Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

69. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, May 14, 1965, 5:51–8:13 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting in the Cabinet Room, 1745, 14 May 1965 on the Dominican Republic

PRESENT WERE

• The President
• For State: Messrs. Ball, Mann, and Vaughn
• For Defense: Messrs. McNamara and Vance
• For the White House: Messrs. Bundy, Moyers, and Valenti
• For CIA: Messrs. Raborn and Helms

1. This meeting consisted of a two and a half hour discussion of a variety of matters affecting United States Government policy toward the Dominican Republic.

2. At the start, Mr. Bundy indicated that he had heard from Mr. Davidson and that the approach to Caamano had gone a hundred percent.² In other words, Caamano had accepted the proposition conveyed to him by the two Colonels representing Bosch. Mr. Bundy also noted that the search was on to locate Guzman. At about 1930, another call came from Mr. Davidson to the President in which Mr. Davidson stated that Guzman had agreed to serve as president of a provisional government.³ It was further indicated that Guzman was proceeding to San Juan for the purpose of meeting with Bosch. At this juncture, there ensued considerable discussion of which United States Government official should proceed to San Juan, to meet with Guzman, and to reenforce on the part of the United States how Guzman was to handle the problem of Communists in the Dominican Republic. The President finally decided, after considering McNamara and Harriman, to have Vance fly to San Isidro first for conversations with Ambassador Bennett and General Palmer, then proceed to San Juan, probably on 15 May, for the desired talk with Guzman. It was further agreed that Kennedy Crockett would go to New York for a private and unofficial conversation with Balaguer in order to insure that Balaguer would play ball if and when he received a telephone call from Bosch. It was emphasized that Balaguer was not to let on that the United States Government had approached him since Bosch has indicated that he is very touchy on the point of having this matter handled by himself only.

3. One part of the meeting dealt with the deteriorating economic situation in the Dominican Republic. There was considerable discussion of this problem, and it was finally decided to send Gaud, Solomon, and a team of twenty-odd economy experts to Santo Domingo in an effort to get the economy of the country moving again.

4. The President was most anxious to have Davidson persuade Bosch that Radio Santo Domingo should stop its inflammatory broadcasts. He indicated that we were prepared to have the Loyalists cease their incendiary statements if Radio Santo Domingo would do the same.

5. Secretary McNamara was asked to organize sabotage teams from the Special Forces to take out the radio transmitters of Radio Santo Domingo if this eventuality appeared necessary.

6. There was a lengthy discussion of actions to be taken if the Davidson mission were to fail. There was acrimonious argument about a Mann proposal to pull United States troops across the bridge to San Isidro and permit the city of Santo Domingo to become a political and economic whole. There was opposition to this suggestion from others present. Bundy advocated having United States troops clean out the northern section of Santo Domingo. There was also reluctance to accept this recommendation. In addition, the role of Balaguer in the present and future of the Dominican Republic was canvassed in depth.

7. The problem in the countryside was much discussed, but it soon became related to what one should do about Santo Domingo since that city is the political and economic heart of the country.

8. During the meeting, the President spoke on the telephone with Mr. J. Edgar Hoover. A part of the conversation related to a request from the President that Mr. Hoover improve coverage on Balaguer.⁴

9. The meeting adjourned at 2015.

Richard Helms ⁵
Deputy Director

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Chron as DDCI and DCI, Folder 13, January 1–December 31, 1965. Secret. Drafted by Helms on May 15. The time of the meeting is from the Presidentʼs Daily Diary. (Johnson Library)
2. Fortas telephoned President Johnson at 2:45 p.m. on May 14 to inform him that “the entire plan has been accepted.” They also discussed the next step in the plan, which was to locate Guzman. (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Abe Fortas, Tape F65.25, Side A, PNO 1 and 2)
3. Fortas telephoned President Johnson at 7:29 p.m. on May 14 to tell him Guzman had agreed to accept the position. Fortas suggested that a “professional,” such as McGeorge Bundy be sent to San Juan to meet with Guzman. President Johnson asked what Bundy would do, and furthermore, why was it necessary for him to go to San Juan since Fortas was as “good of a man as Iʼve got” down there. Fortas thought it was essential for someone else to “talk to the future number one man, … to do a belly-to-belly understanding of everything.” Fortas reasoned, “it would be better to have someone who will have a continuing role establish the relationship” since as an intermediary he would be leaving the scene eventually. (Ibid., Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Abe Fortas, Tape F65.25, Side A, PNO 4, and Side B, PNO 1)
4. President Johnson telephoned Hoover at 7:05 p.m. on May 14 to ask if he had any information on Balaguer. Hoover replied he did not and President Johnson said he wanted Hoover to “get right after [Balaguer] in New York,” and that he “sure wanted [Hooverʼs] operation stepped up wherever it is for the next 48, 72 hrs. unless [he] wanted to have another Castro.” (Ibid., Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and J. Edgar Hoover, Tape F65.25, Side A, PNO 3)
5. Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.