Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

5. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State¹

Santo Domingo, May 21, 1964, 2 p.m.

1053. For ARA. Subject: Prospects for the Dominican Republic.

1. On conclusion of my first eight weeks in this tormented country, Dept will perhaps be interested to have from me a preliminary analysis of the situation here and its portents for United States policy.

Continuing State of Crisis

2. During this period since late March the country has been rocked by three major crises, two of which were political and either of which could easily have ended in a military takeover. One did end with change in governing triumvirate. Govt is attempting to face up to financial crisis, and some initial measures have been taken; but we are still in early stretch of long road. Sufficient to say that with crises recurring so constantly little gets done. Political malaise is perhaps more serious than economic, and the various forces emerge from one crisis to prepare for the next.

Embassy Activity

3. In this 8–week period American preference has been fully reestablished here. While our personnel situation is still seriously short, we are gradually, perhaps too slowly, building back to strength of last [garble—July?]. AID Mission has been reactivated, as has MAAG, and both new chiefs are now assembling staffs.

4. We have been involved in considerable substantive activity, when we could find a day quiet enough to take action. Such projects as 4-million-dollar EXIM Bank loan for road maintenance machinery, 900–unit workersʼ housing in San Pedro de Macoris, 600–unit middle-class housing in Santo Domingo and release for on-going projects of funds totaling more than $1.1 million to assist educational activities, labor cooperatives, etc., have been signed or announced. Numerous scholarships and travel grants covering wide variety of interests and training have been put in motion. I have given a number of formal speeches, together with many informal talks, and have made three major trips to north and east sections of the country, plus shorter trips to nearby towns and in and around the capital. I have also visited numerous Peace Corps volunteers on station, including several who live in the most depressing slum areas of Santo Domingo and Santiago and whose work in a broad range of fields cannot be praised too highly. All these activities have been well received and have received appropriate publicity.

5. Quite aside from govt contacts—and there is almost daily exchange here with top level due to informal atmosphere in which triumvirate governs and the seeming necessity of getting even minor decisions made by them—there have been conferences, meetings and discussions with professional, cultural, business, agricultural, political and military leaders and with labor and youth groups. In short, the country knows we are back in business here. Written and spoken comments at all levels and representing all sectors of opinion (except Communist) indicate great relief and satisfaction that U.S. is back.

Economic Misery

6. As a result of sampling this wide cross section of Dominican opinion, I am convinced that countryʼs major interest at the moment is finding jobs and food, i.e. getting on with economic development. With perhaps a third of the working force unemployed and many others underemployed, urban slums I have visited are Asian-like in their overcrowding and squalor (they lack even such basic necessities as water, sanitation, and garbage collection). They are seething with unrest and frustration. Economic misery, as distinct from political tyranny, strikes me as much more prevalent now (drift to cities dramatizes it, of course) than when I served in this country over twenty years ago during the Trujillo period.

Political Apathy

7. One of the things which has impressed me most in my travels and conversations about the country has been the almost total lack of interest in talking politics with me. This excepts, of course, the several party leaders here in the capital whose profession it is to keep the waters boiling. In conversations with others, however, the more sophisticated emphasize development needs and propose projects, large and small, government and private. Less educated people stress jobs and housing. I am repeatedly surprised at how rarely politics comes up. On two separate visits to San Pedro de Macoris, for instance, which offered informal talks with full range of income groups from top to bottom, not once was a political matter mentioned. Despite shrillness of individual political leaders, each of whom has his devoted cadre of actilarts and some of whom have no further following, most observers agree the country is largely apathetic at this time as regards political matters. This does not mean, however, that Dominican politicians are going to give up playing politics.

Leftward Drift

8. On other hand, the poor and the unemployed, most of whom scrape through on a minimum subsistence diet and have trouble even getting water, while not active politically, appear to be steadily drifting leftward in their sympathies. They are, of course, on receiving end of heavy stream of radio and word-of-mouth propaganda from extreme left. My Peace Corps friends who live in slum areas tell us that many of their neighbors sympathize with Castroite 14th of June movement. Comments made to me on my own visits to these sections indicate, despite the appealing simplicity and easy friendliness which still characterizes the average Dominican, a general sense of abandonment at hands of society. Perverted as it is in its aims, the 14th of June at least shows interest in their misery and promises them help.

Lack of National Purpose

9. Disorders (including bomb tossing and stone throwing in such normally quiet provincial towns as La Vega) during recent taxi drivers strike, which had no economic justification and was in fact a political effort manipulated by both right and left for separate (but often converging) ends, showed how close to the surface violence is in Dominican life today and how tension grips rich, poor and govt authority alike and influences their actions toward extremism. Part of this represents general spirit of revolt against authority—any authority—which is aftermath of long Trujillo tyranny; and part unfortunately represents those more endemic Dominican characteristics of inordinate suspicion one of another and lack of sense of national purpose (despite homogeneous population) or feeling of individual responsibility to act in national interest—traits which have so often been commented on over the years by observers of the local scene. The difference now is that time is shorter than it was.

