Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

369. Memorandum of Meeting¹

Washington, May 27, 1968, 10:10 a.m.

PRESENT

• The President
• Ambassador of Haiti, Arthur Bonhomme
• Assistant Secretary of State, Covey T. Oliver
• William G. Bowdler

Ambassador Bonhomme opened the conversation by saying he had come at the express direction of President Duvalier. He then made an indirect criticism of the State Department for the delay in getting the appointment,² noting that he had asked for it one hour after the landings at Cap Haitien but had been referred to Assistant Secretary Oliver.

The Ambassador made protestations of Duvalierʼs high regard for the President. He referred to the President having “loosened the strangulation” of Haiti. To illustrate the point, he referred to the education loan granted by the IADB.

Ambassador Bonhomme then recited general complaints about exile activities against Duvalier. He said most of the action was in the United States, but it also goes on in Curacao, the Bahamas and Europe. The State Department was aware of all this. He admitted that six months ago, an expedition had been stopped in Miami by U.S. authorities, but the plotting continued. The implication here was that the State Department was not cracking down as hard as it could.

On the Cap Haitien incident, he claimed his Government had facts that U.S. aircraft flown by U.S. pilots and other U.S. military equipment had been used in the invasion. He noted that Haitian exiles, prior to and after the invasion broadcast programs from the U.S. calling for the overthrow of Duvalier. He added his government had tapes. He said there is evidence of Castro Cuban involvement and made a murky reference to the possibility of another missile crisis over Haiti if exiles, with Cuban support, were to succeed, as Castro had done with his twelve followers.

During this part of the conversation, the President interrupted to say he was not aware of any evidence of U.S. involvement. He asked Mr. Oliver and Mr. Bowdler if they had such information. Mr. Bowdler noted we had asked the Ambassador and his government for such evidence, but so far it has not been forthcoming.

Referring to Haitiʼs request for UN Security Council action, Ambassador Bonhomme said Duvalier had given him instructions not to attack the United States. He would present evidence on the equipment used by the Haitian exiles and from whence they came. He admitted that the Cap Haitien invasion had been staged from the Bahamas and not from U.S. territory. He was vague on the action he would ask of the Security Council, saying the UN could recommend that states prevent the type of activities which have been directed against Haiti.

The President asked Mr. Oliver and Mr. Bowdler if they had any comments. Mr. Oliver pointed out that Haiti, in going directly to the UN Security Council, had by-passed the OAS—the body to which it should have gone with its evidence and complaint. Mr. Bowdler recalled that when we had hard evidence last year on the Miami-based invasion, we stopped it cold and got convictions. In this complaint, the Haitians say they have evidence, but have not given it to us; and we cannot act except on the basis of facts.

In closing, the President told the Ambassador he could not tell President Duvalier what to do, but it was regrettable that he had not brought his complaints to the body where we handle hemisphere differences. He reminded the Ambassador that we can act only on the basis of solid evidence, and the quicker it is furnished, the quicker we will be able to assess it and act accordingly.

WGB

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. V. Confidential. Drafted by Bowdler. The meeting was held in the Presidentʼs office.
2. Telegram 170497 to Port-au-Prince, May 24, reported Ambassador Bonhommeʼs meeting with Katzenbach that day during which Bonhomme said he had instructions to give President Johnson a message from Duvalier. Katzenbach asked for the “facts” of U.S. involvement in the bombing and invasion. When Bonhomme “went on in typical rambling fashion” about the operation being launched from the Bahamas, Katzenbach observed that this meant that the Haitian Government did not think the attack had come from the United States. Bonhomme replied to both issues that the “facts are for the Security Council, not for you.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL HAI-US)