Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

56. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 3, 1965, 11:31 a.m.–12:24 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Situation in the Dominican Republic

PARTICIPANTS

• For the United States:
  • The President
  • The Chief of Protocol, Lloyd N. Hand
  • Donald F. Barnes (Interpreter)
• For Venezuela:
  • Former President Betancourt

The President outlined chronologically the events that preceded the sending of Marines to the Dominican Republic: increased chaos on Saturday,² convening of the O.A.S. Peace Committee on Tuesday,³ meeting of the O.A.S. Council on Wednesday,⁴ rapid deterioration of the situation on Wednesday afternoon, and decision to send the Marines late that same afternoon. He said that the failure of the O.A.S. to take any steps left the U.S. with no choice but to send in troops, in view of the announcement by the local authorities that they could no longer guarantee the safety of Americans residing in the Dominican Republic. He said that any President of a Latin American Republic would have made the same decision if his nationals were in danger.

The President also said that within hours of the landing of the Marines the U.S. had names, addresses, and other information concerning Communists and Castroites who were in the rebel ranks. The primary reason for the decision to send troops, a decision that had to be taken immediately, was to protect the lives of Americans and other foreign nationals who were in danger.

The mission of the American forces was to guarantee the safety of foreign nationals, including American, to keep bloodshed at a minimum, and to provide medical and food supplies to everybody in the Dominican capital.

Mr. Betancourt said that no matter how urgent the decision to send Marines had been, time should have been taken to call in the Latin American representatives to the O.A.S., even if just to announce to them the need for sending troops. This would have reduced the reaction of Latin American Presidents and Congresses, who have accused the U.S. of unilateral action.⁵

Mr. Betancourt said that he had been pleased to hear Secretary Rusk state that the U.S. was not thinking in terms of Wessin y Wessin or of any other Dominican military figure that had been equally rejected by the people as a basis for a government.⁶ He said that he, together with José Figueres and Luis Muñoz Marín, would use their good offices to convince Juan Bosch not to run for office again. He felt that Bosch, as he had said before, was a good man and an anti-communist democrat, but was naive, and did not have the ability necessary to govern his country.

Mr. Betancourt said that this Dominican experience should serve to illustrate the dangers of de facto governments in Latin America, and that what had happened on this island could also happen in Ecuador, Honduras, or Guatemala. He said that it was important that the inter-American conference that was to meet in Rio pass a vigorous resolution to have existing de facto governments call for elections, and to discourage those who might be thinking of a coup dʼetat.

President Johnson said that it was obvious that the O.A.S. did not move rapidly, and that there were occasions, such as the one in the Dominican Republic, when action had to be taken promptly, in view of the danger to the lives of so many people, as well as the menace of the extremists in the rebel ranks. Mr. Betancourt, after listening to the explanation by President Johnson of chronology of events leading to sending of troops to Dominican Republic, agreed that he would have done same thing.

Mr. Betancourt agreed that a communist victory in the Dominican Republic was unacceptable. He said that the events on that island should serve as a warning, to illustrate the fact that the people of Latin America wanted freedom and elected governments. He also said that whatever solution was reached in the O.A.S. required only 14 votes, and that the U.S. should not devote too much effort to obtain the votes of the so-called large countries, such as Mexico and Argentina. If the U.S. had a solution, it could get it approved with the support of Colombia, Venezuela, and Costa Rica, and that no effort should be made to obtain unanimity.

President Johnson asked Mr. Betancourt what possible solution could be found for the Dominican problem, be it a provisional or a trusteeship government. Mr. Betancourt replied that both were possibilities, and that he had considered the idea of a trusteeship government, to include the representatives of Costa Rica (José Figueres), Colombia (Alberto Lleras Camargo), Venezuela (Rómulo Betancourt), with the possible addition of former Governor Luis Muñoz Marín.

President Johnson asked whether Mr. Betancourt could suggest some responsible persons in the Dominican Republic who might be approached in the search for a viable solution. Mr. Betancourt replied that he did not know enough about the Dominican Republic, because of the isolation surrounding the island during the Trujillo era.

The President suggested that any comments to the press speak of the fact that he and Mr. Betancourt had known each other for a long time, that they had discussed Latin America in the twentieth century and the Alliance for Progress. Mr. Betancourt agreed, and said that he would prefer to draft a written press release, which he would send to Secretary Rusk before he gave it to the press.⁷

Mr. Betancourt said that he wished to emphasize the information he had received from the Venezuelan consul in Santo Domingo, whom he regarded as a reliable observer, to the effect that communists were by no means in control of the rebel forces in the Dominican Republic.

Mr. Betancourt said that he would be available to the President at any time he was called to make a contribution to good inter-American relations. The President said that he would surely call on him, and that he would be glad to see Mr. Betancourt any time he so desired.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 217, Presidentʼs Memoranda of Conversations, January-March 1965. Confidential. Drafted by Barnes and approved by the White House on May 17. The time of the meeting is from the Presidentʼs Daily Diary. (Johnson Library) Former President of Venezuela Rómulo Betancourt was in Washington to attend various OAS meetings on the Dominican crisis. At the time of this meeting, President Johnson was considering a proposal first suggested by Abe Fortas for a committee of “Wise Men” to act as trustees or overseers of the effort to bring about a resolution in the Dominican Republic. Fortas dictated this idea to President Johnsonʼs secretary on May 1 at 11:15 a.m. Fortas said: “This is a very secret and confidential message. If the OAS does not move, it seems to me you might consider the following after careful checking with Bosch and everybody else, the designation of Betancourt, Figueres and Marín as an interim committee, might be attempted. This is my own idea, not communicated or checked with anyone.” (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Abe Fortas, Tape F65.16, Side A, PNO 3) The proposal was later abandoned in part because of opposition from some Latin American governments and from the existing five-nation Special Committee of the OAS; see footnote 2, Document 52.
2. April 24.
3. At 4 p.m. on April 27 the Inter-American Peace Committee, representatives from Colombia, Argentina, Dominican Republic and the United States, convened to hear Dominican Republic Ambassador Bonilla give a report on the revoltʼs origins and developments.
4. On April 28 at 10:30 a.m. a regular meeting of the Council of the OAS was held to discuss the Dominican Republic situation.
5. During a meeting at 10:10 a.m. on May 3 Betancourt told the Secretary that “the United States had committed a serious error; it should have called a meeting of the OAS, be it midnight or dawn, to inform the Latin American Ambassadors that Marines were on their way and why they were being sent … to avoid Latin America being faced with a fait accompli.” (Memorandum of conversation, May 3; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP) Rusk informed President Johnson of Betancourtʼs position during a telephone conversation that began at 11:15 a.m. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Dean Rusk, Tape F65.18, Side A, PNO 7)
6. During Ruskʼs meeting with Betancourt (see footnote 5 above), the Secretary admitted “privately” that he thought, “no members of the present Junta, or Wessin y Wessin, could form a government, since they had no popular support.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP)
7. Not further identified.