Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations

455. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, February 7, 1964, 8 p.m.

2992. Cyprus. Rossides approached Stevenson after SC this afternoon to make following points. It was not entirely clear to what extent they stemmed from his govt and to what extent they were his own personal ideas.

He emphasized that in Cypriot view there must be SC res which would reaffirm independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. As to peacekeeping force, this should be comprised of some NATO and some non-NATO states. He mentioned specifically UK, three Scandinavian states, Ireland and Austria. He argued that UN force with above-mentioned mandate would have such prestige that it would not be challenged and hence could be much smaller than we had contemplated, perhaps three or four thousand.

Rossides assumed that this “UN force” would have to be paid for from UN funds. He had spoken to Federenko earlier today and inquired whether Sovs would object to expenditure UN funds for this purpose. Federenko had been evasive but had said any expenditure UN funds would of course have to be approved by SC. We asked whether if SC approved Sovs would pay their share. Rossides replied he had not asked this question but he assumed they would.

We explained in some detail necessity of assessments being levied by GA and grave complications and delays which would result from application Article 19,² discussion special scale, etc. Rossides attempted to argue these problems could be deferred until regular GA session and expenses Cyprus operation covered from SYG’s contingency fund until that time. We demonstrated this impracticable and pointed out only feasible means of financing would be by those contributing forces. We are far from sure Rossides was convinced.

Comment: We note with considerable apprehension that substantial UN role in Cyprus operation is more and more assumed in NY and speculation and discussion of modalities stimulated by Rossides and Sovs is creating climate which will no doubt encourage Cypriots to emphasize and expand UN role. We fear that cumbersome and time-consuming quadripartite negotiation which we are now conducting between each formal approach to Cypriots may drag out negotiation with latter to our disadvantage in view of climate developing here. We suggest that effort be made very rapidly to drop any points in our current position which are not absolutely essential, to decide just how far we can go in terms of SC res (consensus is almost certainly not sufficient), to decide with Cypriots appropriate composition of force, and to present agreed plan to SC in nearest future.

Stevenson

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to London, Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia.
2. It reads: “A member of the United Nations which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of the arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceding two years. The General Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a Member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member.”