Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

79. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State¹

Santo Domingo, May 18, 1965, 2055Z.

1778. For the President from Bundy.

1. Though I remain least pessimistic senior officer here, I am deeply shaken by this morningʼs monkey-wrench.² It forces reconsideration of question of basic control of a possible Guzman government. You can judge better than I the role of Bosch, but the stoogeʼs role of Guzman in this episode is clear and unless your evidence to the contrary is conclusive, my own guess is that military command initiated this proposal, whoever concurred in it.

2. Since military command arrangements of yesterday proposed to put a relatively unknown colonel over a group of men whose collective energy and determination is amply demonstrated in recent weeks, and since Guzman obediently telephoned a clearly absurd ultimatum to Embassy, none of us can responsibly recommend that agreement all but completed yesterday is now safe for the United States. Evidence is strong that it would put real control of all Dominican ground forces in hands of those who now have this control downtown. At the very minimum, and on optimistic assumptions about influence of Bosch and impact of office on Guzman, we should have a very hard up-hill road requiring constant energy and skill in daily infighting.

3. Apparently all of us in Washington and here agree that there are men in rebel command who prefer continued struggle to any agreement they do not control. In the light of the last daysʼs events, I do not think Guzmanʼs government on presently negotiated basis is good enough for us to bet on. Nor do I think time is running out down here.

4. In this situation I believe that when negotiations are reopened we should advance new requirements which combine advantage of testing basis of authority and limiting role of present military command in new government. I think of two such provisions.

5. The first is elimination of three least desirable members of rebel command by appointment abroad. This is parallel to plan already accepted by loyalists and I would nominate Aristy, Tavaras, and Monte Arache.

6. Second, I would reopen question of Minister of Armed Forces and insist on re-establishment of Bosch agreement that a man acceptable to both sides be found.

7. I pressed both of these ideas yesterday but did not insist in face of absolute refusal because we wanted agreement and hoped it would work. Now I believe that strong and sustained pressure for these provisions is essential:

A. To test the source of power,

B. To strengthen our confidence in Guzman government, and

C. To attempt wedge-driving in a dangerous cabal.

8. Unless otherwise instructed I shall take this line in my first talk with Guzman. If eventually we decide to take less for agreement, I can always fall back.

Bennett

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at the Department of State at 5:23 p.m. and passed to the White House at 5:28 p.m., and to DOD exclusively for McNamara at 6 p.m.
2. In a telephone conversation with President Johnson at 11:55 a.m., May 18, Bundy reported that Guzman sent him a message explaining the reasons for the sudden impasse. Bundy read Guzmanʼs message to the President: “I have the obligation to suspend conversations and agreements until there has been a total cease-fire. This is because yesterday the Constitutionalists troops permitted the troops of San Isidro to penetrate the city, [at this point Bundy inserted: ‘this is a description of the action in the north in their terms’] so the press and the representatives of the United Nations could see for themselves that these advances are protected by the Americans. It is established that the United States is giving arms, ammunition, and all kinds of military help to the anti-constitutional forces. [Bundy inserted: ‘Thatʼs not so incidentally.’] The troops of San Isidro and Imbert have been permitted pass through the line of communication and in some case they have even been protected with helicopters. This has obliged me to terminate the conversations and the agreement until a cease-fire has been achieved.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of a telephone conversation between President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, Tape F65.33, Side A, PNO 3)