Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

58. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, May 6, 1965, 3:00 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Dominican Republic Task Force Meeting—May 6, 1965

PARTICIPANTS

• Secretary McNamara, Ambassador Bunker, Mr. Mann, Mr. Vaughn, Mr. Crockett, Mr. Greenfield, Mr. Allen, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Gaud, Mr. Helms, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Valenti, Mr. Moyers, Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Chase

The following points supplement and, in places, overlap the detailed action memo which is attached at Tab 1.²

1. Third OAS Resolution—The group discussed the desirability of getting a third OAS resolution which primarily would permit a reconstituted OAS Commission (a) to advise the Dominicans on the running of their government and (b) to eventually bring about elections. Among others, the following points were made during the discussion. First, the group agreed that we should try to get Figueres, Betancourt, Lleras Camargo and Munoz Marin to constitute the new Commission.³ Second, the group felt that while we probably would be able to get the resolution we want, there will probably be some opposition. Ambassador Bunker said that the Venezuelans may argue that this sort of OAS intervention will bring about a situation even more amenable to the communists. Secretary McNamara thought that the OAS was a couple jumps away from sending a Commission down to the Dominican Republic to really govern. Third, the group felt that even a relatively weak resolution, gotten quickly, would be helpful. Mr. Bundy noted that the main thing is to get the Wise Men into the Dominican Republic. He added that, in getting rid of the Caamano Government, it would be nice to have people like the Wise Men tell US that this is the right thing to do. Fourth, Secretary McNamara thought that we should do some contingency planning in the event we canʼt get an OAS resolution. Even if we canʼt get a resolution, it would be good to get the Wise Men to the Dominican Republic.⁴

2. Unified Military Command—Ambassador Bunker said that there are variety of countries which seem to be ready to provide contingents for the Dominican Republic crisis—Costa Rica (police), Venezuela (destroyers), Brazil (1000 troops), Argentina and Colombia.⁵ The group agreed that the unified command should probably be run largely from the Dominican Republic. In this regard, we can send some lawyers down to the island to help Ambassador Bennett run the U.S. part of the show. The operation will be coordinated with Bill Saunders, the Assistant Secretary General of the OAS.

3. Withdrawal of U.S. Forces—Secretary McNamara suggested that we seek opportunities to withdraw some of our forces; this will considerably help our public relations problem. As an excuse, we can say that the effectiveness of the cease fire makes this possible; later on we can say that we are withdrawing because it is clear that the Latin Americans are coming in. The Secretary went on to say that we have 13 battalions in the Dominican Republic and we might think seriously of withdrawing 2 battalions, one at a time, over the next 72 hours.

The group heartily endorsed the McNamara view. Mr. Greenfield noted that we will be in a much stronger position if we go to the altar willingly rather than reluctantly. Ambassador Bunker said that it would make his task at the OAS enormously easier.⁶

4. Junta Forming—Mr. Mann said that as yet we have not had much luck. When we do get a slate, we should ensure that there are no communists on it, and that we know what the Junta prepares to do about the communists in the country.

5. Communists—The group discussed at some length the problem of the communists. The communists probably ought to be kicked out of the country; if we donʼt move fast, however, they will all be underground.

In this regard, we must put more emphasis on rounding up the communists; the problem is that there is no one who can give the order to actually pick them up. About the best we can do is to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] tail them and Defense, when it can, take pictures of them.

Mr. Bundy pointed out that the communist angle, as well as the eventual problem of disarming the rebel-held part of the city, make it clear how much we need some sort of government on the island.

6. Public Relations—Mr. Bundy said that while yesterdayʼs effort with the press took US a long way in our effort to look better in this affair, we still have things to do.⁷ First, we should thicken the case about the communists in the Dominican Republic. Second, we should ensure that the Santo Domingo press corps gets suitable matérial on the communist threat. Third, Mr. Vaughn should produce a paper spelling out more sharply the chronology of OAS participation in the Dominican Republic crisis.⁸

Mr. Bundy also said that Len Meekerʼs legal memo,⁹ which is good, will be beefed up by last nightʼs OAS resolution and by further consultation with the Attorney General, who has a strong background in international law. Once the memo is in shape, it will be released.

7. Relief—The group agreed that this is an area in which we can pull out all the stops. We should sharpen up our coordinating in Washington, just as it has been sharpened up in the Dominican Republic. In this regard, Bill Gaud has the coordinating responsibility in Washington.

8. Moving Junta Headquarters—Mr. Crockett said that General Palmer and Ambassador Bennett want to let the Junta move from San Isidro to the Fair Grounds. The Junta wants to be closer to town, and feels it will have better protection at the Fair Grounds. The problem is that the Junta will then be very close to the rebels, and if the rebels attack the Junta, we will be faced with a very touchy problem; in effect, we will have to decide between letting the rebels beat up the Junta and breaking our “neutrality” and intervening in favor of the Junta. The group agreed that the Junta could move—on the condition that the OAS Commission has no objection.

