177. Telegram From the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State1

736. Embtel 735.2 UK Ambassador Allen saw PriMin and Wattari3 this afternoon and says in effect he got brushoff despite fact he made clear that GOI enactment of NIOC law could well have adverse effect on Anglo-Iraqi relations.4 PriMin took position issuance of law would [Page 321] enhance possibility of fruitful negotiations between GOI and IPC, and he expected such negotiations would begin within a month. Wattari confirmed firm decision taken issue law but would not tell Allen when. Allen thinks it will be soon and that there is no chance GOI will now decide seek IPC views first.

Comment (Noforn): From our conversation believe Allen inclined regard GOI pressure on IPC as part of larger GOI plan to exert maximum pressure on British position in Persian Gulf and Aden with view to drive British out as soon as possible. If he reflects FonOff views, may mean UK will seek handle IPC problem in this broader context. This likely run counter to US interests in Iraq.

Strong
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAQ. Confidential. Repeated to London, Jidda, Kuwait, Tehran, and Dhahran.
  2. Not printed. (Ibid.)
  3. Iraq’s Oil Minister.
  4. The NIOC law would set up the National Iraqi Oil Company to develop oil fields in areas expropriated from the Iraq Oil Company (IOC) in Law 80 of December 12, 1961. Law 80 took back 99.6 percent of IOC’s original concession. Background on the Iraq petroleum situation is in a memorandum from Lowenfeld to Under Secretary Ball, October 24, in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Central Files, 1964–66, PET 6 IRAQ.