Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

63. Telegram From the the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic¹

Washington, May 10, 1965, 10:22 p.m.

949. Ref Embtel 1558.² Of the four alternatives described in Embtel 1558 from Martin, modified second alternative seems to US to be best. Embassy should put its full resources to exploration of possibility of establishing coalition regime in which Caamano and possibly one other non-communist member of his group (acceptable to Imbert and his group) could be added.³

Purpose of this would be to split Caamano and hopefully Bosch partisans in rebel zone away from extremists. This would be a further step toward establishment of a provisional government which hopefully could gradually consolidate its control over entire country with broad popular support.

We recognize this is delicate operation from Imbertʼs point of view, but assume from your messages that idea of coalition not unacceptable to him.

From Caamanoʼs point of view our guess is that more can be gained by appealing to his patriotism and to need for avoiding bloodletting than by any other tactic. However, if additional inducements from US already known to you would in your opinion be productive this could be mentioned also. Caamanoʼs group may be waiting for arrival of “Wise Men” (Betancourt, Munoz-Marin/et al). You may inform him that after several days effort we have not been successful in obtaining OAS agreement to this. All of this is a matter for your own on-the-spot discretion.

In any case we should work for provisional coalition government which could, after establishing control over entire national territory, return the country to normalcy and eventually, under OAS supervision, guide country to a non-communist constitutional government.

One of the issues which apparently has great appeal to Dominicans at this time is constitutionalism. We do not have any clear opinion about what concessions it would be prudent to make such as proposal 1962 or 1963 constitutions be adopted. This would, of course, be without Bosch or his designee as president. A preliminary investigation here suggests that all previous constitutions contain provisions for suspension of constitutional guarantees under circumstances similar to those which exist now. Clearly this would be necessary at this time. We would like your opinion on this possible bargaining position with Caamano and such others which may occur to you as compatible with our objectives, i.e., prevention of commie takeover and later elections and constitutional regime.

You should take this line with OAS Committee. We will broach this line of thought to those OAS Committee members still in Washington before their departure tomorrow afternoon.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted and approved by Mann and cleared by Vance and Vaughn. Repeated to London.
2. Document 62.
3. In telegram 1626 from Santo Domingo, May 12, Bennett reported that negotiations with Caamañoʼs forces to form a “broadened collective government” had “produced little reason for immediate optimism,” but that moderate PRD member Antonio Guzman had offered to be the “middle man in an effort to form a broad-based Junta.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Miscellaneous Reports on the Dominican Situation [2 of 2])