Need For Urgent U.S. Action

10. Given the above factual situation, what should be the U.S. posture? My own conviction after eight years here is that we have less time even than we thought during Washington consultations in March. If we are to influence Dominicans in ways we want to see them go and counter leftist efforts to poison popular mind, we must lose no time in getting under way with full-scale Alliance for Progress program. Despite rather somber picture drawn above, I do not believe body politic here is as yet deeply infected with Castro-Communist venom, notwithstanding intensive efforts mentioned above. There is rather touching trust and faith that the United States can solve all Dominican problems; there is, in fact, over-dependence on us.

11. The time for us to act is now. AID Director Carter Ide is presently in Washington, and I hope he can be given urgent and sympathetic support in getting approval of program along lines worked out during his recent consultation here. We believe emphasis should be in fields of (1) agriculture (agricultural productivity has simply got to be increased to meet needs of rapidly increasing population and to offset effects of measures to counter balance of payments problem) and (2) education, but with sufficient flexibility to take on desirable projects that may be offered in other fields. There is critical need to put people to work here, and we should have some impact projects of sufficient scope to be impressive and have effect on local consciousness.

Support for Self-Help

12. Our program should place stress on encouraging and assisting self-help efforts of Dominican Govt and private entities and to maximum extent feasible should be implemented step by step as needed reforms are instituted. While many activities necessarily have to be carried out in conjunction with govt, we should make strong effort to avoid tying ourselves too directly to any one administration or any one group. To extent we can do so in accord with sound operational and fiscal procedures, we should seek to work with communities and with private professional, business and labor groups. In that connection, one of most hopeful aspects of local scene involves Community Development Associations which are now being organized all over the country and which are anxious to work with us. These associations are being sparked by the excellent Santiago Committee, which is worthy of similar activity in an American city of its size and already has a number of positive successes to its credit. These efforts indicate that at long last at least some Dominican citizens are becoming aware of their private responsibilities for public progress. Labor organizations and agricultural cooperatives also offer possibilities as suitable vehicles for direct cooperation. We should encourage them. In short, we must tie our programs to people and local initiative and act so as to convince the entirety of the Dominican public that the American people and Govt have an abiding interest in their progress toward social betterment and higher standards of living.

Political Effects

13. What are the political effects of all this? We cannot forget—and we should not let Dominicans forget—that the standards of this hemisphere require Dominican Republic to work its way back to constitutional govt. At the present time, however, except for self-serving declarations of political leaders, most of whom agree only on getting the ins out and wishing themselves in national palace, there is widespread popular apathy. Not one of the various political leaders with whom I have talked gives the impression of having national stature or being capable of giving this country leadership needed. This includes present leadership of the democratic left.

Bosch & Balaguer

14. Oddly enough, the two individuals most often mentioned and credited with stature of presidential possibilities are outside the country, Juan Bosch in Puerto Rico and Joaquin Balaguer in New York. As for Bosch, his own political party, whatever its public posture, is by no means united in desiring his return, there is no widespread public demand for it. And quite apart from whether Dominican armed forces would or would not agree to his coming back, there are sound grounds for believing that Bosch himself much prefers the comfortable martyrdom of Puerto Rican exile to the pains and aches involved in attempting to govern this distressingly ungovernable country. Those who know Bosch best hold that he has no intention of attempting a comeback. Comments of Piera quoted Embtel 1037² are latest of a series.

15. Balaguer may well represent at this time the largest common denominator of support for the Presidency, since he has the large PR party behind him and enjoys the backing of important right wing elements in the armed forces and the church and at least some popular favor within groups such as the taxi drivers to whom he gave free taxicabs during his previous incumbency. (He also has bitter enemies who threaten his assassination in event of his return.) However, Balaguerʼs proven combination of political charlatanry and economic profligacy, together with his record of close association with the Trujillo dynasty, would scarcely seem to recommend his as in the U.S. interest. In final analysis it is not so much Balaguerʼs personal qualities that make him undesirable. It is fact that his return would open way for re-imposition throughout country of interlocking Trujillo mechanism of governing. It is still less than three years since Trujillo. Those people are still around and they are anxious for another chance.

Donald Reid Cabral

16. That brings us to Donald Reid Cabral, leading member of the governing triumvirate and professedly apolitical. I have not the slightest doubt that Reid Cabral has the smell of politics deep in his nostrils. He has already begun maneuvers to find his way to a longer term, preferably alone and preferably constitutional if he can find a formula. These intentions are already suspected of him by his peers, and there will be increased rumblings, together with efforts to block him, as his presumed intentions become clearer. It is perhaps worth bearing in mind in that connection that he is not the first interim Latin American leader nor, it can be safely wagered, will he be the last to conclude he is the man to lead his country onward.

