Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

346. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee¹

Washington, June 15, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Haiti—The Danger and Possible Pre-emptive Action

I. Assessment of the Situation

The danger inherent in the Haitian situation may require preemptive action of an urgent nature if U.S. interests are to be served. It may flare without warning, following any one of three separate developments which the U.S. Government is presently powerless to prevent. They are:

(a) An invasion by leftist-led Haitians known to be serving with the rebel forces in the Dominican Republic, known to have arms at their disposal, and known to have the intent.

(b) An internal revolt led by members of Duvalierʼs entourage, with or without Communist backing from the outside, which might well be forthcoming.

(c) The sudden demise of Duvalier, resulting in a power struggle in which none of the contestants would be acceptable, and which might be won by the best-organized opposition forces inside Haiti, the Communists.

II. Warning Signals

There are reliable reports that Haitian Communists outside the country have recently accelerated their organizational activities.

Haitians in Paris and in French universities, numbering in the hundreds, are being wooed by the Communists among them, reportedly to demonstrate to the French Communist Party that the financial support being channelled to them from Moscow is justified.

Haitian students in West Germany, both Communists and non-Communists, are being invited to Prague for quick indoctrination courses.

A group in Caracas is allegedly expecting support from the Communist movement in Venezuela.

Radio Havana continues its inflammatory barrage in the Creole language, exhorting Haitians inside the country to revolt against Duvalier and the U.S., whom they treat as a single oppressor.

There are unconfirmed reports that small quantities of arms have been smuggled to the Communists in Port-au-Prince.

Plotters are reported to be at work in inner circles of the Haitian government where Communist sympathizers are tolerated.

Reports on Duvalierʼs health run the gamut from indigestion to his death. He may safely be considered in questionable health.

III. The Problem

To reduce, or eliminate, the possibility of an invasion of Haiti by leftists in the Dominican Republic.²

To constitute a contingency force composed entirely of Haitians which could be moved swiftly to Port-au-Prince to preserve order and protect a provisional government of our own choosing following Duvalierʼs disappearance.³

To prevent a take-over by Communists or Communist sympathizers now in positions of power in Duvalierʼs government, should they, or other unacceptable elements, trigger an internal revolt.

To explore quick means of approach in time of crisis to the Chief of Staff of the Haitian Army in order to gain army backing of the provisional government against the National Security Volunteers (VSN) and the Ton Ton Macoutes (TTM).

IV. Proposal

[4 paragraphs (37½ lines of source text) not declassified]

V. Advantages

It is believed that the action suggested above would:

(a) materially reduce the possibility of an invasion of Haiti by leftist-led elements in the Dominican Republic by usurping the manpower and isolating the leaders;

(b) allow the constitution of a pre-emptive force of Haitians under competent Haitian officers for quick transfer to Port-au-Prince in case Duvalier dies or is overthrown by internal revolt;

(c) diminish the capability of Communist agitators to foment trouble by appealing to those men of military age among the Haitian population of the Dominican Republic;

(d) improve the morale of the key officers in the Haitian army who know the exile officers who would be involved and feel some solidarity with them. It might do more to assure an army on which reliance could be placed in time of crisis than any move that could be made at present.

VI. Disadvantages

Disadvantages might be:

(a) [2 lines of source text not declassified];

(b) the creation of an organization with a will and capability to act against Duvalier; its purpose may conflict with U.S. policy, and it may be difficult to deter.

VII. Diplomatic Action

As a separate action to be undertaken immediately at the time of Duvalierʼs disappearance, it has been agreed that the U.S. ambassador make contact with General Gerard Constant, the Haitian Army Chief-of-Staff and tell him that if he can keep the army together and maintain order, the U.S. will guarantee his safety and arrange the arrival in Port-au-Prince of Haitian civilian leaders now in exile, in accordance with a listing to be negotiated with him on the spot. It is suggested that the ambassador explore with the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] ways and means of making swift, sure contact when the need arises. It is believed that Constant would be more amenable and have more chance of successfully controlling the army if the suggested action [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is approved, as noted in paragraph IV (4) above.

VIII. Attributability

It is believed that all the action proposed in this paper can be undertaken without revealing the hand of the United States Government.

1. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Records. Secret; Eyes Only. In a June 23 memorandum to Thompson, attached but not printed, Vaughn recommended that Thompson support the CIAʼs proposal in the 303 Committee.
2. A June 28 memorandum from Williams to Vaughn transmitted the minutes of the 303 Committee meeting of June 25. During the 303 meeting FitzGerald reported the recent deaths of Andre Riviere and a Haitian émigré leftist fighting in the Dominican Republic, and suggested that the threat of a takeover by leftist exiles was no longer as likely. (Ibid., Country File, Haiti)
3. [text not declassified]