Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

341. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaughn) to the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes)¹

Washington, May 13, 1965.

SUBJECT

• The Impact in Haiti of the Dominican Crisis

In the two and a half weeks since the fall of the Reid Cabral government, the Dominican crisis has had only a very limited impact on the situation in Haiti. This could change quickly however if the several Haitian exile activists now serving with the Dominican rebel forces should succeed in obtaining rebel logistic support for an invasion of Haiti.

Immediate Impact

Relations with the Dominican Republic

From the outset of the Dominican crisis, official Haitian reaction has been one of ill-disguised fear that Juan Bosch, or someone answerable to him, might gain control of the government in Santo Domingo. Haitian officials have seized eagerly on the leftist infiltration of the present pro-Bosch forces as a pretext for their fears, and have underscored again and again their willingness to go along with any move to brand Bosch a threat to the security of the hemisphere. As a practical matter, Haitiʼs fear of Bosch has little to do with the issue of Communism and is based primarily on Boschʼs association with leaders of the non-Communist left, principally Figueres, Betancourt, and Munoz Marin, all of whom are openly and loudly critical of the Duvalier dictatorship to the point of having pressed for OAS censure of the regime. Bosch himself, during his brief tenure in office, permitted Haitian exiles to launch two probes against Haiti from Dominican soil.

Haitian Exile Groups

Usually reliable sources report that Haitian exiles living in Santo Domingo obtained a sizeable quantity of weapons when the Dominican rebels stormed the Fortaleza Ozama on April 30. Among these exiles were two individuals who participated in Dominican-based guerrilla invasions of Haiti in June and August of 1964. These two, plus their French military advisor, are currently members of Colonel Caamanoʼs inner circle according to recent reports. The acquisition of arms and of influential new Dominican contacts materially changes the power position of these exiles. The Reid Cabral government had disarmed and/or interned most of these exiles under pressure from the OAS. To date there are no indications that the exiles have organized themselves for an invasion but they have reportedly expressed their intention of doing so as soon as the situation permits.

Relations with the U.S. and the OAS

The immediate practical effect of Haitiʼs newly revived fear of Bosch has been to mute the otherwise predictable criticism of the use of U.S. military forces in Santo Domingo and to soften, temporarily, Haitiʼs perpetual attempts to blackmail the U.S. in OAS meetings. During the current Meeting of Consultation, Haitiʼs fears have dictated support for the U.S. position, without haggling. At the same time, however, there are indications that Duvalier may soon attempt to trade on his “cooperation” and on the proximity of the Dominican crisis to make a bid for the resumption of large-scale U.S. aid. Even before the start of the Dominican crisis, Foreign Minister Chalmers said he believed it would be useless for the forthcoming Rio OAS conference to discuss “the strengthening of representative democracy” without giving attention to the underlying question of “reinforcing the respective economies”.

Internal Repercussions

There is no evidence that security measures have been tightened in Haiti nor that the border garrisons have been reinforced. There have been reports that one of the two Haitian Communist parties (the PPLN) and several other small, disorganized opposition groups—all of which are clandestine—have discussed the implications for Haiti of the Dominican crisis but there has been nothing to indicate that any group plans overt action on the face of Duvalierʼs ruthless repressive tactics. Aggressive broadcasts by Radio Havana, in Creole to Haiti, urging Haitians to back the Dominican rebels, have had no visible effect.

The Haitian economy, chronically shaky and recently in a state of near paralysis, has not been affected by the Dominican situation.

Possible Impact in the Next Few Months

One of the most obvious possibilities for the near future is that the Haitian exiles now serving with the Dominican rebels may attempt an invasion of Haiti under cover of the present confusion in Santo Domingo.

If these exiles should find themselves able to move, they could well succeed in bringing Duvalier down with as few as 300 well equipped men. Their failure to do so in 1964 can be ascribed in large part to the lack of support from the Dominican side of the border, lack of trained manpower (no invasion group numbered more than 30 or 40), and a lack of suitable equipment.

In 1964, despite the exilesʼ poor logistics and support, Duvalier was unable to effectively control the invasion areas for four months (July through early November). The exiles now in the best position to mount an invasion, i.e., those in Santo Domingo, have had no pronounced ideological orientation but reportedly have drawn closer to leftist groups in recent months for lack of support from other quarters.

Ambassador Timmonsʼ assessment of Duvalierʼs probable reaction to this and to other factors in the situation is set forth in the attached telegram (Port-au-Prince 1489, May 11, 1965).² While it is possible, as stated in the Embassy assessment, that Duvalier might accept or even welcome U.S. military intervention in the event of an invasion, such intervention would almost certainly create serious difficulties for the U.S. in terms of hemisphere opinion and would be likely to backfire within Haiti after a short time, given Haitiʼs vivid memories of the U.S. Marine occupation of 1915–1934.

1. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Records. Secret.
2. Telegram 1489 from Port-au-Prince, May 12, reported Timmonsʼ discussions with Chambers and Raymond, and Timmonsʼ analysis that Duvalier favored an authoritarian regime in the Dominican Republic, as far to the right as possible. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP)