Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

90. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State¹

Santo Domingo, May 23, 1965, 0730Z.

1925. Ref: Deptel 1199.²

1. We can and will make additional effort insure Guzmanʼs ability provide us with evidence that his position vis-à-vis rebel camp strong enough give reasonable assurance that he can control his own government. We do not believe, however, that formula of three major rebel leaders for three San Isidro types reaches heart of problem. “Control” in our terms really means ability to deliver on the Communist question. To meet our need for more convincing indication that threat of Communists can be met, we propose insisting on one of two following alternatives.

2. Spanish Communist and PSP member Manuel Gonzalez y Gonzalez is, according to reliable testimony, much in evidence around rebel headquarters. It is widely believed here that he has been functioning as leading rebel military tactician. As pointed out Embtel 1904,³ available evidence points to Pena Tavares and Garcia German as possibly representing additional significant Communist penetration of rebel high command. We can insist on immediate expulsion of these three as demonstration of Guzmanʼs good faith on Communist issue. Substitution on this list of Gonzalez and Garcia for Montes and Aristy would have double advantage of avoiding very difficult demand for departure of two major popular “heroes” of the revolution while focusing on real threat of suspected Communist subversives. Our present view of Aristy is that he is a tricky nuisance but probably not a Communist.

3. As perhaps even stronger, and in some way more palatable alternative from Guzmanʼs point of view we could ask for firm agreement now on deportation of specific Castro-Communists whose credentials are not in doubt. List could include 20 agreed names of members of three red parties who have spent time in Soviet Bloc, Cuba and/or Communist China and who we know are presently in D.R. involvement or lack of it in rebel movement would not be main issue. We would simply make up list of leftist subversives and seek Guzmanʼs firm commitment to the immediate expulsion of agreed 20 as soon as located. Names of our leading candidates follow in separate cable.⁴

4. In our judgment we should at this time seek Guzmanʼs consent to one or other of two foregoing proposals. This would not mean, however, that other could not be carried out at later date under terms of private agreement on Communist issue.

5. In order obtain final concession on one of these alternatives we request definite authority to approach Guzman on basis that his acceptance will be sufficient for final agreement. We cannot get him to do either of these things on any other basis. There will be other things to ask for but they are all covered by our public and private memoranda and by our continuing power position.

6. For this reason, unless otherwise instructed, we will handle language of understanding on Communists on one or other of two following bases:

(A) First and preferably, by existing public and private memoranda

(B) Second, by following language which meets your suggestions in your 1199 while accepting as we have before the notion that not all Communists need be thrown out at once.

“Memorandum of Understanding—shorter form.

With respect to Communists and Trujillistas:

It is understood that effective measures must be taken by the constitutional government to protect the Dominican people from the subversive activities of Communists and Trujillistas. The initial understanding on this point continues as follows:

‘These measures will involve their separation from the Dominican community. This may take the form of their internment in some isolated area under Dominican jurisdiction or their departure from the island. Identification of such persons to be effected promptly by mutual consultation and prompt action will follow as aforesaid.’

It was later agreed that ‘the detailed procedures would have to be worked out with the new President with the object of accomplishing an effective job utilizing the resources available to all concerned.’

Still later it was agreed that while internment and departure of Communists and Trujillistas is permissible, it may have practical disadvantages. It was agreed that the best practicable course will be for persons of U.S. choosing to work closely with the new Minister of Police and come to agreement as to how best to achieve the basic objective. The cooperation of U.S. personnel will be sought and retained for such time as may be necessary. Such U.S. personnel should be of Spanish-speaking background.”

7. Vance and I believe he can handle military much better by waiting until we have solid platform with Guzman. If you give us clear green light on above basis tomorrow, we will proceed fastest.

8. Tonight Mora told us firmly that Imbert solution is no good. He is prepared to say so to Imbert too when time comes. He will also back a clearly anti-Communist and broadly based Guzman government. So give us the tools and we will finish the job.

Bennett

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received in the Department of State at 4:59 a.m. and passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA at 5:25 a.m.
2. Document 89.
3. Telegram 1904 from Bundy in Santo Domingo, May 22, described Pena Tavares as a “leading Communist in the rebel military command,” and Garcia German as an even “more sinister figure” than Pena. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. V, 5/19/65–5/31/65)
4. Not further identified.