76. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State1
1752. For the President from McGeorge Bundy.
First day in Santo Domingo persuades all of us that even a temporary settlement will be hard to get. With great pain and difficulty Davidson has built a long bridge out from Bosch to this brutalized and fanatically divided island but a day of most intense discussion shows [Page 186] that this bridge has no solid pillars on the opposite bank yet. Moreover Imbert and other right-wingers are trying to knock it down before it is built.
First disconcerting experience was violent rebel rejection of yesterdayʼs agreed principle that Minister of Armed Forces should be chosen by joint agreement of contending forces. With Hector Aristy reportedly in the lead rebels appear to have insisted violently to Guzman on Montes Arrache who holds this post under Caamano and is totally unacceptable to loyalists. When I repudiated this wild notion Guzman fell back upon Rafael Hernandez. I pointed out that by agreement we were already asking loyalists for their list of acceptable names and injection of any single rebel name would produce justified and violent charge of bad faith. Guzman then asserted with every show of conviction tinged by relief that in that case there was no further chance of his success and he should give up. No question that rebel military leaders shook him badly. In this situation I suggested possibility of delaying appointment of defense secretary and retention of his powers by president himself. Guzman revived remarkably and went off to try this on the rebels.
He returned shortly with their agreement, but agreement only masked dangerous concession by him to rebel leaders which led to my telephonic reports.2 He was offering rebel control over nomination of Chief of Army Staff, while masking this proposal with offer of equal privilege to loyalists on Navy and Air Chiefs. When questions revealed his unwillingness or unacceptability to name prospective Army Chief, I took time out. Washington calls and our own deliberations now persuade us that only possible solution is in our own pressure for particular names which on some of the evidence are digestible by both sides. We find no such name for Minister of Armed Forces but we (a) will probe that acceptability of Nelton Gonzales and Sosa Estrada with loyalists tomorrow though latter is known to Embassy as a thief and (b) await reaction of Bosch on two of names given by loyalists and passed to Davidson. Our own belief is that most promising pattern now is temporary vacancy in this Ministry and a slate of de Leon for the Army, Jimenez for the Navy and Nelton Gonzales for the Air Force. We plan strong effort for this ticket tomorrow.
Meanwhile loyalistsʼ generals spent most of Vanceʼs day on extended and passionate arguments over folly of our planned compromise, with focus on their violent objections to 1963 constitution. This seems foolish but Vance and Mann join in first-hand judgement that it is literally a fighting matter to loyalist leaders. We are correspondingly [Page 187] grateful for prompt and imaginative legal help from Davidson and bespeak his help with Bosch again tomorrow. Meanwhile we have heard nothing about planned approach by Bosch to Balaguer. We shall need Balaguerʼs help both with general public and with rich and respectable who now fear U.S. sellout to Commiesʼ best friend Bosch.
Foregoing deals only with bargaining details. Underlying questions are those reported by telephone: with Guzman we shall have no quick end to Communist threat, but equally no quick Communist takeover. We shall have long contest with Communists not unlike battle in France after 1944 but with no French civilization and no deGaulle. If instead we back loyalists to the limit, we could certainly “win”, but I doubt if we could remove U.S. troops for years. This island is cockpit of senseless hate where no strong and responsible leadership has yet emerged and where energy is largely polarized to extreme left and extreme right.
My own firm conclusion is that we should persist in present effort to establish Guzman promptly but without any concessions whatever in basic agreed position, since some entrenched elements in rebel command are sworn enemies to us, and to Guzman himself in the long-run. Right now net of short-run pressure runs against rebels so we have some leverage if only we can keep our honest farmer from going happily home.
Your motto is still right but both “si” and “no” must be somewhat qualified no matter what course we take. The guns are in the streets, and there is no Dominican will or way to get them back soon.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Received in the Department of State at 2:48 a.m. and passed to the White House at 3:23 a.m.↩
- See footnote 1, Document 75.↩