17. Reid is something of a bantam cock in personality, is strong-willed and impulsive and is at times erratic; he is not well organized personally, with the result that plans and promises often outrun performance. There is a great deal of spur-of-the-moment shifting of gears. However, there seems no doubt of his good intentions nor of his strong desire to improve conditions in his country. He does not lack for personal courage and he is personally honest. He greatly admires the United States and its way of life. While lacking a “popular” background (he will always be subject to the charge of belonging to the oligarchy) and not a rabble-rouser, he can be effective in a crowd; he was, for instance, impressive at a large labor gathering on May Day in which I participated. In sum, from standpoint U.S. interests we could do a lot worse in a country like this in which there is such a paucity of possibilities.

Problem of Illegitimacy

18. As an interim executive Reid suffers from the stain of political illegitimacy and he can expect no help from the practicing politicians in removing it or forgetting it. However, if he can prove himself to the people in the months ahead and earn their support for an acceptable formula for return to constitutionality, I see no grounds on which the United States should object. The trick, in light of the political jockeying and plotting which goes on incessantly behind the scenes here, will be for Reid to gain the months in which to prove he can do something for the people and earn their support, i.e. fill todayʼs vacuum of popular support with himself.

Views of Papal Nuncio

19. I should like to comment parenthetically that Monsenor Clarizio, Papal Nuncio, an enlightened and progressive man who is a force for good in this country, shares the views expressed above regarding political prospects and alternatives in this country.

Dark Horse

20. Crises ripple here with speed of summer lightning. According to his political opposition, Reidʼs radio speech of May 15 has had effect of causing parties to intensify their efforts find unity on single national candidate so as to increase pressure for elections. Given nature of party and individual rivalries this would be neatest trick of week, but if such efforts should prosper result might be turn toward Balaguer. Or an individual might be found whose name has thus far not appeared in speculation. Certain it is that, regardless of extent of political apathy in country at large, party leaders have no intention of giving triumvirate any peace or tranquillity. Giving the matter a purely pragmatic view, however, so long as Reid holds the support of the armed forces he will have his office and his opportunity. At present he has that support, and he works hard to keep it.

The Military Problem

21. Given the realities of the military position in the DOM Rep, Reid is in fact in the midst of a most discreet operation. He is softly stroking the military in hopes it will purr in response; so far it is docile, although it is an uncertain and dangerous instrument. He is simultaneously engaged in the delicate task of (1) reducing Trujillista influence (still strong, and Balaguer–oriented) and (2) removing from the general military establishment some of the undue privileges it enjoys, while at the same time striving to prevent a split among the several different factions which could easily deteriorate into armed conflict with unforeseeable consequences for the country. It is possible, of course, that he may slip off this tight rope and fall into the military pocket. It is quite probable that it will look that way from time to time, but I believe he is alert to this danger. In my opinion he deserves our sympathetic understanding in his effort to work out a more rational place in Dominican society for the men with the guns. He deserves it the more in view of the constant effort of some political elements to serve their own ends by inciting the military to more active intrusion in the affairs of state.

The Prospects

22. If our own activities meet with success—and we have a staff with good teamwork and high morale which is prepared to work hard at the job—some of this success will perhaps rub off on govt in power (as will failures). There is no way to get away from fact that any positive program our part will be taken by many as evidence our support of whatever regime in power at time. However, to serve our long-range interests in this country, I repeat the view that we should insofar as we can avoid tying our program to any one individual or administration and base it as much as possible on broad cooperation with private groups and community activities. Our approach should remain sufficiently flexible to enable us to cut loose from any particular govt formula that may develop badly. We should never cease to stress publicly that our activities are long-range and our interest the welfare of the whole Dominican people.

23. In this throbbing tropic atmosphere, where the realities are often sordid and the atmosphere usually oppressive, the situation does not seem to me to lend itself to brilliant theorizing or to elaborate operational plans which are dependent for their execution on sophisticated reactions simply not to be found in this politically primitive environment. Rather it seems to me we are faced with meeting each dayʼs problems as they arise, measuring them against our constant objectives and tackling them on that basis. We shall be misunderstood, and we shall be attacked by those who want revolution immediately and by those who want no changes at all. Our daily fare will probably contain as much failure as success, but with luck we may advance a bit now and then. Our problem is largely one of infusing as much reason as possible into an atmosphere in which reason has been resisted and defied for most of history.

24. With sufficient commitment on our part I believe the problem here is manageable, although I do not underestimate the difficulties and the uncertain prospects. We learned all too recently here that we do not, despite our great influence, have the last word; we are dealing with human material which does not always respond logically or even in its own long-range interests. When the chips are down it is the Dominicans who make their own final decisions—largely on the basis of their own self-generated pressures.

25. There are many larger problems than the Dominican one, and many which would appear to be basically more insoluble. But the Dominican Republic is on our doorstep and, let us have no illusions, the Dominican problem is urgent.

Bennett

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, FN 2 DOM REP. Secret; Limit Distribution.
2. Not found.