Office of the Historian

307. Memorandum From Peter Jessup of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson1

Washington, September 22, 1965.

SUBJECT

  • Status of Proposed Reactivation of US Paramilitary Activities Against Castro

On June 2, 1965, Admiral Raborn, in the forum of the 303 Committee, requested the reactivation of the paramilitary effort2 against Cuba on a highly selective basis. The CIA argued as follows:

1.
Castro is supporting and encouraging active or potential insurgent groups in 14 Latin American nations as well as several in Africa. Cuba is a privileged sanctuary within the Western hemisphere from which Communist subversive efforts are launched.
2.
Castro defiance of the US strengthens ultra-nationalist and pro-Communist movements in the hemisphere.
3.
Although time is on Castroʼs side, he is still vulnerable. Many divisive forces are at work within Cuba.
4.
Reactivation of selective paramilitary harassment at this time is our best means to cost him heavily in money and manpower at a highly critical time and reduce his capability to export revolution.
5.
CIA has in being a small paramilitary mechanism composed of Cubans which can mount carefully selected operations which can destroy installations and facilities with loss of life held to a minimum while economic damage is maximized.
6.
The program envisaged would include:
a.
sabotage of Cuban ships in Cuban ports
b.
maritime raids on coastal targets
c.
deception operations to keep Cuban defenses on costly alert.

The Department of State examined this proposal; the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (ARA) supported the CIA reasoning.3 They felt that of all possible methods, paramilitary activities have the best chance of creating within Cuba the political, economic, and psychological effects we seek. Reactivation of these operations would provide an unmistakable signal to all concerned of our continuing opposition to Castro. The stronger the regime becomes, the greater the difficulties and danger for US policy in Latin America.

ARA concluded that we can 1) continue our present “limited” policy and probably lose ground; 2) we can increase pressure and perhaps arrest and eventually reverse the forward movement of the Cuban regime; 3) we can move forward toward an accommodation.… Of these options, the policy of increased pressure provides the best protection of our position in Latin America.

On 30 August, the Secretary of State made known his views in the attached memorandum.4 He is “strongly opposed to resumption of such operations at this time” for reasons he makes clear in the attached single page memorandum.

On 20 September, Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance confirmed that he and Mr. McNamara hold the same opinion as Mr. Rusk.

Peter Jessup 5
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to Pres., McG Bundy, Vol.14. Secret. Sent to the President under a covering memorandum, in which Bundy “reluctantly” agreed with Rusk and McNamara, and asked the President whether he wished to “Let it go” or whether they “should take the matter up at an early lunch.” The President checked the latter option. A notation in Bundyʼs handwriting reads: “P.S. President heard negative argument on Sept. 29 and agreed to drop matter for now.”↩
  2. See footnote 2, Document 302.↩
  3. See Document 304.↩
  4. See Document 306.↩
  5. Bundy initialed under Jessupʼs signature.↩