Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

96. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State¹

Santo Domingo, May 26, 1965, 1050Z.

2003. From Bundy.

1. Vance, Mora and I met May 24 with Caamano, Aristy and Jottin Cury for four hours during late afternoon and early evening. Guzman and Jorge Blanco also present, as was Benitez who lent his valuable assistance in assuring that we all understood one another. Meeting held in deserted Conservatory of Music just across line in rebel territory on George Washington Blvd.

2. Our lengthy discussion was quite useful in my judgment. Caamano and company should now have clear idea of what we want and of what problems must be solved before final solution can be achieved. They can now have no illusions about the firmness of our purpose nor false optimism about a quick and easy solution. At same time, way was left open for further talks which could ultimately produce good results. As a starter Vance and Mora will meet with Caamano tomorrow to discuss problem of removing dangerous source of incidents by bringing National Palace within our security lines.

3. I opened conversation by reviewing status of our negotiations with Guzman. Emphasized my respect and admiration for Guzman both as person and as negotiator for Constitutionalists. Said we had been close to agreement on several occasions during past week but serious issues arose each time and we were not in position of having to step back and give careful consideration to problem as a whole. Told them I was going to Washington tomorrow² but Dr. Mora and Vance would be here to carry on. Emphasized our deep interest in having everyone concerned make maximum use of OAS presence and Dr. Moraʼs good offices in working toward final settlement of Dominican problem.

4. Listed following specific issues to be resolved: (A) constitution—we can understand deep desire on part of Caamano forces for return of 1963 constitution. However, must point out that by no means all Dominicans share this desire. (B) Caamano of Armed Forces—insistence that member of Caamano group hold command of army remains one of principle obstacles. (C) Communism—we are satisfied that present leadership of Constitutionalist movement is against communism but there are serious differences between us on how problem should be handled. (D) Civil Base of Government—we have come a long way toward understanding on necessity for broadest possible representation in government so as to attract wide support. However, we might have to go farther. (E) Imbert and the Other Side—power of GNR and its forces has grown considerably during last ten days. Result has been hardening attitude on questions such as who will command army. No one now can seriously believe that a complete victory is possible for either side.

5. Guzman expressed himself as shocked and disappointed at my presentation. (This appeared to be largely for benefit of Caamano and company. Guzman had not filled them in on Mondayʼs conversation—Embtel 1963.)³ Said he thought we had reached final agreement on constitutional formula, names of officers who would hold top military commands, including Minister Armed Forces and Army and Air Force commanders, (Navy unsettled but not a particular problem) and on composition of Cabinet. This would leave as only basic problem matter of how to deal with communism. (Guzman did not mention problem of departure of rebel leaders.)

6. I made it entirely clear that in this, as in all diplomatic negotiations, agreement must be reached on all points in order regard any one as having been finally settled. Conceded that we had reached understanding in principle on various points at various times but obviously failure settle all issues left each side free re-examine its position as a whole.

7. Caamano gave Aristy the floor first. He said Constitutionalist “government” had put negotiations in hands of Guzman and was fully prepared accept peaceful solution as long as it included restoration of 1963 Constitution. On that issue they would not give an inch. As for growing strength of Imbert side this was clearly result of US intervention. Imbert could only exist with US support. If US forces would leave the country the Constitutionalists could finish the job they began April 24. Re army command, Aristy said Caamano group had conceded on other three military posts but would continue insist that Army C/S come from their ranks.

8. Caamano picked up the argument in even more forceful terms: There are only two real “bands” in DR, Constitutionalists and the US. Imbert able clear northern part of city only because LOC had divided Constitutionalist forces and because US military had provided active assistance. Caamano had thought that, as matter of course, there would be cease-fire while conversations went forward. Instead on day after talks began US permitted Imbert to attack. His forces used US arms and were assisted by US helicopters, as well as by US troops firing from LOC. Constitutionalists had nevertheless continued make concessions in in effort find peaceful solution. Now they were virtually being asked to surrender with demand that they give up claim to Army C/S post. He (Caamano) would offer his head if necessary for a real solution but would keep it tightly screwed on under present circumstances. Army C/S post must be filled by Constitutionalist officer.

9. In reply I made following points: (A) Caamanoʼs assessment of our role here and of our relationship to Imbert was quite simply wrong. I knew what orders had been given and I had confidence in the discipline of our troops. No such military cooperation with Imbert had taken place. (B) Re armed forces posts, we were not talking about either side ceding or surrendering anything. Had been agreed from first with Bosch that Minister of Armed Forces and Army C/S would be officers acceptable both sides. (C) Assertion that only two sides exist also incorrect. Imbertʼs side is a fact, like it or not, and it controls good part of the country.

10. Mora intervened at this juncture to suggest that continuing discussion of specific issues was unprofitable and inappropriate. We should be talking about basic positions and general attitudes. Mora also did valuable work in strengthening Guzman with Caamano by paying tribute to his integrity, sincerity and honest representation of Constitutionalist side. I used Moraʼs intervention to emphasize that my review of status of negotiations was not meant to indicate we were closing the door. Far from it. We merely saying time had come to take stock and see where we might go from here.

