320. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Oliver) to the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Owen)1

SUBJECT

  • Comments on National Policy Paper for Cuba
1.
While I am in agreement with the general conclusions and recommendations of the second draft of the National Policy Paper on Cuba,2 I wish to emphasize that the carrying out of the recommended actions would require an extremely careful and subtle approach. This is necessary so that (a) we do not give the impression to Cuba and to the world that we have finally accepted the permanence of the Castro regime in an unchanged form, and (b) that we do not over-emphasize the “carrot” aspect in the carrot and stick approach. The draft does, of course, fully discuss the dangers in implementing the program.
2.
There is, however, one important new factor. Since the draft was first produced, internal conditions in Cuba have deteriorated strikingly. This trend has intensified even since the last draft was considered. This situation has been covered in other documents, including the first draft of the IRG paper on Cuba3 which is now being submitted. The point at hand here, however, is that the current deterioration in Cuba gives more hope than we have had for a long time that elements in the Cuban power elite may themselves conceivably be impelled within the near or at least foreseeable future to consider whether some drastic change does not have to be made in Cubaʼs posture toward the world (and even in the internal aspects) if Cuba is to survive. I therefore think that now and for some months to come we should be even more cautious in anything we do so as not to convey a seeming signal4 that we have [Page 752] finally accepted the permanence of the Castro regime just at a time when others, who have disagreed with our attitude in the past, may be acquiring real doubts as to the viability of the regime. It is a time for alert watchfulness and for sending of signals which encourage power elite elements to do something about Castro or some of his policies in the hope that they could reach accommodation with us, rather than a time to seem conciliatory toward the Castro regime as such.
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 73 D 191, Misc. Correspondence, FitzGerald, Apr–Jun 1968. Secret. Drafted by FitzGerald and Park F. Wollam (ARA/CCA) on June 3.
  2. See Document 322.
  3. Attached but not printed, the IRG Paper on Cuba, May 10, described a progressive decline in Cuba, including a shortage of consumer goods, a very poor sugar crop, a decline in Cuban productivity and foreign exchange earnings, public protest demonstrations, and anti-Castro wall writings. Also see Document 321.
  4. In a February 16 memorandum to Under Secretary Katzenbach, Oliver had proposed an easing of the administrative criteria with respect to licenses for export of pharmaceuticals to Cuba. Katzenbach approved this recommendation on February 23. However, in an April 30 memorandum to Rusk, Oliver recommended that this modification be deferred because “Intelligence and other reports indicate a striking deterioration in economic, psychological and other conditions in Cuba.” (Both in National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/CCA Files: Lot 73 D 245, The Secretary, 1968)