9. Peace Corps—The group discussed the problem of the Peace Corps people in the Dominican Republic who are giving interviews that are damaging our interests. Mr. Moyers said that Sargent Shriver is dealing with the problem. While the group saw certain advantages in bringing the Peace Corps back to the U.S., they also saw a number of disadvantages—e.g., Peace Corps people would hold their interviews in the U.S., which would also hurt; it would be a blow for the Peace Corps people all over the world if we quashed their right to speak freely. The group went on to agree that we should give the Peace Corps people some background on the Dominican situation and leave them there. Mr. Bundy thought that Ambassador Martin and Harry Shlaudeman would be very good on this.

[2 paragraphs (6 lines of source text) not declassified]

GC

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Gordon Chase, Meetings on the Dominican Republic—Planning Group. Secret; Eyes Only; No Distribution. Prepared by Chase on May 7. The time of the meeting is from a May 6 memorandum from Vaughn to Rusk. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, AID Files: Lot 70 D 295, Dominican Republic Coup—Memoranda, Letters, 1965–1967)
2. Attached but not printed.
3. The proposed commission members were: José Figueres, former President of Costa Rica; Rómulo Betancourt, former President of Venezuela; Lleras Camargo, former President of Colombia; and Luis Muñoz Marin, former Governor of Puerto Rico. According to Tab 1 this third OAS resolution should: 1) broaden the powers of the Commission to advise the provisional government, 2) authorize OAS supervision of elections, 3) grant the Commission an effective role in rounding up and exiling communist elements from the Dominican Republic, and 4) give the Commission greater influence in the composition of the eventual Dominican Republic Government. During a telephone conversation between President Johnson and Mann on May 5, 5:46 p.m., they discussed the proposed commission members. Mann informed the President that the OAS had not yet approved of the commission which would require passage of a resolution by two-thirds of its members. Mann thought “the sooner we get that Commission going on down there the better off we are going to be.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between Johnson and Mann, Tape F65.20, Side A, PNO 2)
4. McNamara told President Johnson during a telephone conversation at 11:15 a.m. on May 7: We have to “get the 4 Wise Men or somebody down there we can associate with. We cannot remain in association much longer with Wessin … the rebels are gaining power, position and prestige every passing day.” (Ibid., Recording of telephone conversation between Johnson and McNamara, Tape F65.20, Side B, PNO 2)
5. During a May 5 Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OAS the Ministers considered the establishment of an inter-American military force in the Dominican Republic. At 2 a.m. on May 6 the Ministers approved a U.S.-initiated resolution requesting that American states make military and police contingents available to form an Inter-American Armed Force (IAAF) which would operate under the authority of an OAS Unified Command (UC). This resolution was adopted by a vote of 15–5 (Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay), with 1 abstention (Venezuela). Subsequently, on June 2 the Meeting of Consultation adopted a resolution naming the force the “Inter-American Peace Force.” According to their own history of this intervention, the JCS had suggested that Latin military contributions consist of small, lightly equipped companies trained in riot control and guerrilla tactics, and that Argentinean and Brazilian battalions be infantry units. Tactical air contributions were not sought but naval contingents were. The JCS asked that these be coastal patrol vessels limited to 1–2 ships per country. The JCS also recommended that the Latin units rely on their own transportation, be as self sufficient as possible, and be capable of receiving and distributing bulk supplies from U.S. sources. (JCS and National Policy: 1965–1968, p. 468)
6. In a May 6 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, Chase recounted information relayed to him by Vaughn who had met with the President earlier that day at 1:36 p.m. (Johnson Library, Presidentʼs Daily Diary) Chase stated that President Johnson thought it “might be unwise to withdraw any troops from the Dominican Republic [because] … it would look as if [the United States] thought it had made a mistake [by] putting too many troops in the Dominican Republic.” Chase also wrote that “the President would be swayed by Bunkerʼs judgment … that a token withdrawal would help him enormously at the OAS.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. III, to 5/7/65) In a May 7 memorandum to Bundy, Chase wrote, “General Palmer reportedly feels that it isnʼt a good idea to withdraw forces at this time for psychological/political reasons. The rebels could take this as a sign that the internationalist heat is getting to US and that we have to pull out.” (Ibid.)
7. Not further identified.
8. Not found; however, an undated 14-page Bureau of Inter-American Affairs report, entitled “Action of the Organization of American States in the Dominican Republic” is in the Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Histories, Dominican Crisis 1965, State–DOD–OAS Chronologies and Narratives.
9. Dated May 7 and entitled “Legal Basis for United States Actions in the Dominican Republic.” (Ibid., Country File, Dominican Republic) Meeker was the Legal Adviser of the Department of State. In a May 6 memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, Fortas commented on the memorandum: “I could not recommend its publication or use as a defense of the legality of the United States actions in the Dominican Republic … itʼs soundness as a matter of legal analysis is subject to effective challenge.” (Ibid., Vol. III, to 5/7/65)