Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

335. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Caribbean Affairs (Crockett) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann)¹

Washington, November 23, 1964.

SUBJECT

• The Multiple Dilemma in Formulating U.S. Policy on Haiti

PREMISE

(1) Continuation of the brutal Duvalier dictatorship and maintenance by the U.S. of even minimal relationships with it are disadvantageous to the United States because:

(a) Continuing economic deterioration, moral decay and despair of another alternative work to the advantage of the communists. In addition, only the most clandestine opposition can hope to survive under Duvalier, a situation more suited to communist organization and tacts than to non-communist opposition.

(b) Haitian oppositionists, along with many of our own people and the people of the Hemisphere, are unwilling to concede that the U.S. interest is better served by the maintenance of even a minimal relationship with the Duvalier dictatorship as contrasted to the moral advantage to be gained by a complete U.S. withdrawal from Haiti.

(2) The maintenance of a U.S. presence in Haiti is in the U.S. interest because:

(a) The U.S. must be in the best position possible to protect the lives and property of its citizens in Haiti.

(b) Haiti has a voice in international forums (OAS, UN, etc.) which can be used for or against U.S. interests. Direct access to Duvalier is necessary in order to get maximum advantage for the U.S. from Haitiʼs vote and voice in international forums.

(c) We must be on the scene if we are to have maximum influence on the course of events in Haiti when Duvalier goes.

ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION

(1) Actively consort with Duvalierʼs opposition to overthrow him.

Advantages

The better Haitians, who are all in opposition to Duvalier, would be greatly heartened. Their bitterness toward the U.S. for tolerating Duvalier would be blunted. We would garner support for such a policy from many of our own people and the people of the Hemisphere who abhor Duvalier. If the policy resulted in Duvalierʼs overthrow, it would open the prospect for establishment of a less repugnant successor government.

Disadvantages

To undertake an interventionist policy such as this would be to assume very grave responsibility for the consequences. In the final analysis we can ensure the establishment and continuation of a less repugnant post-Duvalier government only if we are prepared to install and control it with force of arms if necessary. To undertake an interventionist policy in Haiti without being prepared to go the whole way to ensure its success would be to invite a double curse on our house, i.e., (a) to have intervened, and (b) to have failed.

An interventionist policy in Haiti would represent a major shift of U.S. policy in Latin America. Our enemies would exploit it to the fullest. Many of our friends would see in it a precedent involving much greater dangers to their interests than does Duvalierʼs continuation. We could expect major and continuing criticism.

Assuming we were prepared to bear the consequences in order to do something meaningful for the Haitian people, the needs are so monumental that even the unrestrained application of our resources could be expected to make only a modest impact for at least a generation. Thus, the initial and continuing foreign policy price would be great. The long-term cost to our economy would be very high. But demonstrable and real benefits would be quite small, at least through the mid-term.

(2) Work closely and fully with Duvalier despite his shortcomings.

Advantages

Substantial input of funds and technical assistance would alleviate the great suffering of Haitiʼs masses to some extent in the short run and would offer improved prospects for the countryʼs future. A substantial U.S. developmental effort might give us some leverage in softening Duvalierʼs brutal oppression of the Haitian people.

Disadvantages

All of the better elements of Haiti (who are in opposition to Duvalier) would decry such a policy as strengthening Duvalierʼs hand at home and abroad. Many of our own people and the people of the Hemisphere would denounce our support of a brutal dictatorship. Experience has demonstrated that Duvalier prefers to forego U.S. assistance unless he can get it on his terms and exploit it to his maximum advantage. This would minimize benefits accruing to the Haitian people while maximizing benefits to Duvalier and his supporters. Reactivation of an assistance program in Haiti would be taken as a sign of U.S. weakness by Duvalier and would probably provide little if any additional leverage in dealing with him.

(3) Maintain a U.S. presence in Haiti but make clear by word and deed our distaste for the Duvalier dictatorship.

Advantages

The U.S. position would be clear for all to see. We would satisfy most of those who criticize us for consorting with Duvalier. We would continue to enjoy a presence in Haiti.

Disadvantages

It is unlikely that Duvalier would long tolerate a U.S. presence in Haiti under these circumstances, but would force a confrontation offering two alternatives: (a) a softening of the policy, or (b) the expulsion of our Ambassador and possibly our entire mission. At the very least, our ability to exploit our presence in Haiti would be greatly circumscribed.

(4) Maintain a U.S. presence in Haiti on as normal a basis as conditions there permit, but deny Duvalier U.S. endorsement or economic assistance.

Advantages

Maintenance of a U.S. presence in Haiti on as normal a basis as possible permits maximum application of our influence in attaining our policy objectives. We will be on the scene and in a position to take quick and effective counter measures should a communist takeover threaten or occur either before or after Duvalierʼs demise.

Disadvantages

Maintenance of even limited relationships with the Duvalier dictatorship places us in an ambiguous position, especially for those who find it simpler to see all things in black and white. Criticism and bitterness will be engendered, creating problems for the U.S. now and in the future. Elements of the Haitian opposition who offer the best hope for the countryʼs future are estranged by such a policy. It is a difficult policy to implement because it has few tangible benefits for Duvalier. Consequently, he is constantly tempted to force a confrontation which might deny him the limited benefits he now enjoys over the short run but offers prospects of more tangible returns as the price for a future rapprochement. To stay this temptation, Duvalier must be kept in doubt about future U.S. intentions and the value which the U.S. places on maintaining a presence in Haiti.

CONCLUSION

Despite the disadvantages, Course of Action (4) is clearly the least unattractive of the alternatives open to the U.S.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 HAITI. Secret.