11. Aristy and Cury were not yet prepared let reason flow. They said only two alternatives existed: peaceful solution or total and glorious sacrifice of Constitutionalist forces in fight to the finish. Delays in negotiations suggested—at least to uniformed—that deliberate stalling tactics were being employed in hope of weakening Constitutionalist movement. Time now at hand when people should know the truth. Might even be necessary, Aristy said, to tell all—who had been negotiating and what had been said.

12. I replied that this was up to them. We had nothing to fear. Our purpose was to seek solution in interests of all. Could only point out that type of publicity Aristy suggesting would scarcely brighten prospects for further talks. As for threat to seek solution with arms, my government was committed to sustain cease-fire in accordance OAS resolution. Our forces would, of course, have to reply in kind if attacked. However, no one wanted more violence, least of all Dominican people. Courage and sense of honor of Constitutionalists might be admirable but notion of seeking glory and world sympathy by provoking fight to the end was futile because such a course would solve nothing.

13. From this point on discussion became increasingly more reasonable. I said it my understanding that basic Constitutionalist position was one of opposition to dictatorship of right or left, of determination that country should have honest government responsive to peopleʼs will. I pointed out real Communist danger as we see it and emphasized that US national interests would not permit another Cuba. Also observed that reality of Dominican situation required close and understanding relations between our two countries which, in turn, required appreciation on their part of US responsibilities and attitudes with regard to communism. If my understanding of Constitutionalist position correct our fundamental difference was on issue of how to handle Communist problem.

14. Aristy and Caamano each made rather lengthy statements to effect that: Constitutionalists firmly opposed to communism and knew Communist dictatorship would be even worse than rule by the right. Constitutionalists fully recognized absolute necessity of good relations with US and of economic assistance from US. Constitutionalists would never permit imposition of communism here and were prepared to meet the danger. As soon as constitutional government established, Communists or anyone else who might break law or conspire would suffer full consequences. Caamano said we knew his history from our intelligence sources, knew him to be anti-Communist. He and his movement were out to give people free, honest government and to clean up corrupt armed forces, nothing more.

15. Caamano and friends conceded there were probably a few Communists around. Every popular movement could expect some infiltration. However, there were no Communists anywhere near Caamano, his government or military command—of that we could be sure. He, Caamano, had met only three Communists in his life—gentlemen who happened to be brought under arrest to the National Police while he was on duty there. He had heard other names mentioned but had no direct knowledge of these people. Finally, as Cury said and others agreed, best way fight communism was to give people social justice and work.

16. I said our assessment of situation was quite different. Constitutionalists claimed they could handle problem and we prepared accept that this what they genuinely believe. However, we informed Communists not few and insignificant but rather numerous and active in Constitutionalist movement. These are people who have been identified to our satisfaction. They are brothers-in-arms of Caamanoʼs officers. Their presence and what is to become of them are matters of real concern to us. We must be satisfied that this problem will be dealt with effectively and must have clear understanding on that point in order go ahead toward solution.

17. Cury and Aristy asked if we could provide names and numbers of Communists. Caamano said he prepared accept US technical assistance on the problem. I replied present large meeting no place go into specifics on such delicate subject but perhaps Caamano would wish designate officer (one clearly identified as anti-Communist) who could hold discussions with one of our people. Caamano accepted suggestion. Said he would pick officer and let us know.

18. Talk then turned to basic attitude of Constitutionalists toward concept of national concord and kind of government that might achieve it. Caamano said his side already committed to policy of no revenge and he reluctantly prepared allow “guilty” San Isidro officers leave country without answering for their crimes. Entire Caamano group next took turns presenting case for their contention that fight to restore 1963 Constitution has full support of Dominican people. In essence argument was that installation of government in accordance that documentʼs provisions would end all problems and be greeted with universal joy. I again noted differences in our assessment of Dominican reality, pointing out that majority of Dominican people have not really been heard from; that opposition to Constitutionalist solution does exist in important sectors; and that Caamanoʼs group must think in terms of broader solution than merely going back to Constitution 1963—of practical steps to create a genuine government of national concord.

19. In reply, and after more argument on the case, Aristy and Cury made following points to which Caamano agreed: (a) leaders of Constitutionalist movement do not seek places in new government and are prepared step aside for other men; (b) they wish government to be constituted of men acceptable to broadest possible range of Dominicans; (c) leaders agree to national referendum on 1963 Constitution; (d) they desire that new government establish close and cordial relations with US, based in part on common opposition to communism. Mora and I both expressed view that this was constructive reply which I could take back with me to Washington.

20. Remainder of meeting—which punctuated at one point by sound of heavy firing from Sans Souci area—taken up with discussion of comparative merits 1962 and 1963 Constitutions and of possible specific measures to strengthen cease-fire. At end we agreed Mora and Vance would be available for further talks. Aristy and I also agreed that any public reference emanating from Caamano camp would be along lines that constructive general conversation had been held and that possibility for further talks existed.

Bennett

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received in the Department of State at 7:47 a.m. and passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.
2. Bundy departed the Dominican Republic to return to Washington the morning of May 26. According to a telephone conversation that morning with Bill Moyers at 9:25 a.m. Bundy, who was still in Santo Domingo, reported that publicly he was returning to Washington for consultations with the President, but the private underlying reason was to try to diminish growing criticism in the press that Americans were attempting to install their own government in the Dominican Republic. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between McGeorge Bundy and Bill Moyers, Tape F65.42, Side A, PNO 1)
3. Document 94.