Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

45. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic¹

Washington, April 30, 1965, 11:36 a.m.

695. Following are high points of US policy towards current crisis:

1. Last night OAS Council called for a cease-fire.² You should therefore use your influence to persuade Junta forces that no useful purpose will be served by rash or ill-advised military action. This does not mean of course that they should not defend themselves against attack. Their most important immediate risk is to preserve their existence as organized Dominican force as base for earliest possible effective expansion.

2. Junta should understand that crisis is entering a political phase and they should make every effort to capitalize on their position as the only existing organized authority in the Dominican Republic. They should use this position in order to ensure that OAS action will not result in ascendency of communist groups to political power in the Dominican Republic. Our tactics will be designed to support Junta in the achievement of this objective.

3. We are seriously concerned with change in Junta attitude regarding role of US military forces. It may be that Junta believes that US intends to attack and eliminate rebel forces in the city. US immediate objective is to establish safety zone referred to in last nightʼs OAS Council resolution. In so far as US military forces in San Isidro are concerned, immediate objective is to secure their position there and Ozama bridges leading to it. Strictly FYI: Subject to later developments, second phase of plan would be to establish a defensive line around rebel held portion of city so as to contain them there and give Junta forces opportunity to rest and re-group and to establish its authority over balance of city and countryside. End strictly FYI.

4. You should point out to Junta leaders that OAS last night made an “urgent appeal” to “permit the immediate establishment of international neutral zone of refuge encompassing the geographic area of the City of Santo Domingo immediately surrounding the Embassies of foreign governments”. Point out to Junta that our hope is that the establishment of such a zone by US forces will not be opposed by rebel forces and that such a zone will considerably reduce the perimeter which the Junta itself is obliged to defend. Junta cooperation to this end is essential.

5. You should solicit assistance Diplomatic Corps to carry out last nightʼs appeal of COAS for cease-fire and for establishment of safety zone.

Rusk

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. V, 5/19/65–5/31/65. Secret; Flash. Drafted and approved by Mann.
2. By request of the United States, the OAS Council of Ministers met on April 29 in Washington from 10 p.m. to 2:30 a.m. and adopted two resolutions. The second called for an immediate cease-fire and the establishment of “an international neutral zone of refuge” in the Santo Domingo area. This resolution was introduced by the United States and was adopted by a vote of 16 to 0, with 4 abstentions (Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela). (American Foreign Policy Current Documents, 1965, pp. 958–959) The first resolution adopted called, in part, for a “Meeting of the Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OAS May 1, 1965” and “to approve as the agenda for this Meeting the serious situation created by the armed strife in the Dominican Republic.” This resolution, introduced by Chile, was adopted by a vote of 18 to 1 (Uruguay), with 1 abstention (Dominican Republic). (Department of State Bulletin, May 17, 1965, p. 739)