in post-Apollo programs.” (Department of State, SCI Files: Lot 68 D 383) According to reports of the meeting, “The Secretary stated that his main interest was in near earth activities in space rather than expensive activities for interplanetary performance. He stressed communications and navigation satellites, space sciences, improvement in defense use of space; he did very nicely.” (Memorandum from Nesbitt to Pollack, June 15; ibid.)