Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations

95. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (FitzGerald) to the Executive Director-Comptroller of the Central Intelligence Agency (White)¹

Washington, September 21, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Foreign Affairs Programming System (FAPS)

REFERENCE

• Letter from Deputy Under Secretary Crockett Requesting CIA Comments 2

1. You will note that by letter of 11 August 1966 to Deputy Under Secretary Crockett,² you assigned Mr. Bavis of my office to represent the Agency on the Inter-Agency Group established to develop a Foreign Affairs Programming System (FAPS). On 8 September 1966, he received the attached letter from Mr. Crockett. The letter, which was sent to all Inter-Agency Group representatives, requests that CIA identify to Mr. Crockett’s office those overseas Agency activities and programs which are “interdepartmental” in character under the terms of reference of NSAM 341. It is implicit in the letter that activities and programs identified as such will be subject to review in any foreign affairs programming system that may be developed.

2. Background:

FAPS represents a renewed effort by the Department of State to devise an overall program review system for foreign affairs agencies. It is a departure from the earlier effort known as the Comprehensive Country Programming System (CCPS) and the pilot scheme that evolved from it, i.e., the Executive Review of Overseas Programs (EROP), in that whereas State and BOB shared the sponsorship of the earlier effort, State itself appears to be carrying the principal burden on FAPS. Our involvement in the EROP exercise was basically counter-productive, a view that was shared by BOB. State was so advised, albeit in rather low key, at its conclusion in the fall of 1965.

3. The new factor present in FAPS that was absent in the CCPS/EROP effort is NSAM 341. It is the principal peg on which State will hang its renewed efforts to coordinate foreign affairs programming.

4. Without specific reference at the moment to the question of whether or not NSAM 341 contravenes the National Security Act,³ the NSCID’s flowing from it, or NSC 5412/2,⁴ an effectively pursued FAPS poses a much more serious security problem than EROP did, because it would continuously expose collection and covert action programs to staff-level groups in the State regional bureaus and/or Mr. Crockett’s office. It would certainly result in the imposition of an increased workload on CS components which already respond to the Agency’s PPBS requirements as well as to the Budget Bureau’s reviews. It would also represent a potential for the erosion of the Director’s responsibility for CIA’s programs.

5. Alternate Courses of Action:

There are several ways in which we might respond to Mr. Crockett’s letter:

a. ignore it;

b. prepare a response which indirectly, and by implication, begins to make a case for exemption of CIA from full participation in FAPS; this response would not make reference to exemption per se, but would merely cite the recognition in the NSAM of the special status of the intelligence community and the existing procedures for policy guidance and review;

c. request exemption for CIA in clear and unmistakable terms, either in a response to Mr. Crockett’s letter or in a conversation by you with Mr. Crockett or between the Director and Secretary Rusk.

We are inclined toward the position stated in b., and the tone of the proposed reply (Tab C) is a reflection of this.⁵

6. Comment:

We should not ignore the letter since it raises the fundamental issue of whether CIA identifies its activities and programs as “interdepartmental” and thereby makes them subject to FAPS review, or not “interdepartmental” and therefore to be excluded from FAPS review. It was something of a surprise for us to see this issue trotted out so early in the game. Given the fact that the Inter-Agency Group has met only once, and then only perfunctorily, it is difficult to predict with any certainty what the conceptual basis will be for a FAPS. The publication in early October of the “Hitch Report” will give us a better reading on what program review in a FAPS will involve. Our best estimate, based primarily on our interpretation of the deliberations of the two-day Inter-Agency working group held in mid-August in Easton, is that Mr. Crockett will try to have the Inter-Agency Group adopt proposals to establish an institutionalized staff program review capability under each regional Assistant Secretary of State.

Under the circumstances, the Director may find it impolitic to declare for CIA exemption in unequivocal terms at this time, in which event we should respond by indirection and thus retain our options on the manner and extent of our participation.

7. Mr. [name not declassified] has worked with John Bross, Larry Houston, and [name not declassified] in developing an Agency position. They have concurred in the attached reply.

Desmond FitzGerald ⁶

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01580R, FAPS. Secret.
2. Attached but not printed.
3. Approved July 26, 1947; for text, see Michael Warner, ed., The CIA under Harry Truman (Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, 1994), pp. 131–135.
4. NSC Directive 5412/2, December 28, 1955. For text, see William Leary, ed., The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1984), pp. 146–149.
5. Not attached. For White’s reply to Crockett, see Document 97.
6. Printed from a copy that indicates FitzGerald signed the original.